Scuncio Motors, Inc. v. Teverow, 93-57-A
| Citation | 635 A.2d 268 |
| Decision Date | 13 December 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-57-A,93-57-A |
| Parties | SCUNCIO MOTORS, INC., et al. v. Joshua TEVEROW et al. ppeal. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
This case came before the court for oral argument on November 9, 1993, pursuant to an order directing the parties to show cause why the defendants' appeal should not be summarily decided. The defendants, Joshua Teverow and Letts, Quinn & Licht, appeal from a judgment for the plaintiffs, Scuncio Motors, Inc., and Joseph Scuncio. After reviewing the memoranda submitted by the parties and after hearing the oral arguments of counsel, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown. The issues will be summarily decided. We sustain the appeal.
Scuncio Motors, Inc. (Scuncio), an automobile dealer holding a franchise from Subaru of New England (Subaru), in early July 1981 retained attorney Joshua Teverow (Teverow), an associate with the law firm of Letts, Quinn & Licht, to renegotiate its franchise with Subaru. In its suit, Scuncio alleged that its reliance on Teverow's negligent legal advice proximately caused Scuncio's loss of its Subaru franchise, following which loss plaintiffs commenced this action. Previously, Subaru negotiated extended franchise contracts with Scuncio at six-month or one-year intervals, but in 1981, it required as a condition of renewing the franchise for another three years that Scuncio either construct new facilities at a suitable location or relocate to larger existing facilities within a specified area. Teverow accompanied Joseph Scuncio (Mr. Scuncio) to a "refranchising" meeting on July 24, 1981, at Subaru's offices in Norwood, Massachusetts. Mr. Scuncio told Teverow that he had no intention of constructing new facilities and incurring indebtedness. On the other hand, Mr. Scuncio concluded that if he refused to sign Subaru's franchise agreement "they would have started termination proceedings within the week or immediately." Teverow advised Mr. Scuncio that if he did not sign the agreement, and if Subaru terminated the franchise, Scuncio could bring an immediate court suit. Teverow reasoned that signing the agreement would afford the company some limited additional time before termination by Subaru in the event Mr. Scuncio could not relocate. Mr. Scuncio further alleges that Teverow advised that the General Assembly would in its next session enact legislation that would retroactively protect the dealership from the agreement's coercive mandates. Faced with the Hobson's choice of immediate termination of the franchise by not signing or of buying borrowed time by signing, Mr. Scuncio took Teverow's advice and...
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Vallinoto v. DiSandro
...negligent, and that the attorney's " 'negligence was the proximate cause of * * * her damages or loss.' " Scuncio Motors, Inc. v. Teverow, 635 A.2d 268 (R.I.1993) (per curiam). An integral part of any attorney-malpractice-negligence claim requires proof that actual damages resulted from the......
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Flanders+ Medeiros Inc. v. Bogosian, Civ. A. No. 91-0026L.
...245 (R.I.1849)). The claimant must also prove that the alleged breach was the proximate cause of her damages. Scuncio Motors, Inc. v. Teverow, 635 A.2d 268, 269 (R.I.1993). Therefore, to survive a motion for summary judgment, the claimant must produce competent evidence sufficient to raise ......
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DeCurtis v. Visconti, Boren & Campbell Ltd.
...at issue in this case.9 During oral argument before this Court, defendants contended that our decision in Scuncio Motors, Inc. v. Teverow , 635 A.2d 268 (R.I. 1993), recognized judgmental immunity as a valid defense in the State of Rhode Island. We disagree. Judgmental immunity has never be......
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MACERA BRO. OF CRANS. v. Gelfuso & Lachut
...in its representation, and that the attorney's negligence was the proximate cause of any damage or loss. Scuncio Motors, Inc. v. Teverow, 635 A.2d 268, 269 (R.I.1993). The plaintiffs have not established that but for the attorney's negligence, a security bond would have been posted. It woul......