Scullin v. Wabash Railroad Company
| Decision Date | 12 December 1905 |
| Docket Number | 2 |
| Citation | 90 S.W. 1028,192 Mo. 6 |
| Parties | SCULLIN, by next friend, Appellant, v. WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. Warwick Hough Judge.
Affirmed.
John F Shepley and Douglas W. Robert for appellant.
The purpose of the statute in allowing appeals from orders granting motions for new trial was to avoid the trouble expense and delay of unnecessary retrials. Crawford v. Railroad, 171 Mo. 68; Haven v. Railroad, 155 Mo. 216; Cortney v. Railroad, 151 Mo. 35; Candee v. Railroad, 130 Mo. 154; Ess v. Griffith, 128 Mo. 59; Stoddard v. Railroad, 105 Mo.App. 512; Richardson v. Drug Co., 92 Mo.App. 515.
Geo. S. Grover for respondent.
(1) There is no statute under which the allowance here asked for could be made. There are but three cases in which interest is authorized to be charged by the statutes of Missouri, as follows: 1. In cases of conversion, or seizure, such as actions against carriers for non-delivery, or misdelivery. Sec. 2869, R. S. 1899. It is not here contended, nor can it be successfully, that this action is within the statute above quoted. 2. On contracts in writing. Sec. 3705, R. S. 1899. No claim is here made under this statute, nor could it be, as no contract is here sued on. 3. Interest on judgments. Sec. 3707, R. S. 1899. In compliance with this statute, and in strict obedience to the mandate of this court, the judgment below in the case at bar, has borne and is still bearing six per cent interest from the day of its rendition, December 15, 1904. The statute does not now, and never did, in the history of this State, authorize the allowance of interest, nunc pro tunc, upon a mere verdict of a jury. Such a finding, until it ripens into and is replaced by a judgment, is merely an unsecured claim for which plaintiff has no lien. For that reason no interest either accrues, or can accrue, upon such a claim. (2) The only directions received by the learned judge below were the following: "To set aside the order granting a new trial, and to enter judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with the verdict." This was done, and thus "the appellant was restored to all things he has lost." For he never had anything but a verdict, and after it was set aside, the trial court was directed to enter a judgment upon it, which has been done. Crawford v. Railroad, 171 Mo. 84; Chapman v. Railroad, 146 Mo. 494.
On the 17th day of March, 1900, plaintiff-appellant recovered a verdict and judgment against the defendant in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis for the sum of twenty thousand dollars for injuries alleged to have been sustained by him by reason of the negligence of defendant. Thereafter, on the 7th day of July, 1900, on motion of defendant, the verdict and judgment were set aside and a new trial granted. Plaintiff excepted, and in due time filed his affidavit for an appeal.
At the April term, 1904, of the Supreme Court, the judgment granting a new trial was reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to the trial court to set aside the order granting a new trial and to enter judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with the verdict.
After receiving the mandate from the Supreme Court, and on the 15th day of December, 1904, the trial court entered up judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of twenty thousand dollars and costs.
On the 25th day of January, 1905, and at the same term of court at which said judgment was entered, the plaintiff filed the following motion: "Now comes the plaintiff in the above-entitled cause, by his next friend, and moves the court to set aside the judgment herein rendered at this term of court on, to-wit, December 15, 1904, and to enter said judgment in the sum of $ 20,000 in accordance with the verdict, and to enter said judgment as of March 17, 1900, in accordance with the mandate of the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri, filed herein." Which motion the court, upon the same day, overruled, to which order and ruling of the court the plaintiff then and there duly excepted at the time.
Plaintiff contends that when the said order and judgment of the trial court setting aside the verdict and judgment in his favor and granting the defendant a new trial was, upon his appeal, reversed and remanded by the Supreme Court, with directions to the trial court to set aside the order and judgment granting a new trial and to enter up judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with the verdict, it meant as of date March 17, 1900, when said verdict and judgment was rendered; or, if entered in pursuance of the mandate of this court, on the 15th day of December, 1904, it should have been for the amount of the verdict together with the interest at six per cent per annum from the date the verdict was rendered.
Under the Missouri statutes all judgments bear interest from the time of their rendition,...
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