Scrutchfield v. Sauter

• Decision Date: 27 November 1893
• Citation: 24 S.W. 137,119 Mo. 615
• Parties: SCRUTCHFIELD v. SAUTER et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

24 S.W. 137

119 Mo. 615

SCRUTCHFIELD v. SAUTER et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

November 27, 1893.

VENUE — RELIEF AGAINST EXECUTION — QUIETING TITLE — ESTOPPEL — WIFE'S SEPARATE PROPERTY — RESULTING TRUST.

1. Under Rev. St. § 4967, relating to relief against executions, suit for such purpose can be brought only in the court which issues the execution; but where suit is brought by one not a party to an execution, to stay the same and establish title in the plaintiff to land levied on, and the injunction is denied, the court in whose district the land is situated has jurisdiction.

2. Where goods for the use of the family were bought by the wife, but credit therefor was given to the husband, as had been the custom between the parties for years, the wife is not estopped, when a judgment is obtained against the husband therefor, from claiming certain land standing in his name as her own; she not having knowingly concealed her title, and the seller not having given the husband credit because of such land.

3. Under Rev. St. § 8922, relating to the competency of husband and wife as witnesses, a wife, being the real party in interest, is competent for all purposes except as to communications from her husband.

4. Where a husband reduces his wife's property to possession before the married woman's act of 1876, a subsequent restitution by deed of gift is valid; and when the land so conveyed is afterwards sold, and the proceeds used by the husband in the purchase of lands which he does not reduce to possession in the manner provided by the statute, he holds the legal title to the same in trust for his wife.

Appeal from circuit court, Cooper county; E. L. Edwards, Judge.

Bill by Martha A. Scrutchfield against Fred Sauter, Jones P. Adams, and M. L. Scrutchfield to enjoin the sale of certain land under execution. Decree for complainant. Defendants appeal. Affirmed.

D. W. Shackleford, for appellants. John Cosgrove and J. H. Johnston, for appellee.

MACFARLANE, J.

Defendants were partners doing business in Boonville prior to the year 1887. During the years 1885 and 1886, M. L. Scrutchfield, husband of plaintiff, became indebted to them for goods sold his wife, the plaintiff, and his daughter. Upon this indebtedness they recovered a judgment against the husband of plaintiff in the circuit court of Moniteau county on the 9th day of June, 1889, for $153.28. On the 13th day of June, execution was issued on this judgment, directed to the sheriff of Cooper county, and was by him levied upon certain real estate situate in the city of Boonville, in said county. This suit was commenced by bill in equity to enjoin the sheriff from selling, and to vest the title to said land in plaintiff. Plaintiff charged in her petition that her husband, while acting as her agent, and with her money, purchased said real estate, and, without her knowledge or consent, took the title in his own name. A temporary injunction was granted, which was subsequently dissolved. M. L. Scrutchfield was made a party defendant. After the dissolution the suit was prosecuted against Sauter & Adams, the judgment creditors, and plaintiff's husband. Defendants Sauter & Adams alone answered, denying each allegation of the petition, and, as special defenses: "First, that, the execution which was sought to be stayed having issued from the circuit court of Moniteau county, the circuit court of Cooper county had no jurisdiction of the suit; second, that plaintiff bought the goods for herself and daughter, both being members of M. L. Scrutchfield's family, and had them charged to him, and she is estopped, as to defendants, to claim said property as her separate estate." A demurrer to each of these defenses was sustained. Said defendants answered further: First, that plaintiff knowingly permitted the title to remain in her husband, and that they, believing him to be the owner thereof, and relying thereon, were induced to give credit to her said husband, of which she had knowledge, and that, as against defendants, she should be estopped to claim the property; and, second, that the suit was a fraudulent collusion between plaintiff and her husband for the sole purpose of defeating the collection of a debt due defendants for necessaries purchased and used by the family. Plaintiff, by reply, denied any knowledge that the title to the land was in her husband prior to the date of the purchase of the goods.

The evidence showed that on her marriage, in 1859, plaintiff owned property worth from $5,000 to $10,000. This was reduced to the possession of the husband, and was nearly all lost prior to 1862, at about which date he purchased a farm in Cooper county for $1,600, taking the title in his own name. This he afterwards sold, and in 1866 purchased another farm in said county, for which he paid $5,000, and also took the title in his own name. In about 1876 he conveyed this farm to a trustee for the sole and separate use of plaintiff. They continued to reside on this farm until about 1882, when it was sold for $5,000; and M. L. Scrutchfield received the purchase money with which he purchased another farm, paying $3,500 therefor, and taking the title in his own name. This he sold in 1883 for $4,250, and with the money realized from the sale of these two farms he bought and improved the land in controversy. The title to this land was taken in his name. Plaintiff testified that her husband received the purchase price of the last-mentioned farms as her agent, and the purchase of the property was for her, and she supposed the title was in her name until after the indebtedness to defendant had been incurred. The husband also testified that he managed the farms and business as agent for his wife, and never told her that the title to this property was in his name. He also testified that he collected the rents of the property, and applied them to the support of the family, and paid the taxes. Defendant Sauter testified that Mr. and Mrs. Scrutchfield had been customers of their house continuously since about 1872, running an account in the name of the husband; that the goods for which the judgment was rendered were charged to Mr. Scrutchfield, and the credit was given to him. He was considered good, and they had no doubt of his financial standing. They supposed he owned the property in dispute. They gave him credit while he lived upon the farm, and did not know that it was in plaintiff's name. Plaintiff was permitted, over the objection of defendants, to testify that she had authorized and appointed her husband to act as her agent in purchasing the land. Defendants offered to prove that, two or three years prior to the trial, plaintiff and her husband agreed upon a division of this property between them. This evidence was excluded by the court. Defendants insisted that plaintiff was, under the statute, incompetent to testify as a witness, and for that reason objected to her evidence. This objection the court overruled.

1. Did the circuit court of Cooper county have jurisdiction to restrain the sheriff from selling the property in said suit under an execution issued from the circuit court of Moniteau county? Defendants insist that under the statute (section 4967) and the general law the court from which the execution was issued had the exclusive right to control it, and no other court has a right to interfere. We think the position of defendants sustained by the decisions of this court. Mellier v. Bartlett, 89 Mo. 136, 1 S. W. 220, and cases cited. The statute does not confine the proceedings for obtaining relief to the defendant in the judgment, but "any person against whose property an execution or order of sale shall be issued" is entitled to the remedy afforded by the...