Scurry v. City of Seattle

• Decision Date: 23 February 1894
• Citation: 36 P. 145,8 Wash. 278
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: SCURRY v. CITY OF SEATTLE.

36 P. 145

8 Wash. 278

SCURRY v. CITY OF SEATTLE.

Supreme Court of Washington

February 23, 1894

Appeal from superior court, King county; R. Osborn, Judge.

Action by Nellie M. Scurry against the city of Seattle for damages resulting from grading a street. Defendant had judgment, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Metcalfe & Jurey, for appellant.

George Donworth and James B. Howe, for respondent.

DUNBAR C.J.

This is an action brought by appellant against the city of Seattle for damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of grading a certain street. The action was tried in the superior court, and judgment rendered for the city, from which judgment an appeal is taken to this court. There are several questions involved in this case which are ably presented by counsel both for appellant and respondent, but the view which we take of the third proposition discussed renders unnecessary an investigation of the others. Section 33, art. 4, of the freeholders' charter provides that all claims for damages against the city must be presented to the city council and filed with the clerk within 6 months after the time when such claim for damages accrued; and further provides that no action shall be maintained against the city for any claim for damages until the same has been presented to the city council, and 60 days have elapsed after such presentation. It is conceded in this case that the claim for damages was not presented in accordance with the requirements of said section 33; but the contention of the appellant is that section 33, art. 4, of the freeholders' charter is unconstitutional and void for the reason that it is in contravention of the laws of the state concerning limitations of actions. Section 10, art. 11 of the constitution of the state of Washington provides that cities of a certain class, which includes the respondent city, shall be permitted to frame charters for their own government, consistent with and subject to the constitution and laws of this state. Is, then, the limitation imposed upon the presentation of the claim for damages against the city consistent with and subject to the constitution and laws of the state? We think it is. It is true that under the laws of the state an action of this kind could be brought within three years, but it has never been held that even a statute which made provisions for the presentation of a claim within a certain time was in any way in contravention of the statute of limitations with reference to the commencement of actions. If this requirement of the charter had been complied with the appellant would have had the full statutory period in which to bring her action. It cannot be disputed that the legislature would have had power to have made the provision that is made by section 33, art. 4, of the charter, and that if the provision had been so made by...