Scott v. State, 27292
| Decision Date | 05 October 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 27292,27292 |
| Citation | 192 S.E.2d 367,229 Ga. 541 |
| Parties | Lee SCOTT v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Insofar as § 26-801(b)(4) of the Criminal Code of Georgia renders one who does not directly participate in the commission of a crime a party thereto by reason that such party intentionally advised, encouraged, hired, or procured another to commit the crime, it embodies the theory of guilt by reason of such party having conspired in the commission of the crime, and it was not error in this case for the court to permit the district attorney to tell the jury in his opening statement to them that the State's case against the accused depended solely on conspiracy; nor was it error for the trial court to instruct the jury on the theory of guilt by reason of participation in a conspiracy as applied to this case.
2. The testimony of two alleged co-conspirators who actually participated in the robbery was admissible against the defendant.
3. The references to the appellate courts made by the trial court in its remarks to the jury were not calculated to weaken the jury's sense of responsibility in the performance of its duties, and did not constitute reversible error.
4. No instance of the trial court's 'constantly interrupting' counsel for the defendant, arguing with counsel and not permitting counsel to complete his objections is shown by the transcript to have occurred in the presence of the jury or called to this court's attention by appellant. Accordingly, the ground of enumerated error complaining of such conduct by the court is not meritorious.
5. The charge was not unduly repetitious as to the guilt of the accused.
6. No ruling of the trial court respecting alleged improper comments of the court made in the presence of the jury having been invoked, the ground of enumerated error complaining of such remarks presents nothing for this court to decide.
7. The evidence authorized the verdicts of guilty.
Dan C. Mitchell, Atlanta, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Atty., Joel M. Feldman, Morris H. Rosenberg, Carter Goode, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Asst. Atty. Gen., Courtney Wilder Stanton, and Richard S. Gault, Asst. Attys. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.
Lee Scott was jointly indicted with five other named invididuals, charged with the offense of armed robbery and in a separate indictment with the offense of aggravated assault upon the person of one Emeterio Alvarez. He plead not guilty on both indictments and upon his separate trial was found guilty as to both charged. His motion for a new trial on the general grounds and on several special grounds was overruled and he appealed.
The evidence showed that the accused was employed as a night steward by the Diplomat Restaurant in the City of Atlanta. As such, it was his duty to supervise the preparation and serving of the food by the restaurant personnel, to hire and fire kitchen help, including dishwashers, and generally to superintend the cleanup in the restaurant after it had closed for the day. The cash register wherein the money received in payment for the service of food to the restaurant's customers was held was in the kitchen area of the restaurant. The robbery occurred at about 1:30 o'clock on Sunday morning, November 29, 1971. The robbery itself was actually perpetrated by four individuals who had at one time or another worked in the restaurant as dishwashers employed by the accused Scott. Three of those charged had plead 'guilty' or had been tried and found guilty and, at the time of the trial, were serving sentences imposed upon them as a result thereof. One of the alleged perpetrators of the crimes had fled and had not been apprehended. The State's case against this defendant was based essentially on the theory that he had advised, encouraged, hired or counseled the four who actually committed the crimes to commit the robbery and had planned it and participated therein by giving a signal to the perpetrators so as to advise them when the time for their entry into the restaurant for the purpose of perpetrating the robbery was propitious. During the course of the robbery a gun in the hands of one of the perpetrators was discharged and Alvarez, who was captain in charge of the lounge, was struck and wounded.
1. In his opening statement to the jury, the assistant district attorney outlined the charges against the accused and followed with this statement: At that point, counsel for the defendant interrupted the assistant district attorney and objected to that statement. A colloquy ensued out of the presence of the jury in which counsel for the accused contended that the accused was not charged with the crime of conspiracy but with the offenses of armed robbery and aggravated assault, and that to mention the word 'conspiracy' was highly prejudicial to the defendant's interest. He moved for a mistrial on this ground. The court denied that motion, and that ruling formed the basis for one of the grounds of the appellant's motion for a new trial. In one of the other grounds of his motion he complains of the charge of the court to the jury in which the court submitted to the jury the theory of conspiracy as it related to the charges against the defendant. Appellant's contention in this regard is that under Ch. 26-32 of the Criminal Code of Georgia conspiracy is made a separate and distinct crime; that the accused was not charged under that chapter, and that to submit to the jury the question of conspiracy had the effect of permitting them to consider a charge against the defendant which had not been made by the State. There is no merit in this contention.
Prior to the passage of the Act approved March 18, 1968 (Ga.L.1968, p. 326), except as provided in former Code § 26-1901 relating to conspiracy to falsely charge another with the commission of a crime, there was no separate crime of conspiracy in Georgia. The provisions of the 1968 Act which were repealed by the enactment of the Criminal Code of Georgia were substantially embodied in Ch. 26-32 of that Code which became effective on July 1, 1969. It is manifest from a reading of that chapter of the Criminal Code of Georgia that it was the intent of the legislature to make conspiracy itself a separate crime only in cases where the crime conspired to be committed had not in fact been committed, that is, where the conspiracy had been, so to speak, 'nipped in the bud.' Section 26-801 of the Criminal Code of Georgia defines parties to a crime and provides that every person concerned in the commission of a crime is a party thereto and may be charged and convicted of the commission of the crime. Insofar as is material to this case, that section provides that a person is concerned in the commission of a crime if he intentionally aids or abets in the commission of the crime, or advises, encourages, hires, counsels or procures another to commit the crime. While this Code section does not use the word 'conspiracy' it is plain that it embodies the theory of conspiracy insofar as it renders one not directly involved in the commission of a crime responsible as a party thereto. Under the evidence in this case,...
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