Scudder v. Town of Greendale, Ind., 82-1978
Decision Date | 08 April 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 82-1978,82-1978 |
Parties | Millard SCUDDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOWN OF GREENDALE, INDIANA, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Donald B. Mackay, Schippers & Mackay, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.
Paul Hirsch, Haymaker, Hirsch & Fink, Indianapolis, Ind., for defendants-appellees.
Before POSNER and COFFEY, Circuit Judges, and NEAHER, Senior District Judge. *
The plaintiff-appellant Millard Scudder brought suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 alleging that the defendants, the Town of Greendale, Indiana, its Board of Trustees and a private individual, conspired to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights in denying him a permit to construct houses on a certain piece of real estate. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm.
On November 10, 1978, the plaintiff Scudder acquired title to a piece of real estate located in Greendale, Indiana. Shortly after obtaining title to the real estate, Scudder filed applications with the Greendale Board of Trustees for permits to build two residences. While the building permit applications were pending, Larry Weaver, the owner of an adjacent piece of real estate, submitted a letter to the Greendale Board of Trustees asking that Scudder's request for permits to build on the lot in question be denied. The letter submitted by Weaver, a private citizen who holds no position in the Greendale town government, 1 constitutes his sole involvement in the so-called "conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutionally protected property rights." The Board of Trustees denied the applications "because the location does not front on a dedicated street," basing their decision on Article III, Section 4 of the Town of Greendale's Ordinances which states:
"Every building hereafter erected shall be located on a lot which fronts a street."
The plaintiff subsequently submitted another application for a permit to build a single residence on the real estate. The Greendale Board denied this third application on the same basis that Scudder's lot did not front on a street.
After Scudder's requests for building permits had been denied, he failed to avail himself of state administrative and judicial remedies established by the Indiana legislature for review of zoning decisions. 2 Instead, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the district court for the Southern District of Indiana alleging violations of his federal constitutional rights. The gravamen of the complaint recites:
While this suit was pending in the district court, Scudder's counsel's license to practice law was revoked by the Indiana Supreme Court and the plaintiff chose to proceed pro se in this case. Before trial, after completion of discovery, both the plaintiff and the defendants moved for summary judgment. In support of his motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted affidavits which in effect merely restated in conclusory terms the complaint's allegation that he had been the victim of an unlawful conspiracy to deprive him of the use and enjoyment of his property. 4 In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants submitted a plat map showing that the real estate in question does not front on a street, although the lot does adjoin a right-of-way easement which in turn leads to a public street, Craig Avenue. The accuracy of the plat map is not disputed.
On May 24, 1982, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, stating "that the present case clearly requires exhaustion of state remedies."
The Supreme Court's opinion in Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982), decided after the district court granted summary judgment in the instant case, makes it clear that exhaustion of state remedies is not a condition precedent to bringing suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. In Patsy, the Court stated:
We affirm the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, rather than on the district court's rationale of failure to exhaust state remedies, which is governed by the Patsy decision.
It is important to note that the plaintiff concedes the validity of Article III, section 4 of the Greendale Ordinances which provides:
"Every building hereafter erected shall be located on a lot which fronts on a street."
Moreover, the record clearly establishes that the lot upon which the plaintiff desired to build does not front on a street. Nevertheless, the plaintiff contends the Board of Trustees' application of the admittedly valid ordinance, under some theory somehow deprived him of his constitutional rights, although he does not disclose any legal theory to support his allegations. In support of his motion for summary judgment, 5 the plaintiff submitted his own affidavits which merely restated the accusations that the Board of Trustees had conspired with the adjoining property owner, Weaver, to deprive him (Scudder) of the use and enjoyment of his property.
Since the plaintiff did not challenge the validity of the Greendale Ordinance itself and fails to recite any logical or legal reasoning to support his allegations, his claim is presumably founded on the theory that the ordinance was applied or enforced in an unconstitutional manner. It is well settled that enforcement of an otherwise valid zoning ordinance violates the Constitution only if: (1) the decision of the particular zoning body is arbitrary, South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837, 95 S.Ct. 66, 42 L.Ed.2d 64 (1974); or (2) if the ordinance is applied or enforced with a discriminatory intent or purpose. Tarkowski v. Robert Bartlett Realty Co., 644 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir.1980). As discussed more fully below, the record contains no evidence to demonstrate that the Greendale Board of Trustees' decision to deny Scudder a building permit was either arbitrary or discriminatory.
A particular decision or action is "arbitrary" if it is reached "without adequate determining principle or was unreasoned." United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243, 67 S.Ct. 252, 258, 91 L.Ed. 209 (1946). See also, United States ex rel. O'Connor v. MacDonald, 449 F.Supp. 291, 296 (N.D.Ill.1978); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 96 (5th Ed.1979). Applying this definition, it is clear that the Board of Trustees did not act arbitrarily in denying Scudder a building permit as (1) a valid Town of Greendale ordinance prohibits the erection of buildings on lots which do not front on a street; and (2) the lot in question does not front a street. Thus, the Board's decision was a reasoned application of an "adequate determining principle" (the town ordinance) and therefore was not arbitrary.
Similarly, the record is silent of any evidence to support the plaintiff's theory that the ordinance was applied in a discriminatory manner. As this court in Tarkowski v. Robert Bartlett Realty Co., 644 F.2d 1204, 1206 (7th Cir.1980) stated:
In Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8, 64 S.Ct. 397, 401, 88 L.Ed. 497 (1944), the Supreme Court set forth how "intentional or purposeful discrimination" in the enforcement of a valid law or ordinance may be shown:
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