Scully v. Iowa Dist. Court for Polk County, 91-1176
Decision Date | 22 July 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 91-1176,91-1176 |
Citation | 489 N.W.2d 389 |
Parties | Michael SCULLY, Plaintiff, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR POLK COUNTY, Defendant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Arvid D. Oliver, Des Moines, for plaintiff.
Rex Darrah, Des Moines, for defendant.
Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and CARTER, LAVORATO, NEUMAN, and SNELL, JJ.
Plaintiff, Michael Scully, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in this court pursuant to Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 301 and requested a stay of execution of a Polk County district court order. We granted the writ and issued an order temporarily staying the district court order pending further order of this court. Scully challenges a district court order sentencing him to thirty days in the Polk County Jail for his contemptuous failure to comply with a decree of dissolution of marriage, which required him to discharge certain joint marital debts. Scully contends that because he filed a petition for bankruptcy relief in accordance with chapter 7, title 11, of the United States Code, the subsequent issuance of the sentencing order is barred by the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1991). Because we conclude that the contempt sentence does not violate the Code's automatic stay provision, we now vacate the temporary stay and annul the writ.
On June 15, 1990, a decree of dissolution of marriage was entered in which Scully was ordered to pay certain joint debts and obligations that were incurred during the marriage. Scully failed to discharge at least one of those debts and, as a consequence, the creditor, Midwest Builders, initiated collection proceedings against Scully's former spouse, Sharon Scully.
On May 10, 1991, Sharon filed an application for an order to show cause as to why Michael should not be held in contempt of court for his failure to discharge the Midwest Builders debt in accordance with the dissolution decree. After a June 26 hearing on the matter, the district court issued an order on July 22, 1991, that found Scully to be in contempt of court. More specifically, the order stated that Scully, who had been employed at the time in question, had willfully failed to abide by the court's dissolution decree as it related to the Midwest Builders debt and would, therefore, be required to appear before the court on July 29, 1991, for sentencing. However, the order also indicated that in fixing a sentence on July 29, "the court may consider ... whether petitioner has paid Midwest Builders in full."
On July 26, 1991, Scully filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition (the "petition") with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Iowa. Then, on July 29, 1991, the contempt sentencing hearing convened as was directed in the July 22 order. After a hearing in which Scully's continuing failure to discharge the Midwest Builders debt as well as his July 26 bankruptcy filing were duly noted, an order unconditionally sentencing him to thirty days in jail was filed on July 30, 1991. Although not so specified, we assume that the contempt sentence was issued pursuant to Iowa Code section 598.23(1) (1991), which provides for a thirty-day jail commitment for willfully disobeying an order or decree dissolving a marriage.
Scully responded to the thirty-day contempt sentence by filing a petition for writ of certiorari and request for stay pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 310, which we granted. He contends that the issuance of a postpetition contempt sentence is violative of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title ... operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of--
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceedings against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
....
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
....
(b) The filing of a petition ... does not operate as a stay--
(1) ... of the commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor;
Our review of this contention is for errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 4.
Although this issue is one of first impression for us, it has received exhaustive treatment by the federal courts. The federal decisions can be dichotomized into two general categories: those addressing postpetition contempt proceedings relating to the debtor's failure to discharge a prepetition debt in accordance with a prepetition court order, which is the case sub judice, and those relating to the prepetition failure of the debtor to perform some other court-mandated task.
With respect to the latter category of cases, the federal courts are in agreement that the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not preclude the commencement of criminal contempt proceedings designed to insure compliance with future court orders and, more generally, to uphold the dignity of the court. In re Cherry, 78 B.R. 65, 70 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1987) ( ); In re Dumas, 19 B.R. 676, 678 (9th Cir.Bankr.App.1982) ( ); cf. In re Gedeon, 31 B.R. 942, 946 (Bankr.D.Colo.1983) ( ); In re Marini, 28 B.R. 262, 265 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1983) ( ); In re Corbly, 61 B.R. 851, 857 (Bankr.D.S.D.1986) (same). But cf. Guariglia v. Community Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 382 F.Supp. 758, 761-62 (E.D.N.Y.1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 896 (2d Cir.1975) ( ).
In addition, postpetition contempt proceedings not involving a debtor's failure to discharge a debt pursuant to a prepetition court order may also properly include a sentence that seeks to coerce the bankruptcy debtor into complying with the court's prepetition order. That is, the court may, without violating the automatic stay, issue a purgeable civil contempt citation designed to effect compliance with the prepetition order as well as vindicate the dignity of the issuing court. David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412, 417-18 (9th Cir.1977) ( ); U.S. Sprint Communications Co. v. Buscher, 89 B.R. 154, 156-57 (D.Kan.1988) ( ); International Distrib. Ctrs., Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co., 62 B.R. 723, 728-30 (S.D.N.Y.1986) ( ); Martin-Trigona v. Gouletas, 15 B.R. 645, 646 (N.D.Ill.1980) ( ); In re Cohoes Indus. Terminal Inc., 62 B.R. 369, 378 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd, 70 B.R. 214 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (). But see In re Cherry, 78 B.R. 65, 70, 72-74 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1987) ( ); see also In re Rudaw/Empirical Software Prods. Ltd., 83 B.R. 241, 247 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1988) (...
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