Scotten v. Landers
| Citation | 190 Colo. 27,543 P.2d 64 |
| Decision Date | 08 December 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. C--608,C--608 |
| Parties | Billie L. SCOTTEN, Petitioner, v. Leora V. LANDERS, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Montgomery, Little, Young, Ogilvie, Campbell & McGrew, P.C., Robert R. Montgomery, Denver, for petitioner.
Taussig & Cobb, John G. Taussig, Jr., Paul Snyder, Jr., Boulder, for respondent.
Certiorari was granted to review the decision of the court of appeals in Landers v. Scotten, 34 Colo.App. 387, 528 P.2d 931. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Petitioner, Billie L. Scotten, was successful in the trial court in defending against a claim brought by respondent Leora V. Landers for damages for personal injuries which arose out of a two-car collision. The defense was based on a general release given by Landers in consideration of $600, which expressly provided that Landers released and discharged Scotten from any and all claims '* * * on account of or in any way growing out of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries * * *' resulting from the automobile collision.
Trial was to the court. Scotten stipulated to his liability and evidence was presented in support of the claim for damages for personal injuries. The court found that as a result of the automobile collision Landers incurred medical expenses in the amount of $2,076.99 and sustained damages for pain and suffering in the amount of $3,500.
The evidence concerning the execution of the release showed that at the time of the release the only known injuries to Landers consisted of fractured ribs and bruises. Actually, Landers had incurred, as a result of the accident, a ruptured spleen. This injury was asymptomatic and unknown to the parties at the time of the execution of the release. A few days thereafter, symptoms from this injury became evident. Landers was hospitalized and the injury to the spleen was diagnosed. The damaged spleen was then surgically removed.
The trial court found that before the execution of the release the plaintiff had ample opportunity to consult her own physician, who diagnosed her injuries as transient rather than permanent in nature; that these matters were freely and openly discussed between the parties; that the injury to the spleen was unknown by both parties at the time of the execution of the release; that there was a discussion of the important parts of the release, but that there was no specific discussion concerning the possibility of unknown injuries; that there was no suggestion of fraud or evidence of overreaching, and that the release was openly and fairly arrived at by the parties; that the consideration of $600 was adequate and reasonable in view of the injuries known to the parties at the time; and that there were no equitable grounds upon which to set aside the release. The court concluded in law that the mutual mistake of fact as to the unknown injury to the spleen was not sufficient to set aside the release in view of the specific provision in the release which purported to release claims for unknown injuries.
We agree with the court of appeals that the trial court's conclusion of law was erroneous and not in accord with our decisions concerning the voidability of a release in personal injury cases where there exists a mutual mistake of a material fact concerning the nature of the personal injuries involved. In McCarthy v. Eddings, 109 Colo. 526, 127 P.2d 883, the court adopted the rule promulgated by the Restatement of the Law, Torts, § 900, that a release obtained as a result of a mutual basic mistake may be set aside as ineffective and is not a defense in an action of tort. This rule was recently reaffirmed in Davis v. Flatiron Materials, 182 Colo. 65, 511 P.2d 28, and was followed in Locke v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, 309 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1962). The mutual mistake must relate to a present existing fact or to a past fact and does not extend to mistaken opinions as to the future course of recovery from...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bennett v. Shinoda Floral, Inc.
...signing a release were fractured ribs and bruises was later discovered to have a ruptured spleen, requiring surgery. Scotton v. Landers, 190 Colo. 27, 543 P.2d 64 (1975). A passenger in an automobile accident was originally diagnosed to have one or two cracked or bruised ribs. He later disc......
-
Gleason v. Guzman
...result from her injury." The court of appeals reached an opposite conclusion, finding this case indistinguishable from Scotton v. Landers, 190 Colo. 27, 543 P.2d 64 (1975) and holding that "there was evidence upon which the trier of fact could well conclude that the settlement was based on ......
-
IN RE DOW CO. SARABOND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LIT., MDL 711. Civ. A. No. 86-K-680.
...claim of a mutual mistake of fact. Rather, there was nothing more here than a mutual mistake of opinion. See Scotten v. Landers, 190 Colo. 27, 543 P.2d 64, 66 (1975); Davis v. Flatiron Materials Company, 182 Colo. 65, 511 P.2d 28, 31 ...
-
Guzman v. Gleason, 78-087
...past fact and does not extend to mistaken opinions as to the future course of recovery from known injuries. Later, in Scotton v. Landers, 190 Colo. 27, 543 P.2d 64 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the trial court had erred in not setting aside a release. There, the only known injuries we......
-
Inadequate Disclosures to Clients: Malpractice Pitfall
...of informed consent may well result in compensable claims in the future. NOTES _____________________ Footnotes: 1. Scotten v. Landers, 190 Colo. 27, 543 P.2d 64 (1975). 2. Id. 3. Goff v. Boma Investment Co., 116 Colo. 359, 181 P.2d 459 (1949). 4. Haack v. Loft, 19 Colo. 74, 34 P.2d 568 (189......