Seabd. Air Line Ry v. Phillips

• Decision Date: 07 February 1903
• Citation: 117 Ga. 98,43 S.E. 494
• Parties: SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. v. PHILLIPS.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

43 S.E. 494

117 Ga. 98

SEABOARD AIR LINE RY.

v.PHILLIPS.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Feb. 7, 1903.

STATUTES—PROOF—PRESUMPTIONS—NEW TRIAL—SUFFICIENCY OF MOTION—INJURY TO EMPLOYS—PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE— EVIDENCE—DAMAGES.

1. "The public laws of the United States, and of the several states thereof, as published by authority, shall be judicially recognized without proof."

(a) When it appears in the manner above indicated that a particular law has been of force in another state, until the contrary is shown it is presumed that such law is still of force.

(b) Quære: Do not the provisions of Civ. Code, § 5231, quoted above, place the laws of other states, when "published by authority, " upon identically the same footing as all laws of this state, both public and private, are placed by the provisions of Civ. Code, § 5210, when so published?

2. A ground of a motion for a new trial which complains that "the court erred in charging the jury that the statute offered in evidence as proof of the statute" on which the suit was based was a statute of another state, when that question should have been submitted to the jury, and that this error naturally affects the entire charge, whenever it undertakes to deal with the meaning of such statute, but which does not set forth any extract from the charge or the statute referred to, cannot be considered.

3. A charge, in the trial of a suit by an employe against a railway company, that, if the plaintiff shows the defendant negligent "in some or all of the particulars" alleged in the petition, a presumption of negligence will arise against the defendant, though not exactly accurate, as it lacks the qualification that the negligence must have contributed to the injury, will be no ground for a new trial, when the petition sets forth no ground of negligence which did not contribute to the injury, and when in a subsequent portion of the charge the attention of the jury is distinctly called to the qualification above referred to.

4. A general complaint that error was committed in refusing to admit in evidence ten or more rules of a railway company, offered at onetime and as a whole, so far as appears from the motion for a new trial, is not good, when any one of the rules was inadmissible.

5. In the trial of an action of the character above indicated, it is not error to read to the jury, without comment, rules of the company which are in evidence, when there is no request for more specific instructions on such rules.

6. It was not error to admit evidence showing the customary way in which business of the railway company was conducted in the yard where plaintiff was injured, there being in evidence no rule of the company relating to the matter which was the subject of the evidence.

7. The evidence, though conflicting, was sufficient to authorize the verdict, which was not excessive in amount, and there was no error requiring a reversal of the judgment refusing a new trial.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from city court of Atlanta; H. M. Reid, Judge.

Action by J. M. Phillips against the Seaboard Air Line Railway. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Brown & Randolph and Erwin & Erwin, for plaintiff in error.

C. T. Ladson, for defendant in error.

COBB, J. Phillips sued the railway company, alleging that, as a consequence of its negligence, he had sustained serious personal injuries, which resulted in the amputation of his right leg below the knee. He recovered a verdict for $7,000, and the defendant complains that the court refused to grant it a new trial.

1. The cause of action in this case originated in the year 1000 in the state of Florida, and therefore the rights of the parties are to be determined by the law of that state. One of the questions made by the record is that there was nothing before the trial court showing what was the law of Florida at the date of the plaintiff's injuries. The plaintiff produced a book entitled "Revised Statutes of Florida of 1892, " purporting to have been "prepared under authority of, and adopted by, the Legislature of Florida, and purporting to have been proclaimed as such Revised Statutes by the Governor of Florida, " which contained provisions of law applicable to cases of the character now under consideration. Objection was made that the book should not be admitted as evidence, for the reason that there was nothing therein to indicate that its provisions were of force at the date of the plaintiff's injuries. The Code declares: "The public laws of the United States, and of the several states thereof, as published by authority, shall be judicially recognized without proof." Civ. Code, § 5231. A volume of state laws, purporting on the title page to have been printed by order of the Governor, sufficiently shows publication by authority. 8 Am. & Eng. Enc. L. (1st Ed.) 437; 13 Am. & Eng. Enc. L. (2d Ed.) 1067. The book produced certainly showed that the laws there in contained were of force at the date they were proclaimed, and until the contrary ap-peared there would be a presumption that such laws were still of force. Does not the section of our Code above quoted place the laws of other states of the Union, "as published by authority, " upon the same footing, as to judicial recognition as laws of the United States and the laws of this state? It does so in terms as to the laws of the United States, and uses practically the same language as is found in the section relating to laws of our own state. At one time in this state private laws were required to be proved as other facts, but now all laws, public and private, and resolutions of the General Assembly, are "recognized judicially without proof, " when "published by authority." Civ. Code, § 5210. Was it not the intention of the lawmakers that the laws of this state, the laws of the United States, and the laws of our sister states should all be, in the same manner, judicially recognized "without proof, " when "published by authority"? Cannot any court in this state, including this court, take judicial notice of the law of any state in the Union, when it has produced to it the law of such state, "published by authority, " just as it would in the case of a law of this state so published? This is certainly true as to laws of the United States, and laws of other states are by the Code placed upon identically the same footing as laws of the United States. If such is the law, is it not founded upon sound reason? Why should not this court, or any court of this state, in cases controlled by the laws of other states, be permitted to inform itself as to what is the law of such other state by simply looking into a book which complies with all the requirements of the Code, and then decide the case according to what is really the law, not what is only presumptively the law, and often not actually the law? Of course, if a book containing the laws as published by authority is not accessible, then, in the absence of a copy of the law under the great seal of the state, the case would generally have to be determined by a presumption that the common law prevailed in the other state. Has not the day passed when a court of this state should be required to administer as the law of a sister state that which is not the law, when it has before its eyes an open book, "published by authority, " showing what is the law—refusing to see what may be seen by all men, merely because it was not formally offered as evidence on the trial? This court has in some cases satisfied itself as to what was the law of another state by a resort to the laws of such state "published by authority, " when there was nothing in the record referring to such law. See Barranger v. Baum, 103 Ga. 466 (7), 480 (7), 30 S. E. 524, 68 Am. St. Rep. 113. See, also, Massachusetts Benefit Association v. Hale, 96 Ga. 802, 23 S. E. 845). While it does not appear in the reported decision of this case that the Massachusetts statute was not invoked in the trial court, an examination of the original record shows that no reference whatever was made to this law in the pleadings of the parties. The contract sued on was by its terms to be governed by the law of Massachusetts, and it does not appear what was treated in the court below as the law of that state. The Code still requires that "foreign laws and judgments must be authenticated under the great seal of their respective states." Civ. Code, § 5232. The term "foreign, " in the section just cited, is applicable not only to countries outside of the United States, but also to the different states within the United States, so far as their relation to each other is concerned. In regard to the method therein provided for authenticating the laws of other states of the Union, the method provided in the section is merely cumulative of that provided in the section immediately preceding, for the courts of this state to inform themselves as to what is the law of another state of the Union. See Simms v. Southern Express Company, 38 Ga. 129. The fact that strictly foreign laws, when published by authority, are generally inaccessible, and the laws of other states of the Union are generally accessible, may have been the reason why the Code provided for the judicial recognition of the one without proof, and not of the other. If the decisions by this court, as well as those by other courts, laying down the rule that laws of other states must be proved as facts, are critically examined, it will, no doubt, be found that they were dealing with cases where the law required that such laws should be authenticated under the great seal of the state, or where the law offered in evidence was so authenticated. Such laws may be admitted in evidence in this state when so authenticated, and when so admitted they are to be treated as other facts proved in a similar way. See, in this connection, Simms v. Express Co., supra; Chattanooga R. Co. v. Jackson, 86 Ga. 681, 13 S. E. 109; Craven v. Bates, 9G Ga. 80, 23 S. E. 202; Norman v. Goode,...