Dimond v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis

• Decision Date: 28 June 1940
• Docket Number: 36560
• Citation: 141 S.W.2d 789,346 Mo. 333
• Parties: Belva D. Dimond v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, a Corporation, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

141 S.W.2d 789

346 Mo. 333

Belva D. Dimond v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, a Corporation, Appellant

No. 36560

Supreme Court of Missouri

June 28, 1940

Motion for Rehearing Overruled June 28, 1940.

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. Michael J Scott, Judge.

Reversed.

Carleton S. Hadley, Walter N. Davis and Arnot L Sheppard for appellant.

(1) Respondent's evidence wholly fails to make a prima facie case, was in no wise aided by appellant's evidence, and appellant's peremptory instruction requested at the close of all the evidence was erroneously refused, because, (a) Under the evidence appellant was guilty of no negligence. Coleman v. C., B. & Q. Ry. Co., 287 Ill.App. 489; Cash v. N. Y. C. Ry. Co., 294 Ill.App. 393; Thomson v. Stevens, 106 F.2d 739; Reines v. C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 195 Wash. 146, 80 P.2d 406; Ullrich v. Columbia & C. Ry. Co., 189 Wash. 668, 66 P.2d 856; Bledsoe v. M., K. & T. Ry Co., 149 Kan. 741, 90 P.2d 16; Bowers v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 65 N.D. 384, 259 N.W. 104; Nadasky v. Pub. Serv. Ry. Co., 97 N. J. L. 400, 117 A. 478; Morris v. A. City Ry. Co., 100 N. J. L. 328, 126 A. 295; L. & N. Railroad Co. v. Mischel's Admx., 272 Ky. 295, 114 S.W. 115; Northern Pac. Railroad Co. v. Bacon, 91 F.2d 173; Chesapeake & O. Railroad Co. v. Switzer, 122 S.W.2d 968; Everetts v. Pa. Ry. Co., 198 A. 796; Wink v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 116 Pa.Super. Ct. 376, 176 A. 60; So. Ry. Co. v. Lambert, 160 So. 262; Sheets v. Baldwin, 146 Kan. 596, 73 Pa. (2d) 37; Dolan v. Bremner, 263 N.W. 798; McParlan v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 273 Mich. 527, 263 N.W. 734; Ausen v. M., St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 258 N.W. 511; Morley v. C., C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 194 N.E. 806; Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. v. Dillon, 1 W. W. Harr. 247, 114 A. 62; Bell Cab Co. v. N. Y., N. H. & H. Ry. Co., 199 N.E. 726; Olson v. Railroad Co., 193 Minn. 533, 259 N.W. 70; Jones v. A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 282 Pa. 593; Gage v. Boston & Me. Ry. Co., 77 N.H. 289, 90 A. 855; Orton v. Penn. Ry. Co., 7 F.2d 36; Jacobson v. N. Y. Ry. Co., 94 A. 577; Pa. Ry. Co. v. Huss, 180 N.E. 919; Simpson v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 276 Mich. 653, 268 N.W. 769; Kypfer v. T. & P. Ry. Co., 88 S.W.2d 528; Gulf, etc., Railroad Co. v. Halifield, 120 So. 750; Yardley v. Rutland Ry. Co., 153 A. 195; N. Y. C. Railroad Co. v. Casey, 14 N.E.2d 714; N. Y. C. Railroad Co. v. Dyer, 14 N.E.2d 718; Dyer v. N. Y. C. Railroad Co., 14 N.E. 719, 17 N.E.2d 839; C., C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Gillespie, 173 N.E. 708; Gilman v. Cent. Vt. Ry. Co., 93 Vt. 340, 107 A. 122; Scarborough v. L. & N. Ry. Co., 276 Ky. 292, 124 S.W.2d 88; Mabrey v. U. P. Ry. Co., 5 F.Supp. 397; Driskell v. Powell, 67 F.2d 484; Sisson v. So. Ry. Co., 68 F.2d 403; Jones v. T. & P. Ry. Co., 154 So. 768; Probert v. C. I. & L. Ry. Co., 93 F.2d 259; Burkhead v. Penn. Ry. Co., 275 Ky. 841, 122 S.W.2d 970; Scott v. D., L. & W. Ry. Co., 226 N.Y.S. 291; M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. McClain, 105 S.W.2d 206; Texas & N. O. Ry. Co. v. Stratten, 74 S.W.2d 741; Gallagher v. Montpelier & W. River Ry. Co., 100 Vt. 299, 137 A. 207; Sullivan v. Boone, 286 N.W. 350; Webb v. Oregon W. R. & Nav. Co., 195 Wash. 155, 80 P.2d 409; Rose v. A. Coast Line, 197 S.E. 857; Sessoms v. A. Coast Line Ry. Co., 208 N.C. 844, 182 S.E. 112; Goldstein v. A. Coast Line Ry. Co., 203 N.C. 166, 165 S.E. 337; McGlauflin v. Boston & Me. Ry. Co., 230 Mass. 431, 119 N.E. 955; Crosby v. Great N. Ry. Co., 187 Minn. 263, 245 N.W. 31; Jacobson v. N.Y.S. & W. Ry. Co., 87 N. J. L. 378, 94 A. 577. (b) Crossing protection signals such as wig-wags, blinking lights, crossing bells or crossing watchmen, whether required by statute or common law, are not intended to warn travelers on the highway of the presence of trains which are already on the crossing, but only of trains which are approaching crossings. Coleman v. C., B. & Q. Ry. Co., 287 Ill.App. 483; Bell Cab Co. v. N. Y. N. H. & H. Ry. Co., 199 N.E. 726; Wink v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 116 Pa. S.Ct. 376, 176 A. 761; Morley v. C., C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 194 N.E. 811; Bowers v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 85 N.D. 384, 259 N.W. 99; Dolan v. Bremner, 263 N.W. 798; Reives v. C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 195 Wash. 146, 80 P.2d 406; Crosby v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 187 Minn. 267, 245 N.W. 32; Olson v. C. & G. W. Ry. Co., 193 Minn. 533, 259 N.W. 71; Thompson v. Stevens, 106 F.2d 743. (c) Respondent was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Met. Trust & Sav. Bank v. C., B. & Q. Ry. Co., 150 Ill.App. 407; Johandes v. C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 260 Ill.App. 328; Scruggs v. B. & O. Ry. Co., 287 Ill.App. 310; State ex rel. K. C. S. Railroad Co. v. Shain, 105 S.W.2d 915; Highton v. Penn. Ry. Co., 1 A.2d 570; Serfas v. Lehigh & New England Ry. Co., 270 Pa. 306, 113 A. 370; Kilgore v. So. P. Ry. Co., 50 P.2d 116; Dolan v. Bremner, 263 N.W. 798; Philadelphia & R. Railroad Co. v. Dillon, 114 A. 62; Kypfer v. T. & P. Ry. Co., 88 S.W.2d 528; Fannin v. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 200 N.W. 651; C., C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Gillespie, 173 N.E. 714; Wichita Valley Railroad Co. v. Fite, 78 S.W.2d 714; Mabrey v. U. P. Ry. Co., 5 F.Supp. 397; Inkret v. C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 86 P.2d 13; Chipman v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 114 S.W.2d 14; Mailhot v. N. Y., N. H. & H. Ry. Co., 273 Mass. 277, 173 N.E. 422; Burnett v. L. & N. Ry. Co., 58 Ga.App. 64, 197 S.E. 663; Central of Ga. Railroad Co. v. Adams, 39 Ga.App. 577, 147 S.E. 802; Tidwell v. A. B. & C. Ry. Co., 42 Ga.App. 744, 157 S.E. 525; Brinson v. Davis, 32 Ga.App. 37, 122 S.W. 643. (d) Conceding for argument only that defendant was negligent, its negligence was not the proximate cause of respondent's injury. Gage v. Boston & Me. Ry. Co., 77 N.H. 289, 90 A. 855; Orton v. Penn. Ry. Co., 7 F.2d 36; Pa. Ry. Co. v. Huss, 180 N.E. 919; Simpson v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 276 Mich. 653, 268 N.W. 769; Bowers v. G. N. Ry. Co., 65 N.D. 384, 259 N.W. 99, 104; Gilman v. Cent. Vt. Ry. Co., 93 Vt. 340, 107 A. 122; Hendley v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 198 Wis. 569, 225 N.W. 205; Mabrey v. U. P. Ry. Co., 5 F.Supp. 397. (e) The following cases have permitted plaintiffs to go to the jury, under circumstances similar to those which appear of record here: Poehler v. Lonsdale, 129 S.W.2d 59; Coil's Admx. v. C., St. L. & N. O. Ry. Co., 232 Ky. 33, 22 S.W.2d 428; L. & N. Ry. Co. v. Mahoney, 200 Ky. 30, 294 S.W. 777; Scarborough v. L. & N. Ry. Co., 276 Ky. 292, 124 S.W.2d 91; Central of Ga. v. Heard, 36 Ga.App. 332, 136 S.E. 533; Shelley v. Pollard, 55 Ga.App. 88, 189 S.E. 570; Mallett v. So. P. Ry. Co., 20 Cal.App. (2d) 500, 68 P.2d 281; Roshel v. L. & M. Ry. Co., 112 S.W.2d 876; Hofstedt v. So. P. Ry. Co., 1 P.2d 470; Spiers v. A. Coast Line Ry. Co., 174 S.C. 508, 178 S.E. 136; Richard v. Me. Cent. Ry. Co., 168 A. 811; Dickey v. A. Coast Line Ry. Co., 196 N.C. 726, 147 S.E. 15; Short v. Penn. Ry. Co., 46 Ohio App. 77, 187 N.E. 737; Mann v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 43 Ga.App. 708, 160 S.E. 131; Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Marti, 183 S.W. 846; Prescott v. Hines, 114 S.C. 262, 103 S.E. 543; Myers v. A. Coast Line Ry. Co., 172 S.C. 236, 173 S.E. 812; Rober v. So. Ry. Co., 151 S.C. 459, 149 S.E. 257; Elliott v. M. P. Ry. Co., 227 Mo.App. 225, 52 S.W.2d 448; Rape v. Tennessee A. & G. Ry. Co., 47 Ga.App. 96, 169 S.E. 764; Orange & N. W. Railroad Co. v. Harris, 57 S.W.2d 931; M., K. & T. Railroad Co. v. Long, 293 S.W. 184; Compton v. Texas & N. O. Ry. Co., 96 S.W.2d 239; Christensen v. Willamette Valley Ry. Co., 139 Ore. 666, 11 P.2d 1060; Licha v. N. P. Ry. Co., 201 Minn. 427, 276 N.W. 813; Squyres v. Baldwin, 191 La. 249, 185 So. 14. (2) The court erred in permitting the witness Toensfeldt to express to the jury his conclusions upon the ultimate matters in controversy here, as well as upon matters which are not subject to expert testimony. Cole v. Uhlman Grain Co., 340 Mo. 277, 100 S.W.2d 322; Nagyar v. Penn. Ry. Co., 294 Pa. 585, 144 A. 765.

William R. Schneider for respondent.

(1) Miles v. Am. Steel Foundries, 23 N.E.2d 754. Recognizes exception. Holds: "One cannot recover for driving his automobile into side of train standing across crossing, except under extraordinary or unusual circumstances." Conditions at crossing not similar to case at bar. Coleman v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 287 Ill.App. 483. Facts not similar. Nothing unusual about crossing. Headlight of engine was shining over cars on crossing. View unobstructed for at least 150 feet. Driver thoroughly familiar with crossing. Was traveling twenty to twenty-five miles an hour. (a) This Coleman case cites with approval Crosby v. Great Northern Ry., 187 Minn 263, 245 N.W. 31, which recognizes the exception when it states: "Undoubtedly cases do and will arise where a railroad company, because of peculiar and unusual facts and circumstances render the situation extrahazardous, must in the exercise of reasonable care do things which are not required by statute." Citing a number of earlier Minnesota cases and a most illuminating note in 60 A. L. R., 1110 to 1116, to same effect. (b) Coleman case cites, Morris v. Atlantic City Ry. Co., 100 N. J. L. 328, 126 A. 295. Facts not similar. Nothing unusual about crossing. Fog impenetrable beyond hood of truck. Court, recognizing exception, said: "To sustain a verdict in such a status, it must reasonably appear that the damage resulted by reason of the nonperformance by defendant of some duty imposed by law." (c) Coleman case cites, Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. v. Dillon, 114 A. 62. Nothing unusual about crossing, "unobstructed highway." Could, after seeing train through illumination of headlights, have stopped auto in time to avoid striking train. Facts not similar. Gage v. Boston etc., which recognizes exception. Gilman v. Cent. Vt. Ry. Co., 93 Vt. 340, 107 A. 122. Nothing unusual about crossing. Facts not similar. Driver skidded into train because...