Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Coxetter

Decision Date30 November 1921
Citation82 Fla. 414,90 So. 469
PartiesSEABOARD AIR LINE RY. CO. v. COXETTER.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied Jan. 6, 1922.

Error to Circuit Court, Leon County; E. C. Love, Judge.

Action by S. V. Coxetter against the Seaboard Air Line Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Fence law applicable only to injuries to animals by trains. The statute (chapter 4706, Acts of 1899, amended by chapter 5020 Acts of 1901 [sections 4586-4595, Revised General Statutes of Florida 1920]) imposing upon railroad companies and persons constructing and operating railroads in this state the duty to erect and maintain fences along the lines of such roads suitable and sufficient to prevent the intrusion of animals upon their tracks and fixing penalties and the measure of damages in cases resulting from a failure to do so is applicable, and liability under it attaches, only in cases where the injuries alleged are inflicted upon the animal or animals by the engines, cars, or trains of the railroad company or persons operating the railroad--that is to say, by the operation or movement of the engines, cars, or trains of such companies or persons.

Injury to animal in switch held not within fence law. The negligence alleged in this case is that the defendant railway company negligently and carelessly allowed and permitted a certain device called a 'switch' and the appurtenances forming a part thereof which connected its main line with the side track to become in a defective and dangerous condition that animals were allowed to and did habitually run at large in the community and did come and go at will upon said track at said point, all of which was well known to defendant, who made no objection to such use, but acquiesced and consented thereto. The injury alleged is that the horse of plaintiff in attempting to cross defendant's track where said switch was located was caught and held in such defective switch by one of its feet in such manner that it was injured to an extent beyond recovery and was thereupon killed by plaintiff. Held, that the statute requiring railroad companies and persons owning and operating railroads to fence their tracks and fixing the measure of damages and penalties in cases arising from injuries sustained as a result of their failure to do so is not applicable.

Common-law rule governing injuries to animals stated. The rule at common law is that, where animals roaming at large go upon the right of way or tracks of a railroad company and are injured, the company is not liable unless the injuries suffered are the result of wantonness or willfulness on the part of the railroad company.

Common-law requirement to keep animals off another's premises not applicable in Florida. The common law in so far as it requires the owners of animals to keep them off the premises of another and renders them liable to the owner of such premises for damage done by such stock is not in force in Florida.

Injuries to animals running at large actionable on proof of negligence. Animals running at large are not necessarily trespassers when they go upon the tracks of railroad companies in this state, and railroad companies owe to the owners of such animals the duty not to negligently injure them, and may be liable for injuries negligently inflicted upon such animals going upon their tracks, although their injuries may not be wanton or willful. The action, however must be grounded upon the negligence of the railroad company and the burden of proof of such negligence is upon the plaintiff.

COUNSEL

W. J. Oven, of Tallahassee, for plaintiff in error.

W. C. Hodges and Fred H. Davis, both of Tallahassee, for defendant in error.

OPINION

WEST J.

The plaintiff, S. V. Coxetter, brought suit against the defendant, Seaboard Air Line Railway Company for the value of a horse injured upon the railroad track of defendant near Lloyd, an unincorporated town in Jefferson county, Fla. The injury sustained was of such character that the horse was considered worthless and was put to death by plaintiff. Upon a trial the verdict was for plaintiff, and judgment accordingly was entered in plaintiff's favor and against defendant. To review this judgment defendant took writ of error from this court.

The theory of plaintiff's case is not entirely clear. The negligence alleged consisted primarily in defendant's failure to perform its statutory duty to erect and maintain a fence along both sides of its right of way suitable and sufficient to prevent the intrusion of animals upon its track at the point where the alleged injury occurred.

It is also alleged that defendant did not take reasonable care and precaution to maintain its track in such condition as not to negligently and carelessly injure animals which were habitually accustomed to go upon its track at the point where the alleged injury occurred; that horses, cattle, and other livestock were allowed to and did habitually run at large in said community and did come and go across said track at said point from time to time, all of which was well known to defendant; that defendant made no objection to such use of its track and took no steps to prevent animals going thereon, but acquiesced and consented to such use; that at said point a device called a 'switch' connecting its main line with its side track was permitted to become in such defective and dangerous condition that plaintiff's horse in going upon said track where the switch was located was caught and held by one of its feet in such switch in such manner that it was so injured as to render it beyone recovery, and therefore valueless, whereupon it was killed.

So much of the declaration as is necessary to present this theory of the case is as follows:

'It thereby became and was the duty of said defendant at said point to take reasonable care and precaution to keep and maintain its track and so manage its line of railroad at said point as not to negligently and carelessly injure such live stock and cattle which were habitually accustomed to go and stray upon said track at said point; that said defendant's said main line and said side track at and through the said town of Lloyd was laid practically parallel to the public road running to and through said town, and was practically connected with said public road by a short stretch of uninclosed land which lay between defendant's said main line and side track and the said public road, and that horses, cattle, and other live stock were allowed to and did habitually run at large in said unincorporated town of Lloyd, and did walk upon and cross over defendant's said line of railroad at said point from time to time, as defendant well knew; that although said defendant well knew of the fact that its track was uninclosed with the fence required by law, and that horses and cattle were thereby habitually allowed to run at large and stray upon and over its track at said point, yet said defendant made no objection to such use of its track, and took no steps to prevent said horses and cattle going thereon, and acquiesced therein; that at and in said unincorporated town of Lloyd, in Jefferson county, Fla., and at said point of its said track therein where said defendant had not erected and did not maintain the fence along both sides of its said track required by law, and at the said point where defendant knew, or ought to have known by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, that its track was so situated at and through said town as to become attractive to horses and cattle to stray upon and cross over the same, and at said point where defendant knew that said cattle and horses habitually roamed at large and habitually strayed upon and over its said tracks without objection and with the acquiescence and consent of said defendant, and on or about the 27th day of March, A. D. 1916, aforesaid, said defendant negligently and carelessly allowed the certain device called a 'switch' which connected its said main line with said side track, and the appurtenances forming a part thereof, to become in such a defective and dangerous condition that a certain horse, the property of plaintiff, in attempting to stray upon and across defendant's said track where said switch was located was caught fast and held by one of its feet therein in such a manner that said horse was so badly injured and damaged by reason thereof that it was pronounced by an experienced veterinary surgeon to be beyond recovery or repair, and was thereupon ordered killed and killed because of such injuries received by it by being caught fast and held in said defective switch then and there maintained by the defendant at said point where it knew, or ought to have known by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, that horses and cattle were likely to stray upon and cross over said track and switch because of defendant's failure to erect and maintain a suitable and sufficient fence on both sides of its said track to prevent their intrusion thereon, as required by law; that said defective and dangerous condition of its said switch at said point was known to, or ought to have been known to, defendant by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence on its part; that as a proximate result of defendant's said negligence plaintiff has been damaged to the extent of the value of said horse, wherefore plaintiff sues the said defendant, and claims $350 as his damages.'

This declaration was demurred to upon various grounds, among them, that it sets up no cause of action against defendant; that it shows no violation of duty imposed upon defendant by statute; that it shows no violation of duty imposed upon defendant by common law; that it shows that the animal described...

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5 cases
  • Morgan v. City of Lakeland
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • November 6, 1925
    ... ... the city. S. A. L. Ry. Co. v. Coxetter, 90 So. 469, ... 82 Fla. 414; S. F. & W. Ry. Co. v. Geiger, 21 Fla ... 669, 58 Am. Rep. 697. If ... ...
  • Livingston v. Drew Lumber Co.
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • December 20, 1921
  • Rockow v. Hendry
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • January 23, 1970
    ...Still in force in Florida.' (Emphasis supplied). This abrogation of the common law was recognized in Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Coxetter, 1922, 82 Fla. 414, 90 So. 469, on page 472, where the Court 'In many jurisdictions in this country, however, this rule at common law has been greatly r......
  • Fisel v. Wynns
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • February 8, 1996
    ...but had a right to rely upon the owners of them performing their duty to keep the animals confined. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Coxetter, 82 Fla. 414, 422, 90 So. 469, 472 (1921). "Open range" laws enacted during the 1800s reversed this rule and placed the burden on property owners to fence th......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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