Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Branham

• Decision Date: 09 January 1958
• Docket Number: No. 57-110,57-110
• Parties: SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILROAD COMPANY and R. H. Williams, Appellants, v. Jesse H. BRANHAM, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 621

99 So.2d 621

SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILROAD COMPANY and R. H. Williams, Appellants, v. Jesse H. BRANHAM, Appellee.

No. 57-110.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 9, 1958.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 31, 1958.

Smathers, Thompson & Dyer and L. S. Bonsteel, Miami, for appellants.

Nichols, Gaither, Green, Frates & Beckham and Sam Daniels, Miami, for appellee.

PEARSON, Judge.

The Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company and R. H. Williams, defendants below, appeal from a final judgment based upon a jury verdict. The Seaboard Railroad operates a large freight yard in Jacksonville, Florida. This yard is referred to as the Hogan Street freight yard and is located approximately one block from a busy section of downtown Jacksonville. The defendant R. H. Williams was the yard conductor, employed by the defendant railroad company at the above yard and at the time of the accident which is the subject matter of this cause. The appellee was injured in the Hogan Street yard when the last car of a freight train was backed upon him.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial judge's denial of defendants' motion for directed verdict was error. Plaintiff was standing upon the track with his back to the unlighted train. No warning of the movement of the train was given and no member of the train crew was in the vicinity. The plaintiff entered the freight yard as a licensee and although at the moment of the impact he had exceeded the purpose of the license, in that he was voiding, the defendants owed to him a duty to warn him of any dangerous condition not open to ordinary observation, the breach of which duty was a contributing cause to the injury. The judgment is therefore affirmed.

The factual basis upon which the trial judge acted when he denied the motion for directed verdict must be set forth in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; inasmuch as a party moving for a directed verdict admits for the purposes of the motion not only the facts adduced but also every conclusion favorable to the adverse party that a jury might fairly and reasonably infer from those facts. Gravette v. Turner, 77 Fla. 311, 81 So. 476; Ehrens v. Miami Transit Co., 155 Fla. 394, 20 So.2d 261.

The Hogan Street freight yard is bounded on the north by Bay Street although Bay Street is not contiguous to the yard, on the south by Water Street, on the east by Hogan Street, and extends westward for many blocks. Clay, Pearl and Julia Streets, all of which are a part of downtown Jacksonville within one or two blocks, terminate at the north side of the yard. Aerial photographs and an engineer's survey which were introduced into evidence demonstrate that the defendant railroad has had the good fortune to have a great industrial city grow up around its freight yard. Located in the heart of this city, the yard is immediately adjacent to the busy waterfront area of the St. Johns River port on one side and downtown Jacksonville on the other. The yard was open to public ingress and egress at every point where a freight shed or other service building did not impede progress. As would be expected, in a thriving metropolitan area, the general public had walked through, in, and about the yard for many years.

Plaintiff, upon the evening in question, at a time after sundown, but before it was completely dark, was watching a boat dock at a wharf on Water Street, immediately south of the freight yard. He suffered from a kidney condition and at that time he suddenly had to urinate. Since there was a lady in the group of spectators, plaintiff walked across Water Street and took a path that led across the track. After crossing the track he walked up the track so that he passed three box cars. The third and fourth cars were about twelve feet apart and the plaintiff stepped between them to urinate. This 'fourth' car was actually the last car of a train consisting of thirty-seven freight cars and an engine. As the plaintiff stood with his back to the 'fourth' car, the train was backed, knocking plaintiff down. The train subsequently passed over him, severing plaintiff's legs. The train was backed by an engine which was approximately one-third of a mile away. No warning signal was given. All five members of the train crew were congregated in the cab of the engine, so that no one was at the rear of the train.

The appellants contend that under these facts the plaintiff was a trespasser or licensee to whom the only duty owed by the defendants was to refrain from inflicting wilful or wanton injury after discovering that he was in a position of danger. And therefore, because there was no evidence that the defendants discovered the plaintiff there was no violation of any duty owed to the plaintiff, and the trial court should have directed a verdict for the defendants.

It is true that there are many railroad accident cases which class a licensee with a trespasser, and we will not undertake a discussion of the facts involved in each of these cases. It is sufficient to state that we feel that the more recent and better reasoned decisions permit a distinction between the position occupied by a licensee upon railroad property and that occupied by a trespasser. A most recent case of the Supreme Court of Florida, although not a railroad accident case, set out the distinction recognized by the law in general.

'As a licensee, the defendant owed the plaintiff the duty to refrain from wanton negligence or wilful misconduct, and to warn her of any defect or condition known to defendant to be dangerous if such danger was not open to ordinary observation by plaintiff.' McNulty v. Hurley, Fla.1957, 97 So.2d 185, 189.

Fifty-six years ago the Supreme Court of Florida had before it anothr case arising out of an accident in a Jacksonville railroad freight yard--Morris v. Florida Cent. & P....