Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Hollomon
| Decision Date | 28 January 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. 36938,No. 1,36938,1 |
| Citation | 97 Ga.App. 16,102 S.E.2d 185 |
| Parties | SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILROAD COMPANY v. J. L. HOLLOMON |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
The rulings made in the body of the opinion are so succinctly stated that there is no need of headnotes.
J. L. Hollomon filed an action against the Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company for damages arising out of a collision between a tractor on which the plaintiff was riding and the defendant's train.
The petition alleged in part: that the defendant has its railroad line running through a field on the east side of Georgia Highway No. 55, the property of the petitioner, and that, at this point, the railroad maintains a field crossing for the use and benefit of the petitioner and his employees; that the crossing in the field has been maintained and kept up and installed originally by the defendant; that the petitioner is the owner of certain lands lying on the east side of Georgia Highway No. 55, in Stewart County, Georgia, and near the City of Richland, and that he also resides near the tract of land; that the defendant has constructed across, over and upon the tract of land a certain railroad track; the track running in a north-south direction and leading into the City of Richland; that the highway hereinabove designated runs practically parallel with the railroad track and that both the highway and the track run over, across and upon the lands of petitioner; that there is cultivated land owned by the petitioner between the highway and the railroad track; that there is other cultivated land lying beyond and to the east of the track; that for the purpose of affording the petitioner, his agents, servants, representatives, employees, and members of the general public access to the cultivable and cultivated lands, the defendant has constructed a certain crossing, leading over its railroad tract, running through the lands; that the crossing was originally constructed by and has since been maintained by the defendant; that there are wooded areas and embankments along each side of defendant's railroad track running over, across, and upon petitioner's lands; that at the point of the crossing erected and maintained by the defendant, across the track, there is a certain wooded area on the east side thereof; that a person either on foot or riding a vehicle, approaching the crossing from the east, would have his vision of the track obscured until he was practically on the track; that his vision of the track would be most particularly obscured in viewing the track to the north of the private crossing, when approaching the crossing; that such obstruction existed and exists until a person or vehicle is practically on the track; that, however, upon entering directly on the track, the obstruction did not and does not obscure the view particularly in either direction; the physical characteristics of such obstruction being such that a person approaching the track, either on foot or riding a vehicle, could not and cannot see up or down the track until directly on the track and in the path of any oncoming train or trains; that a person, either walking or riding a motor vehicle, would find his eye level not over ten feet above the ground, and at such crossing, his field of vision in any direction would be only approximately half that of a person riding in a locomotive, whose eye level would be approximately twice the height of the person walking or riding a farm tractor or other motor vehicle; that the employees, servants, agents, representatives, section hands, and all other personnel of the defendant were well acquainted and familiar with the crossing, running across the defendant's railroad track on the lands of the petitioner; that the engineer and conductor on trains operated by the defendant and running along the line were acquainted with the crossing and had full knowledge that the petitioner, petitioner's agents, servants, representatives, and other members of the general public used the crossing as a means of access to the cultivated fields to the east of the track; that approximately 200 yards north of the field crossing through the property of the petitioner there is a public crossing where a certain county road running east to west crosses this railroad track, running north and south; that this crossing referred to as 200 yards north is a public crossing and is used by the public in general and has all signs and warnings at the crossing, as provided by law; that he lives in a house on the west side of Georgia Highway No. 55 and that, on the afternoon of October 24, 1955, he drove his tractor across the highway in an easterly direction into the field road which is approximately across from his home and did cross the railroad track after getting on said field road, going in an easterly direction; that he attended to whatever business he had to do on the west side of the field crossing and, upon completion of his duties, he started back to his home, going in a westerly direction; that upon approaching the crossing going in a westerly direction to get back home, as he approached this field crossing, at about 2:30 p. m., driving a tractor and going about five miles per hour, he looked to see if the train was coming, and having looked, could not see a train approaching; that he listened to determine if he could hear a train approaching and, having listened, he could not hear a train approaching; after having looked and listened, he attempted to cross the track and was struck by the front part of the engine of a certain train; that as he approached the crossing, he was riding and operating a farm tractor, and was traveling about five miles per hour; that the vehicle being a farm tractor was making quite a bit of noise, caused by the discharge of its exhaust; that the noise is normal and customary and to be associated with such a farm tractor; that this noise from the vehicle naturally tended to drown out lower noises, but that the noise created by the farm tractor is not equal to the noise of a train whistle, a train bell, or the engine of a train traveling under power; that he approached the crossing at a reduced speed and both looked and listened to see if he could see or hear a locomotive or train approaching; that he exercised every reasonable care and precaution in attempting the crossing and was in the exercise of ordinary care in attempting the crossing; that the train, which struck him as he started onto the track, was 'coasting' or running under very little power; that the locomotive running and operating in this fashion created very little noise and that the noise of his farm tractor exceeded the little noise created by the locomotive, making it impossible for him to hear the train, even though he attempted to hear; that the wooded area and other obstructions made it impossible for him to see the train approaching, with his restricted field of vision, although he attempted to see; that he doubtless could have seen the train approaching had his eye level been increased only a few feet, but that, when riding on the seat of a farm tractor such as he was operating, the operator's eye level is less than ten feet above the ground and his field of vision thereby relatively restricted; that although he attempted to both see and hear the approach of the train he consequently neither saw nor heard the train and was struck by the locomotive as his tractor entered on the railroad track; that north of this field crossing there is a downhill grade for approximately 100 yards and that the train had cut off the power to coast downhill, thus making very little, if any noise; that the railroad track across his lands in Stewart County, Georgia, runs in a straight course for not less than 100 yards, going south, before it approaches the crossing at which petitioner was struck; that the view, from his elevated level of vision, seated or standing in the cab of his locomotive, of the engineer and any and all other members of the defendant's train crew was absolutely unobstructed in seeing down the track; over and above any and all obstructions, directly onto the road leading to and the crossing on which petitioner was struck; that said engineer and other members of the train crew did on this occasion see the petitioner attempting to cross the track and could have halted the train beofre it struck petitioner and his tractor, or that said engineer and said other members of the train crew, from their elevated point of vantage, could have halted the train before it struck to cross the track had they been keeping a clear lookout ahead, as required by law; that it is the practice of the defendant in operating trains along the track to give the usual customary warning when crossing public crossings, but on this occasion there was no warning given as the train approached the public crossing 200 yards north; that the train crew gave no whistle or other warning at the public crossing 200 yards north of the crossing at which the petitioner was struck, and although there is no statutory duty resting on a railroad company to give warning of the approach of a train at a private crossing, the engineer in this matter was guilty of negligence in failing to give any signal by bell, whistle, or otherwise, and in failing to have the engine under control so that it could be stopped prior to strking the petitioner; and same constituted negligence as a matter of fact, the engineer full well seeing petitioner attempting to make a crossing and, in the face of that, charging headlong into him in absolute disregard for the destruction of human life and property; that on this occasion the train was pulled by what is known as a diesel electric engine and that, on this occasion, the headlight was not burning, although required by custom and practice of the railroad so to do; that upon the train striking the front of his tractor with the left front of the engine, that he...
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