Scott v. Younts

• Decision Date: 11 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 13-94-487-CV,13-94-487-CV
• Citation: 926 S.W.2d 415
• Parties: Michael Davis SCOTT, Appellant, v. Shirley Elaine YOUNTS, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 415

926 S.W.2d 415

Michael Davis SCOTT, Appellant, v. Shirley Elaine YOUNTS, Appellee.

No. 13-94-487-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas Corpus Christi.

July 11, 1996.

Rehearing Overruled Aug. 15, 1996.

William A. Dudley, Cook, Dudley & Associates, Corpus Christi, for Appellant.

Ann E. Coover, Coover & McCrossin, Corpus Christi, for Appellee.

Before YANEZ, CHAVEZ and RODRIGUEZ, JJ.

OPINION

YANEZ, Justice.

Michael D. Scott brings this appeal contesting the modification of his child support obligations. The trial court increased the appellant's monthly child support obligations from $700 to $2500 based on changes in the needs and circumstances of the child and other parties affected by the child support order. We affirm.

Mr. Scott ("appellant") and Shirley Elaine Younts ("appellee") were never married, but had a child, Elaine Marie, out of wedlock. Mr. Scott did not provide any support to the child for the first two years of her life. After the child turned two years old, Mr. Scott was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $300 per month, which was subsequently increased to $700 per month. Mr. Scott did not have visitation rights to the child at any time, but he apparently did make timely payments. In March 1994, Ms. Younts filed suit again, seeking to modify the existing child support order. Ms. Younts stated in her motion that the existing order was no longer in compliance with the Family Code, ¹ and that an increase in support would be in the child's best interests. In a cross action, Mr. Scott moved to be appointed possessory conservator of the child.

After hearing testimony on each motion, the trial court on June 17, 1994, appointed appellant as possessory conservator with certain restrictions, and also ordered him to pay $2,500 per month in support of his daughter. The court based the modification of support on 1) the proven needs of the child, 2) the ability of the parents to contribute, and 3) the amount of possession and access to the child. The court did not quantify or delineate what the proven needs of the child were. Appellant moved for reconsideration, and in the alternative moved for a new trial on both orders. The court granted a hearing on his motion regarding possession and access, but denied rehearing the support modification. After the hearing on appellant's motion, the court on September 30, 1994, vacated the original order, and modified the possession order. With regard to the support order, the court maintained the $2,500 per month support order and added that it found the total proven needs of the child to be $3,250 per month.

Appellant requested that the court make findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to the Family Code § 14.057. In response, the court made numerous findings regarding the child's needs and the financial status of each parent. It found that appellant's net monthly resources were approximately $25,240 per month, and Ms. Younts' net monthly resources were $900. The court also found most of the mother's requests to be needs of the child, and calculated the proven needs of the child at $3200 per month. ² The court then allocated responsibility between the parents in meeting those needs as follows: Ms. Younts would provide $700 per month, and Mr. Scott would pay $2,500 towards those needs. Appellant requested the court to make specified additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, but the court declined to do so.

By six points of error, appellant challenges the court's modification of his support obligations. In points one through three, appellant alleges that the trial court abused its discretion in increasing the child support from $700 to $2500 per month. He also alleges that the court erroneously considered appellant's history of voluntary support provided, as well as the increased needs, standard of living, and lifestyle of the child's custodial parent as factors in calculating appellant's obligations. In points four and five, appellant complains about the adequacy of the findings entered by the court, and the sufficiency of the evidence to support those findings. In his sixth point, appellant contends the court erred in refusing to supersede its judgment and stay enforcement pending appeal.

The issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts of this case in setting the child support order. Appellant contends that the court did not follow the procedures dictated by the Family Code for modifying the support order, and therefore the order should be either reversed and rendered, or reversed and remanded. Essentially, appellant complains that the appellee merely presented the court with a wish list of things for her child, and because the appellant was wealthy enough to pay for them, the court ordered the support increased beyond what the Code permits. Thus, we must first consider how support orders may be modified when an obligor's net resources exceed $6000 per month, and second, we must determine whether the court acted within the parameters provided by the Family Code.

THE FAMILY CODE

The Family Code permits courts to modify child support orders whenever there has been a material and substantial change in the circumstances of the child, or a person affected by a support order, and the modification is in the best interests of the child. TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. §§ 14.08 & 14.056(a). ³ In determining whether a material and substantial change in circumstances warrants a modification, courts may refer to the child support guidelines listed elsewhere in the Code. Id. § 14.056. The Code also specifically prevents courts from considering certain things as grounds for modification: namely, any increase in needs, standard of living or lifestyle of obligee, any history of voluntarily provided support, and net resources of new spouses. Id. § 14.056(a),(b) & (c).

The "guidelines" referred to in § 14.056 instruct the courts to consider various factors when ordering child support, based in part on the net resources and abilities of the parties, as well as the needs of the child. Id. §§ 14.052(b) & 14.054. A court may deviate from the guidelines when their application would be inappropriate or unjust under the circumstances. Id. § 14.055(a).

The Code provides a bifurcated analysis in setting child support, depending on whether an obligor has net monthly resources below or above $6,000. Although the court may consider a wide range of factors in setting support obligations for persons who earn less than $6,000 in net monthly resources, the Code provides a much narrower method for calculating the support obligation when an obligor's net monthly resources exceed $6,000, as they do in this case. Id. § 14.055. At the time the motion for modification was filed, and the decision rendered, the relevant provision of the Code read as follows:

Section 14.055 GUIDELINES: AMOUNT ORDERED

(c) In situations in which the obligor's net resources exceed $6,000 per month, the court shall presumptively apply the percentage guidelines in Subsection (b) of this section ⁴ to the first $6,000 of the obligor's net resources. Without further reference to the percentage recommended by these guidelines, the court may order additional amounts of child support as appropriate depending on the income of the parties and the proven needs of the child. The proper calculation of a child support order that exceeds the presumptive amount ... requires that the entire amount of the presumptive award be subtracted from the proven needs of the child. After the presumptive award is subtracted, the court shall allocate between the parties the responsibility to meet the additional needs of the child according to the circumstances of the parties. ⁵

(emphasis added). In other words, the court must first determine what the proven needs of the child are. If the needs of the child exceed the presumptive award, the court must subtract the presumptive award from those needs. The presumptive award for a single child would be 20% of the first $6,000 of the obligor's net monthly resources, or $1,200. TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 14.055(b). Any support ordered in excess of $1,200 may only be based on the unmet needs of the child. The court may consider the circumstances of the parties in allocating the burden of meeting the child's needs in its support order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court has discretion to set child support within the parameters established by the child support guidelines set forth in the Family Code. Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 860 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Tex.1993). A trial court's decision in this regard will not be overturned unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Id.; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 805 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles; in other words, whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex.1990). The appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, even if it would have reached a different result. See Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223 (Tex.1991).

THE EVIDENCE

At the hearing, Ms. Younts testified about the current needs of the child. She also presented the court with two lists: 1) a list of her current expenditures ⁶ and 2) a list of items which she believed would either be necessary or beneficial to her daughter, but which she could not currently afford. ⁷ Appellant did not specifically object to the presentation of either of these lists or their contents during the hearing. Ms. Younts also testified that she had lost her job, was doing temporary work, and that her savings had dwindled in the years preceding the suit due to her child's increasing expenses. The court also heard evidence regarding the appellant's gross income, which, in the year preceding the hearing, totaled $436,400.

We now consider whether the court acted...