Scott v. Texaco, Inc.
| Decision Date | 19 January 1966 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Christine SCOTT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. TEXACO, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 28883. |
Jerry B. Riseley, Studio City, for appellant.
Schell & Delamer, Richard B. Goethals, and Abe Mutchnik, Los Angeles, for respondent Texaco, Inc.
Gilbert, Thompson & Kelly, and Jean Wunderlich, Los Angeles, for respondent Kelley.
Bernard Patrusky, Los Angeles, for respondent Smead.
Christine Scott, a passenger in a Chevrolet, brought suit against the driver of a Renault, the driver of a Volkswagen, and Texaco, Inc., the owner of a tanker truck for personal injuries arising out of a multivehicle automobile accident.
Events started when the Renault went out of control at night on the downhill curve of a two-lane transition road connecting two Los Angeles Freeways, turned over, and came to rest in the left lane. Mrs. Scott's Chevrolet stopped in the left lane about two car-lengths behind the Renault, and four to six other automobiles stopped behind it in the same lane. Mrs. Scott got out of her automobile in order to warn other vehicles of the accident and get flares from the trunk. While on the highway she waved her hand at approaching cars and shouted, 'A wreck, a wreck.' Two cars in the right lane saw her wave. One slowed down and then drove on. The other, a Volkswagen, slowed or stopped in the right lane in response to her signal. At that moment, a fully-loaded Texaco gasoline truck came around the curve of the transition road, found both lanes blocked 150 feet ahead, applied its brakes, but was unable to stop until after it had struck Mrs. Scott, the Chevrolet, and the Volkswagen.
Mrs. Scott contended the Renault driver, Kelley, was negligent in allowing his car to overturn on the transition road, the Volgswagen driver, Smead, was negligent in stopping in the right-hand lane, and the operator of the Texaco truck was negligent in running into her, the Chevrolet, and the Volkswagen. Each defendant denied negligence and pleaded Mrs. Scott's contributory negligence. The jury returned a verdict for all defendants, and Mrs. Scott has appealed.
Mrs. Scott contends it was prejudicial error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury that she was a rescuer and as a rescuer not barred from recovery by contributory negligence unless she acted rashly and recklessly.
The point she brings before us involves an exception to the general rule that a plaintiff's own negligence which contributes in any way to an accident bars recovery for damages against a negligent defendant. Under the exception, a plaintiff injured while attempting to rescue someone else from danger is not bound to a standard of ordinary care but may be allowed to assume extraordinary risks and to perform acts which might be considered negligent in other circumstances.
Essentially, the rescue rule expands the risks which a rescuer may properly take in order to save a third person in danger from harm. Conduct which ordinarily might be held negligent may not necessarily be so considered when performed by a rescuer in an effort to save another from bodily injury. (Petersen v. Lang Transportation Co., 32 Cal.App.2d 462, 467-468, 90 P.2d 94; Hymes v. Pollock, 108 Cal.App.2d 536, 638, 238 P.2d 1056; Bilyeu v. Standard Freight Lines, 182 Cal.App.2d 536, 545-546, 6 Cal.Rptr. 65. It has been said that only conduct which amounts to rashness and recklessness will defeat the right of a rescuer to recover for personal injuries against a negligent defendant. (Petersen v. Lang Transportation Co., 32 Cal.App.2d 462, 467, 90 P.2d 94.) 'It seems quite clear that the rule in question is quite different from the ordinary rules of contributory negligence with respect to the degree of care required of the acting party. In the ordinary case any negligence, no matter how slight, will defeat recovery but in this exceptional case such negligence must amount to rashness or recklesseness. As was said in Eckert v. Long Island R. Co., 43 N.Y. 502, 3 Am.Rep. 721: 'The law has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute negligence to an effort to preserve it, unless made under such circumstances as to constitute rashness in the judgment of prudent persons.'' (Petersen v. Lang Transportation Co., 32 Cal.App.2d 462, 467, 90 P.2d 94, 97.)
Plaintiff sought an instruction which would have allowed the jury to conclude she was a rescuer, and we think an instruction on this subject should have been given, either in the form suggested by Lang Transportation or as a further definition of contributory negligence on the part of a rescuer. If the jury found that Mrs. Scott was reasonably acting as a rescuer, then only rash and reckless conduct on her part would amount to contributory negligence and bar her recovery against a negligent defendant.
In weighing the case against Kelley, the Renault driver, the jury unquestionably needed the benefit of instructions on the rescue rule. There was evidence to show that Kelley had been arguing with his wife and as a result of the argument had lost control over his vehicle, conduct which would clearly from the basis for a finding that he had been negligent. His initial negligence triggered the sequence of events which followed and made him potentially liable for all injuries which proximately resulted from it. Whether this negligence was a proximate cause of the second accident or whether an independent intervening cause such as negligence on the part of Mrs. Scott cut off the force of Kelley's original negligence was a question for the jury to determine under proper instructions. (Carter v. Pickering, 1951, 191 Va. 801, 62 S.E.2d 856; Champagne v. A. Hamburger & Sons, 169 Cal. 683, 147 P. 954; Bilyeu v. Standard Freight Lines, 182 Cal.App.2d 536, 6 Cal.Rptr. 65; Merrill v. Buck, 58 Cal.2d 552, 563, 25 Cal.Rptr. 456, 375 P.2d 304; Lacy v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 220 Cal. 97, 29 P.2d 781.)
The jury may also have needed rescue instructions in considering the case against Texaco. It may be argued that rescue...
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