Seabd. Air Line Ry v. Andrews
| Decision Date | 18 July 1913 |
| Citation | 140 Ga. 254,78 S.E. 925 |
| Parties | SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. v. ANDREWS. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.)
1. Carriers (§ 234*)—Evidence (§ 80*)— Laws of Another State—Injury to Passenger—What Law Governs.
In an action for damages instituted in this state by a passenger against a common carrier, on account of personal injuries caused by the negligence of the defendant's servants, where the injury occurred in the state of Alabama, the liability of the defendant will depend upon the laws of the latter state; and where no particular law of Alabama is pleaded or proved, the presumption is that the common law prevails there, and the case will be considered as governed by the common law.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent Dig. §§ 965, 1263, 1538; Dec. Dig. § 234;* Evidence, Cent Dig. § 101; Dec. Dig. § 80.*]
2. Carriers (§§ 234, 280, 320*)—Negligence —Injury to Passenger—Question for Jury—"Extraordinary Care."
The motion for nonsuit was properly overruled.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 965, 1085-1092, 1098-1103, 1105, 1106, 1109, 1117, 1118, 1126, 1149, 1153, 1160, 1167, 1179, 1190, 1217, 1233, 1244, 1248, 1263, 1315-1325, 1538; Dec. Dig. §§ 234, 280, 320.*
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 3, p. 2626.]
3. Carriers (§ 348*)—Injury to Passenger —Instructions.
The judge charged the common-law doctrine, which prevents a plaintiff from recovering if by the exercise of ordinary care he could have avoided the consequences to himself caused by the defendant's negligence; and the assignment of error which complained of his failure so to do was without merit.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Carriers. Cent. Dig. §§ 1403-1405; Dec. Dig. § 348.*]
4. Trial (§ 256*)—Carriers (§ 234*)—Injury to Passenger—Instructions.
The judge in effect also charged the common-law doctrine that the plaintiff cannot recover damages for an injury to himself, where the same is done by his consent or is caused by his own negligence. If further instructions in this regard had been desired, there should have been an appropriate request.
(a) So much of Civil Code 1910, § 2781, as relates to comparative negligence and diminution of damages is not a common-law doctrine, and it was not erroneous to omit reference to it in the charge.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 628-641; Dec. Dig. § 256;* Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 965, 1263, 1538; Dec. Dig. § 234.*]
5. Exceptions to Instructions.
Other exceptions to the charge afford no ground for a new trial.
6. Verdict Sustained.
The evidence authorized a finding for the plaintiff, and the verdict was not excessive.
Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; Geo. L. Bell, Judge.
Action by W. A. Andrews against the Seaboard Air Line Railway. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.
W. G. Loving, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
Lawton Nalley, of Atlanta, for defendant in error.
This was an action for damages against a railroad company by a passenger, where it was sought to recover on account of personal injuries resulting from the negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff obtained a verdict for $650. The defendant moved for a new trial, upon the general grounds, and upon others which complained: (a) Of the judge's refusal to grant a nonsuit; (b) of his omission to charge on specified subjects, and of one part of the charge as delivered by him; and (c) that the verdict was excessive. The motion for new trial was denied, and error was assigned upon this judgment. The case asmade by the plaintiff was substantially as follows:
On January 23, 1911, between half past 2 and 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the plaintiff purchased a ticket in Birmingham, Ala., over the line of defendant's railroad, from Birmingham to Piedmont, Ala. The defendant's train was standing in the car shed in Birmingham, and was due to leave at 3 o'clock. When the plaintiff went to get on the train, he was directed by the gatekeeper where to go. He went as directed to the train, which was in charge of the flagman, who was standing at the steps directing passengers into and off the train, and he was directed by the flagman to enter a designated car, which he did. He carried a valise in his right hand, and walked down the aisle of the car in quest of a seat. When about two-thirds of the distance he stumbled over a suit case, valise, or some other obstruction in the aisle, and struck his side on the arm of a seat. Two ribs were broken, and he was totally disabled for five or six weeks, suffered physical pain, and incurred physician's bills. He was a traveling salesman, earning a salary of $100 a month, and a certain percentage on sales made by him. The car was not lighted at all. There were furnaces near the car shed, which produced large quantities of smoke in that vicinity; other cars were standing near by on a parallel track, and the day was dark and cloudy; all of which, in addition to the fact that the train was under the car shed, tended to darken the inside of the car which plaintiff entered. He could not see or detect the obstruction in the aisle, and did not know of its presence until he came in contact with it. There was a general custom, known to the plaintiff and the defendant, for passengers to carry their hand baggage into the car and place it in the aisles opposite their seats. Other passengers had entered the car before the plaintiff, carrying hand baggage of the character mentioned. The facts relied on for recovery by the plaintiff, as stated above, were contested by the defendant. There was considerable evidence to show that the car was not dark, that hand baggage could readily be seen when in the aisle, and that the plaintiff was not injured at all.
1. The injury occurred in Alabama, and the liability of the defendant will depend upon the law of that state. No special law of Alabama was pleaded or proved, and the presumption is that the common law prevails there. Sou. R. Co. v. Cunningham, 123 Ga. 90, 50 S. E. 979. The case, therefore, must be considered as governed by the common law.
2. Stress is laid on the assignment of error which complains of the refusal of the judge to grant a nonsuit. At the time of the injury the plaintiff was rightfully on the defendant's car as a passenger. The defendant was bound to exercise extraordinary care for his safety. The train was a regular passenger train, and extraordinary care would have required defendant to exercise that extreme care and caution which every prudent and thoughtful person would use with a like train under like circumstances. Sou. R. Co. v. Cunningham, 123 Ga. 90 (2-4), 50 S. E. 979; Hutchinson on Carriers, § 895 et seq. Failure to exercise such care relatively to a passenger would constitute negligence. What facts would suffice to show the exercise of such care is ordinarily a question for the jury. The facts of this case, relatively to negligence of the defendant, were not such as would take the case out of the general rule. It could not he said, as a matter of law, that a very thoughtful and prudent person, engaged as a common carrier, knowing the custom of obstructing the aisle (the only way of ingress and egress to seats in the car) with valises and other hand baggage, and the danger incident thereto, would have directed his passenger to enter the car at a time when there were no artificial lights and it was too dark within for a passenger to readily detect obstructions before coming in contact with them. If it were dark in the car, extraordinary care would, at least, require that the employés of the company should see to it that the way was clear for the passenger to take his seat before directing him to enter, or to provide some means to prevent his injury by falling over baggage, which, under the known custom, was likely to be placed in the aisle. No similar case has been decided by this court.
Counsel for plaintiff in error cites the case of Burns v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 233 Pa. 304, 82 Atl. 246, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 811. On its facts the case was somewhat similar, except that there was no evidence of custom of passengers known to defendant to deposit their baggage in the aisle, and the question for decision was not upon the grant of a nonsuit. In the opinion it was said: ...
To continue reading
Request your trial