Scrougham v. State

Decision Date31 December 1990
Docket NumberNo. 49A04-9007-CR-355,49A04-9007-CR-355
Citation564 N.E.2d 542
PartiesLeo L. SCROUGHAM, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Reginald B. Bishop, Roberts & Bishop, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Ian A.T. McLean, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

CHEZEM, Judge.

Case Summary

Defendant-Appellant, Leo L. Scrougham, appeals from his convictions for Rape (class B felony), Sexual Battery (class D felony), and Confinement (class D felony). We affirm.

Issues

Defendant presents one (1) issue for our review, which we restate as follows:

Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions for Rape, Sexual Battery, and Confinement.

In addition, State raises the question of "whether this case must be remanded for re-sentencing on the ground that Sexual Battery is a lesser-included offense of Rape."

Facts and Procedural History

At approximately 8:00 a.m. on July 7, 1989, D.T. went to visit her friend Dawn Crockett at the home of Defendant. Crockett was living there with Defendant's son, Harold Scrougham. D.T. went to the home that day to check on Dawn's health (she suffered a miscarriage several days earlier). D.T. entered without knocking or ringing the bell because they had told her to do so on prior occasions. With respect to the Defendant, D.T. thought of him "as a second father," and thought she "could trust him." D.T. was sixteen years old at this time.

Upon entering the home, D.T. called out for both Harold and Dawn. When they did not answer, D.T. called out for the Defendant. Defendant emerged from his bedroom, told D.T. that Harold and Dawn were not there, and asked D.T. to come into his bedroom so he could talk to her. D.T. went into the bedroom and sat on the bed, as requested by Defendant. Defendant then asked D.T. if she had ever had sex with anyone in her family, to which D.T. responded "no." While D.T. tried to ignore Defendant, he continued to ask questions about sex. He then stated "I haven't had any for six years since my wife died," and "I wish I had you once."

Defendant next instructed D.T. to reach under the corner of his mattress and retrieve some magazines. When she complied, D.T. discovered that they were "porno books." She immediately put them down and said she would not look at them because she "was brought up in a Christian home." Defendant then told D.T. to "reach down and feel his penis." D.T. refused, got up from the bed, and tried to leave. Defendant grabbed her, forced her back onto the bed, took her clothes off, and then he fondled and raped D.T. At first D.T. "tried getting away," "tried fighting him," and "tried biting him," but eventually she gave up because Defendant was hurting her. She was no match for Defendant, who weighed approximately 300 pounds at the time.

While Defendant was raping D.T., the telephone rang. Before he answered it, Defendant clamped his hand over D.T.'s mouth to keep her from screaming for help. After completing the telephone conversation, Defendant went to the bathroom and got dressed. D.T. grabbed her clothes and went to the kitchen where she called her best friend Danielle Johnson. D.T. told Danielle that she "just got molested by Harold's dad." Harold and Dawn came home several minutes later, and Harold testified that "[it] [t]ook her like tenminutes before she stopped crying where she could talk, she was crying so hard, for her to tell." Defendant had already left the house by this time.

On July 21, 1989, the Marion County Prosecutor's Office filed an Information, which charged Defendant with Rape (class B felony), Sexual Battery (class D felony), and Confinement (class D felony). Defendant was found guilty of these charges at the conclusion of the jury trial on January 31, 1990.

Discussion and Decision
I

Defendant argues that "the State did not present sufficient evidence of probative value to prove [that] he committed the charged crimes." In particular, Defendant argues that "the convictions were based on the victim's testimony which was inherently unbelievable." As stated by Defendant:

[D.T.'s] testimony was disjointed and unbelievable. First it is unbelievable that a sixteen year old girl would sit on the bed of the father of her friend at 8:00 a.m. and discuss sex and not think anything about it. Additionally, it is unbelievable that after the alleged attack [D.T.] did not attempt to leave the house but instead called her friend. Even more incredible is the fact that after reporting the alleged rape to her teacher, [D.T.] returned to the SCROUGHAM home. Her reasoning that she returned because MR. SCROUGHAM was not there is further evidence of the incredible [sic] unbelievable nature of her testimony.

Additionally, it is unrealistic to believe that someone who has been raped would hang around the scene of the rape, call friends on the phone and then after leaving return to the crime scene to see friends.

We initially note that the convictions in this case appear to rest primarily upon the testimony of D.T. Nevertheless, the uncorroborated testimony of the victim is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction. See, Ellis v. State (1988), Ind., 528 N.E.2d 60, 61; Jones v. State (1983), Ind., 445 N.E.2d 98, 100. In addition, the law is well-established that a court reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. It is the jury's responsibility to determine whether testimony is contrived, and to generally judge the credibility of witnesses. Accordingly, we "will not in any way impinge on that responsibility unless confronted with 'inherently improbable' testimony, or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of 'incredible dubiosity.' " Bedwell v. State (1985), Ind., 481 N.E.2d 1090, 1092. We consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict, together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, and if there is evidence of probative value to support the verdict, it will not be disturbed. O'Connor v. State (1988), Ind., 529 N.E.2d 331, 332; Clark v. State (1987), Ind.App., 512 N.E.2d 223, 227.

Defendant first claims that "it is unbelievable that a sixteen year old girl would sit on the bed of the father of her friend at 8:00 a.m. and discuss sex and not think anything about it." With respect to this claim, Defendant has mischaracterized D.T.'s testimony and taken it out of context. He ignores the fact that D.T. was a friend of the family who was given liberal access to the household. In addition, he ignores the fact that D.T. "trust[ed] him," and thought of him "as a second father." When her testimony here is considered in proper context, it is not "unbelievable." D.T. went over to Defendant's house to check on the health of her friend Dawn. She went into the bedroom only at the request of Defendant, who said he had something to tell D.T. Once in the bedroom, D.T. did not "discuss sex" with Defendant. Instead, Defendant tried to get D.T. to discuss the subject, but she refused. D.T. testified that she felt uncomfortable and tried to ignore Defendant.

Defendant next claims that "it is unbelievable that after the alleged attack [D.T.] did not attempt to leave the house but instead called her friend." Once again, Defendant has failed to provide the proper context of testimony at trial. He ignores the fact that D.T. was not raped by a stranger; she was raped by her "second father." After an attack, one is more likely to flee from a stranger than a friend or relative. In addition, other than the rape itself, D.T. was not physically harmed by Defendant. She also knew the rape was over when Defendant went into the bathroom and got dressed. In other words, D.T. could have reasonably assumed that the danger to her was over for the moment. With respect to the fact that D.T. "called her friend," we note that she did so immediately after the rape. During that conversation, D.T. told her friend that she "just got molested by Harold's dad." Harold and Dawn then came home to find D.T. "crying so hard" it took her ten (10) minutes to stop. The testimony at trial established that Defendant had left the house by this time.

We next address the claim that "[e]ven more incredible is the fact that after reporting the alleged rape to her teacher, [D.T.] returned to the SCROUGHAM home." This testimony is not incredible or unbelievable. D.T. knew that Defendant would not be there when she returned. In addition, she sought the help of her friend Dawn, who assisted her in getting to St. Francis Hospital. Once at the hospital, D.T. called her family and told them about the rape. She initially did not want to involve the police because she had been raped before and knew what she would have to go through.

Lastly, Defendant argues that D.T.'s testimony about the rape is "unbelievable" because "[a]t trial the defense offered uncontroverted evidence from an unbiased witness which placed MR. SCROUGHAM in his vehicle at the time of the alleged rape." This is a misrepresentation of the record. First, the witness in question was not necessarily "unbiased," as she had been a friend of Defendant's family for approximately twenty-five (25) years. Second, the witness' testimony did not conclusively establish that Defendant was in his car when the rape allegedly occurred. The witness testified that she called Defendant at approximately 7:55 a.m. and requested that he come over and give one of her tenants a ride so she could obtain food stamps. She testified that the trip to her place would take Defendant between fifteen (15) to thirty (30) minutes, depending on traffic conditions. He arrived there at 8:21 a.m. On the other hand, D.T. testified on cross-examination that she arrived at Defendant's house between 7:40 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. Upon arrival, she immediately went into the bedroom at the request of Defendant. The rape occurred shortly thereafter,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • Watkins v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • May 21, 1991
    ... ... 35-42-4-3(b) are two separate and distinct crimes, neither of which is a lesser included offense of the other. The evidence in that case consisted of photographs depicting the defendant and victim in poses involving fondling and cunnilingus. Cf. also, Scrougham v. State (1990), ... Page 1268 ... Ind.App., 564 N.E.2d 542, trans. denied (holding constitutionally proper to sentence on rape and sexual battery convictions where evidence showed defendant "fondled and raped" victim). We find Buck to be directly on point here where the State charged Watkins ... ...
  • Austin v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • November 18, 1992
    ... ... 532, 382 N.E.2d 893, 897: ... The focus of a proper double jeopardy analysis must be on whether or not the offenses to be prosecuted and punished are the same, not whether the offenses spring from the same act or operative circumstances ...         See also, Scrougham v. State (1990), Ind.App., 564 N.E.2d 542, trans. denied ...         The definition and elements of Robbery are set forth in Indiana Code 35-42-5-1. The statute provides that the State must prove at trial that Defendant "knowingly or intentionally t[ook] property from another person or ... ...
  • Bigbee v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • July 30, 1992
    ... ... Accordingly, the crime in question is not an "included" one, and there is no double jeopardy problem here. See, Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306; Elmore v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 532, 382 N.E.2d 893, 897; Scrougham v. State (1990), Ind.App., 564 N.E.2d 542, 546, trans. denied ...         Defendant next argues he was denied effective assistance of counsel. In particular, he claims "his appointed trial counsel [failed] to properly prepare and defend against the charges of armed robbery and carrying a ... ...
  • Griffin v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • December 31, 1991
    ... ... Hansford v. State (1986), Ind., 490 N.E.2d 1083." Id. Inasmuch as child molesting as fondling and touching with ... intent to gratify includes all the same elements of sexual battery, the applicability of Bowling and Watkins are apparent as is the implicit overruling of Scrougham v. State (1990), Ind.App., 564 N.E.2d 542, trans. denied ...         In Scrougham this court held separate convictions and sentences for rape and sexual battery arising from a single confrontation did not violate the protections afforded by the double jeopardy clauses of the United States ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT