Scruggs v. Henderson
| Decision Date | 31 July 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 17757.,17757. |
| Parties | Sam Reed SCRUGGS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden, Tennessee State Penitentiary, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Sam Reed Scruggs, in pro. per.
David W. McMackin, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Tenn., Nashville, Tenn., on the brief, George F. McCanless, Atty. Gen., State of Tenn., of counsel, for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, EDWARDS and COMBS, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal by a prisoner, who now is incarcerated in the Tennessee State Penitentiary, from an adverse decision rendered against him in the district court.
Appellant was convicted in the criminal court of Davidson County, Tennessee, in 1953 under three indictments charging highway robbery and received a total sentence of from twenty to thirty-four years. In September 1962 these sentences were commuted to ten to twenty-four years and appellant was paroled on October 9, 1962.
While on parole in 1963, appellant was convicted in the criminal court of Davidson County on eleven charges of burglary and received a total sentence of not less than six nor more than thirteen years. The State trial court ordered these sentences to begin on the date of appellant's delivery to the keeper of the prison.
T.C.A. § 40-3620 provides that a parolee who is convicted of a felony while on parole must serve the remainder of the sentence from which he was paroled, or such part of that sentence as the Board of Pardons and Paroles may determine, before he commences serving the sentence affixed while on parole. Pursuant to this statute, appellant is now serving the remainder of his 1953 sentences.
Appellant filed a "Petition for Declaratory Judgment" in the district court, challenging the constitutionality of T.C.A. § 40-3620 on the ground that this statute is invalid as violative of the doctrine of separation of powers. District Judge William E. Miller treated the petition as an application for habeas corpus, correctly holding that the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, cannot be used as a substitute for habeas corpus. Olney v. State of Ohio, 341 F.2d 913 (C.A.6); Forsythe v. State of Ohio, 333 F.2d 678 (C.A.6).
District Judge Miller denied the application for habeas corpus, saying:
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Shaw v. Garrison, Civ. A. No. 68-1063.
...of Parole & Probation, 384 F.2d 238 (9th Cir., 1967); Booker v. State of Arkansas, 380 F.2d 240 (8th Cir., 1967); Scruggs v. Henderson, 380 F.2d 981 (6th Cir., 1967); United States ex rel Bennett v. People of the State of Illinois, 356 F.2d 878, 879 (7th Cir., 1966), cert. den. 384 U.S. 946......
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Robinson v. Leahy
...the exhaustion requirement merely by changing the form, as opposed to the substance, of the relief requested. E.g., Scruggs v. Henderson, 380 F.2d 981 (6th Cir. 1967); Hogan v. Lukhard, 351 F.Supp. 1112 (E.D.Va.1972). A 42 U. S.C. § 1983 cause of action is ordinarily not subject to the same......
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Grayson v. Eisenstadt, Civ. A. No. 68-1098.
...Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 Col.L.Rev. 1201, 1205 (1968). 10 Ruip v. Kentucky, 1968, 6 Cir., 400 F. 2d 871; Scruggs v. Henderson, 1967, 6 Cir., 380 F.2d 981, 982; Booker v. Arkansas, 1967, 8 Cir., 380 F.2d 240, 242-243; United States ex rel. Bennett v. Illinois, 1966, 7 Cir., 356 F.2d 87......
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Clausell v. Turner
...prison." Forsythe v. Ohio, 333 F.2d 678, 679 (6th Cir. 1964). See also Ruip v. Kentucky, 400 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1968); Scruggs v. Henderson, 380 F.2d 981 (6th Cir. 1967); Olney v. Ohio, 341 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. Katzenbach v. McClung, supra, must be read as rejecting the broad scope of jurisdi......