Scott v. Scott
Decision Date | 14 June 1963 |
Docket Number | No. 399,399 |
Citation | 259 N.C. 642,131 S.E.2d 478 |
Parties | Donald SCOTT v. Roslyn Kern SCOTT. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, by Charles F. Vance, Jr., Winston-Salem, and Erdheim & Armstrong, New York City, for defendant-appellant.
McLennan & Surratt, Winston-Salem, and Weidlich & Rogers, New York City, for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendant's first assignment of error raised the question, does a resident judge have jurisdiction to pass upon a motion of nonsuit in chambers?
Since the enactment of Chapter 142, Public Laws of 1945, (now the first proviso in G.S. § 7-65) the answer has been YES. Prior thereto, it was NO. McIntosh, North Carolina Practice and Procedure (1st ed.) Section 630; Bynum v. Powe, 97 N.C. 374, 2 S.E. 170; McFetters v. McFetters, 219 N.C. 731, 14 S.E.2d 833.
Chapter 92, Public Laws of 1921, Extra Session (now G.S. § 1-209) gave the clerks of the Superior Court authority to enter judgments of nonsuit and certain other judgments. Thereafter, the authority of the clerk to enter judgments of nonsuit was concurrent with that of the judge at term. Hill v. Huffines Hotel Co., 188 N.C. 586, 125 S.E. 266; Caldwell v. Caldwell, 189 N.C. 805, 128 S.E. 329; Ward v. Agrillo, 194 N.C. 321, 139 S.E. 451. However, since February 14, 1945 a resident judge's jurisdiction to enter a voluntary nonsuit is not confined to term. By Chapter 78, Public Laws of 1951, the legislature amended G.S. § 7-65 to give similar powers to any Special Superior Court Judge residing in the district.
G.S. § 7-65 now provides, in part, as follows:
As pointed out in 23 N.C.L.R. 329, 330, the 1945 Legislature added the proviso in the above excerpt in consequence of the suggestion of Barnhill, J., later C. J., in his dissent in State Distributing Corporation v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 224 N.C. 370, 30 S.E.2d 377 (1944). At that time, in the opinion of Justice Barnhill, a resident judge had no jurisdiction at chambers to hear a cause upon an agreed statement of facts. G.S. § 7-65 then consisted only of the two sentences (minus the reference to special judges) preceding the proviso. Said Justice Barnhill:
'It confers concurrent jurisdiction on the resident judge only in those matters in which the Superior Court has jurisdiction 'out of term.' Actions pending on the civil issue docket are not included. Hence, the resident judge has no jurisdiction, and the judgment is without force in law. * *
Since the 1945 and 1951 amendments to G.S. § 7-65, this Court has held that a regular judge has jurisdiction to hear and determine in chambers an action involving title to a bank account in which the answer raised no issues of fact, Westcott v. First & Citizens National Bank, 227 N.C. 39, 40 S.E.2d 461; that a special judge in the county of his residence has jurisdiction to hear and determine a demurrer in chambers, Parker v. Underwood, 239 N.C. 308, 79 S.E. 2d 765, and to hear and determine a controversy without action, Spaugh v. Charlotte, 239 N.C. 149, 79 S.E.2d 748.
In all matters not requiring a jury, or in which a jury trial has been waived, the resident judge and any special judge residing in the district now not only have concurrent jurisdiction with the judge holding the courts of the district, but they may pass upon such matters in vacation, out of term or in term time.
G.S. § 7-65 conferred upon Resident Judge Johnston jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's motion for a voluntary nonsuit. He allowed the motion as a matter of right but refused to dismiss the action, presumably so that defendant might pursue her motion to amend her answer in order to assert an action against the plaintiff for alimony without divorce. Two questions now arise: (1) Was plaintiff entitled to take a voluntary nonsuit in his divorce action as a matter of right after notice that defendant intended to file a cross action for alimony without divorce but before it was actually filed; and (2) if so, the nonsuit having been entered, may defendant now amend her answer to assert such cross action?
The rule with reference to the right of a plaintiff to take a nonsuit is stated in McIntosh, North Carolina Practice and Procedure (2d ed.) Section 1645:
McKesson v. Mendenhall, 64 N.C. 502; Caldwell v. Caldwell, supra; Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Whiting Manufacturing Co., 209 N.C. 560, 184 S.E. 48; Sink v. Hire, 210 N.C. 402, 186 S.E. 494.
The defendant concedes this to be the general rule, but she contends that in an action for divorce a plaintiff's motion for voluntary nonsuit is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
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McCarley v. McCarley, 90
...rule of procedure has been recognized in domestic cases, Griffith v. Griffith, 265 N.C. 521, 144 S.E.2d 589 (1965); Scott v. Scott, 259 N.C. 642, 131 S.E.2d 478 (1963), and applied in Cox v. Cox, 246 N.C. 528, 98 S.E.2d 879 (1957). It appears to have been generally recognized in divorce cas......
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Fullwood v. Fullwood, 702
...both parties, made findings of fact with respect thereto, and awarded alimony to the wife. G.S. § 50--16; Scott v. Scott, 259 N.E. 642, 131 S.E.2d 478; Beeson v. Beeson, 246 N.C. 330, 98 S.E.2d 17. Error of law does not appear in the alimony In the husband's divorce action the wife interpos......
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Griffith v. Griffith, 287
...Carolina Index, Vol. 4, 'Trial,' § 29, p. 325. The rule applies to actions for divorce and alimony as in other cases. Scott v. Scott, 259 N.C. 642, 131 S.E.2d 478. In this case the defendant has not answered and has not assserted any claim or demanded any relief against the Apparently defen......