Scudder v. Scudder
| Decision Date | 14 January 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 34899,34899 |
| Citation | 348 P.2d 225,55 Wn.2d 454 |
| Parties | Janet Griffin SCUDDER, Respondent, v. Kathryn Hackett SCUDDER, Executrix of the Estate of Sidney T. Scudder, deceased, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Brethorst, Fowler, Bateman, Reed & McClure, Seattle, for appellant.
Bayley, Fite, Westberg & Madden, Seattle, for respondent.
This is an action for the recovery of support-money payments alleged to be due plaintiff, Janet Griffin Scudder, and chargeable against the estate of her deceased divorced husband.
The facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff, a widow with two minor boys, married the decedent, Dr. Sidney T. Scudder, on October 3, 1952. Thereafter, her two children (who were born on January 1, 1945, and October 4, 1947, respectively) were adopted by the decedent. Plaintiff and the decedent were divorced in King county on March 9, 1956. Prior to the divorce, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement, which provides, in part:
The divorce decree entered thereafter provided, in part, as follows:
'3. The property settlement agreement heretofore entered into by and between the parties be and is approved in every detail, * * *.
(Italics ours.)
Prior to his death on March 10, 1957, the decedent paid all support payments. No payments were made after that date.
The plaintiff timely filed a creditor's claim against the decedent's estate, in the sum of twelve thousand dollars, claiming support for her minor sons at the rate of fifty dollars per month for each child during their minority, being all amounts accrued or to accrue subsequent to March 10, 1957, the date of Dr. Scudder's death. The claim was rejected by the executrix and this action was brought upon the rejected claim.
After trial, the judge made his findings and conclusions and entered judgment allowing plaintiff's claim in the amount of fifteen hundred dollars for the fifteen months which had elapsed to the date of trial, and for the further allowance of fifty dollars per month for each child payable to the plaintiff during their minority, provided that the children are still being supported by the plaintiff and they are not emancipated. Defendant appeals.
The error assigned by the appellant involves but the single issue of whether decedent's obligation to pay child support survives his death.
Appellant and respondent both discuss at length our decision in Stone v. Bayley, 1913, 75 Wash. 184, 134 P. 820, 48 L.R.A.,N.S., 429, in which the husband's duty of support arose out of a consensual property settlement agreement, which was not mentioned in the divorce decree at all. Consequently, there was no provision whatever in the decree relating to the husband's obligation of child support. In the course of its opinion, this court decided that the trial court had the power to charge the husband's estate with the obligation of child-support payments. The real basis of the Stone decision is that this court held that it was the intention of the parties that the obligation of their contract should survive the husband's death.
We think that the case at bar is not controlled by the Stone case because the decree before us approved the property settlement agreement 'in every detail,' and therefore the rights and duties of the parties arise by operation of law. Whereas originally the husband's obligation for support payments arose out of the provisions of the property settlement agreement, once these provisions were approved and confirmed by judicial decree, the husband's obligation to make such payments became subject to modification, alteration, and revision by the court. Heuchan v. Heuchan, 1951, 38 Wash.2d 207, 228 P.2d 470, 22 A.L.R.2d 1410.
Thus, if Dr. Scudder had lived and his earning power had subsequently become impaired, he would have had the right to apply to the court for a reduction of the support payments on the basis of a change in circumstance. Shattuck v. Shattuck, 1927, 141 Wash. 600, 251 P. 851. Here, his earning power has not merely been impaired, but, by virtue of his death, it had absolutely ceased to exist. No conceivable change in circumstances could be of greater materiality to the persons concerned. Yet, under respondent's contention, the husband's obligation for support payments continues to be measured by the same set of circumstances that existed at the time the divorce decree was entered. Thus, a divorced physician whose professional income is reduced by a lessening of his earning power may obtain equitable relief, but the legatees of a physician whose professional income ceases to exist because of his death must continue to pay the same amounts for child support that were first fixed by the court on the basis of his earnings when the divorce was granted. These two rules seem to us to be highly inconsistent.
Assuming that the trial court has power to require support payments for a minor child to continue after the death of the husband, the immediate question before us is whether, in this instance, the trial court exercised its power to that extent. Standing alone, a decree ordering the husband to provide support for his minor children operates in personam and would not survive his death. Esteb v. Esteb, 1926, 138 Wash. 174, 244 P. 264, 246 P. 27, 47 A.L.R. 110. In this respect, it is no different from an alimony decree.
In Murphy v. Shelton, 1935, 183 Wash. 180, 48 P.2d 247, 248, this court held that before the provisions of an alimony decree could survive the death of the husband,
Construing the instant decree as though the language of the settlement agreement were expressly set out therein, we think that it falls far short of compliance with the above quoted rule. But, even if the problem before us be regarded as strictly one of contract construction without reference to the decree, we are not persuaded that this case falls within the Stone v. Bayley rule.
In the Stone case, supra, the court found that it was the father's intent that the support payments as provided in the contract should survive his death, because he had provided in his will for the support of his children by a prior marriage without making any such testamentary provision for the support of the child of his second marriage. The court interpreted this fact to mean that the father had recognized his continuing contractual obligation to provide for the support of the child in question. The two boys involved in the present case were born to the wife during a prior marriage and had been adopted by the second husband (now deceased) after his marriage to their mother. Although this fact would not affect the deceased husband's legal obligation to support the children, it is a factor to be considered in determining the intention of the parties in entering into a contract of child support.
Of further significance is the fact that the settlement agreement required Dr. Scudder to maintain a life insurance policy on his life, naming the wife and children as beneficiaries, to secure the payment of $21,326.60 of community indebtedness to third parties which the husband had agreed to discharge. The contract further stated that 'This obligation shall not be construed to include the support payments for the minor children.' Thus, in our opinion, it was...
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Chapter A. Restrictions On Property Subject To Succession
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