Scruggs v. Baltimore & O.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 09 November 1936
• Docket Number: Ag. No. 18.
• Citation: 4 N.E.2d 878,287 Ill.App. 310
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois
• Parties: SCRUGGS v. BALTIMORE & O. R. CO.

287 Ill.App. 310

4 N.E.2d 878

SCRUGGS

v.BALTIMORE & O. R. CO.

Ag. No. 18.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Nov. 9, 1936.

Appeal from Circuit Court, St. Clair County; Maurice V. Joyce, Judge.

Action by Ines Scruggs against the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company. From a judgment for defendant on directed verdict, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed. Beasley & Zulley, of East St. Louis, for appellant.

Kramer, Campbell, Costello & Wiechert and John C. Roberts, all of East St. Louis, for appellee.

EDWARDS, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair county in favor of defendant, rendered upon a verdict directed in its favor upon the trial of the cause.

It appears from the evidence that on May 27, 1934, appellant, who was the plaintiff below, with three companions started from East St. Louis about midnight for O'Fallon, the home of plaintiff. They had attended a show in Belleville, after which they drove to a tavern in East St. Louis, and then proceeded toward O'Fallon over the concrete highway known as United States Route No. 50. In the front seat of the car plaintiff was riding with the driver, Edgar H. Brockhahn, her former husband; in the rear were Lillian Owens, who at the time of the accident was a married woman named Mrs. Layman, and William Hollman. Just outside the westerly limits of O'Fallon the highway is intersected by a line of railway owned by the Illinois Terminal Company, and used occasionally by the defendant.

On the night in question, defendant, while switching over this line of railroad, stopped its train, leaving some box cars standing upon the crossing, without light, watchman, or other signal to warn of their presence. About the only disputed point in the evidence is whether these cars occupied and obstructed the crossing for more than ten minutes, in violation of section 70, c. 114, Smith-Hurd's R.S.1935, which provides that in no case shall such obstruction continue for more than ten minutes. The evidence upon this proposition is conflicting. Plaintiff contends that such obstruction of the crossing for a period of time exceeding ten minutes was negligence on the part of the defendant. Whether such is true, as a matter of law, it is not questioned by the defendant; hence it is not necessary for us to pass upon the point.

Plaintiff and her companions were approaching the crossing from the west, riding, as they testify, with the dimmer lights on. They had been going about 40 miles per hour, and about a quarter of a mile from the crossing slowed down to 20 miles an hour. It was a clear night at the time, and the moon was shining brightly. The photographs in evidence disclose that there were no buildings, trees, hedges, or other objects near to the crossing which would have the effect of darkening or casting a shadow upon it or otherwise affecting the visibility at such point, and that the view of the crossing from the west was clear and unobstructed.

Plaintiff states that she had lived in O'Fallon for four years, was familiar with the crossing, and had passed over it many times prior to the accident. She further said that from her position in the front seat of the car she was looking straight ahead, that her eyesight was good, and that she could see 40 or 50 feet ahead; that she knew the lights were on dim, but did not speak to the driver of such fact; and that she did not see the box cars until within 20 or 25 feet of them.

It appears from the testimony that the occupants of the car were conversing as they rode along in approaching the crossing, and that there were the usual cross-arm warning signs at the crossing. The car crashed against the side of one box car, injuring plaintiff, and to recover damages therefor she instituted this suit.

As before observed, the court, at the close of all the evidence, directed a verdict for defendant. The chief controversy seems to be whether under the circumstances the conduct of plaintiff, just prior to and at the time of the accident, was such as to charge her, as a matter of law, with negligence contributing proximately to her injury, or whether the circumstances were such that the question should have been submitted to the jury as one of fact.

At the time in question the statute, section 17, c. 95 1/2, Smith-Hurd's R.S., required that motor vehicles upon the public highways, during the period from one hour after sunset to sunrise, should carry two lighted lamps showing white lights, or lights of a yellow or amber tint, visible at least 200 feet in the direction the motor vehicle was proceeding. It has been held that the violation of this section is prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the driver. Johnson v. Kushler, 269 Ill.App. 553;Johnson v. Gustafson, 233 Ill.App. 216.

The...