Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Simon
| Decision Date | 08 December 1908 |
| Citation | 47 So. 1001,56 Fla. 545 |
| Parties | SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. v. SIMON et al. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Headnotes Filed December 19, 1908.
Error to Circuit Court, Jefferson County; John W. Malone, Judge.
Action by Abraham Simon and another, copartners, against the Seaboard Air Line Railway. Judgment for plaintiffs and defendant brings error. Affirmed, if plaintiffs enter a remittitur; otherwise, reversed.
Syllabus by the Court
Where the subject embraced in the body of an act is less comprehensive than, but is included within, the subject expressed in the title, the provision of the Constitution that each law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title, may not be violated, when the subject expressed in the title is not misleading.
The provision of the state Constitution that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law, and the provisions of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States as to property rights, extend to the property held and used by corporations, since the beneficial ownership of such property is in natural persons, and the law forbids the doing by indirection that which is forbidden to be directly done.
The legality of classifications adopted for legislative regulation may be determined with reference to the due process of law provision of the state Constitution; but, as such determination involves a federal question, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States control.
Classifications adopted for legislative regulation should have some just relation to, or reasonable basis in, essential differences of conditions and circumstance with reference to the subject regulated, and should not be merely arbitrary; and all similarly situated or having similar legal duties and obligations in regard to the subject regulated should be included in one class, at least where there are no practical differences that are sufficient to legally warrant a further or special classification in the interest of the general welfare.
The legal duties of persons, firms, or corporations operating railroads may be of a peculiar nature and essentially different from the duties of other common carriers, and as to such matters they may be separately classified for purposes of legislative regulation.
Where the subject of regulation, as in chapter 5424, p. 104, Acts of 1905, is payment for goods lost in transit by a common carrier, a subject as to which the legal duties of all common carriers are similar, and there appears to be no reasonable basis for imposing the burden of the regulation upon railroads alone, a statute making such regulation applicable to railroads only provides for an unreasonable classification, that in effect denies to those operating railroads due process of law and the equal protection of the laws, in violation of constitutional rights, and such statute is inoperative
COUNSEL Geo. P. Raney, for plaintiff in error.
T. M Puleston, for defendants in error.
In an action in the circuit court for Jefferson county to recover for sugar lost while being transported by the railroad company in March, 1907, the court at the request of the plaintiff gave the following instruction to the jury 'The court instructs you to find for the plaintiffs the value of the sugar, to wit, $145, and allow them in addition thereto 25 per cent. per annum on said sum from the date when plaintiffs' claim was filed with defendant.' The defendant excepted thereto. Verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiffs in accordance with the instruction above quoted. A motion for new trial covering the charge was overruled. The defendant excepted and took writ of error.
The only question presented for determination is whether the statute authorizing the allowance of 25 per cent. per annum in addition to the value of the goods is not unconstitutional, because the classification adopted is such that it deprives the company of property without due process of law and denies to it the equal protection of the laws.
Chapter 5424, p. 104, Acts of 1905, provides 'that any person from or corporation operating any railroad in this state' shall, within 90 days after the filing of a claim for the loss of or damage to any shipment, pay the claim, and upon failure to so pay 'then they shall pay to said claimant the sum of 25 per cent. per annum on the principal sum of said claim, and when the said claimant shall bring suit and recover for his claim * * * he shall be allowed in said suit the said 25 per cent. per annum in addition to the principal sum of said claim and have judgment therefor,' provided the recovery is greater than the sum that had been tendered in settlement of the claim before the expiration of the said 90 days.
The title to the chapter is 'an act providing that any common carrier transporting freight shall pay claims for a loss or damage to any shipment received by said common carrier within a certain time from the filing by the shipper of said claim with the common carrier, and when, under certain conditions they fail so to pay said claim, the said common carrier shall pay interest on the said claim at the rate of twenty-five per cent. per annum, and under certain conditions shall be allowed judgment for the said interest in addition to said claim.'
While the title of the statute extends to the comprehensive class of 'any common carrier,' the body of the act covers only 'any person, firm or corporation operating any railroad in this state.'
Where the body of a statute covers a subject affecting a class not covered by the title, the constitutional provision that 'each law enacted in the Legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title' may be violated; but where the class affected by the subject contained in the body of the act is not as broad as, but is included within, that expressed in the title, the quoted provision of the organic law may not be violated. The body of the act should not contain and operate upon a subject affecting a class that is broader and more comprehensive than the one expressed in the title of the act; but the subject covered by the body of the act may be more restricted, if included within the subject expressed in the title, when the title is not misleading. The title may be broader than the act; but the act should not be broader than the title. Otherwise, the subject embraced in the act may not be expressed in the title, as required by the provision of the organic law.
Common carriers of goods ordinarily include all persons, firms, or corporations operating a railroad; but persons, firms, or corporations operating a railroad do not ordinarily include all common carriers of goods. The class affected by the subject embraced in the statute is not as broad as, but is included within, that expressed in the title. See Lewis' Suth. Stat. Const. § 124; 26 Am. & Eng Ency, Law (2d Ed.) 582; State ex rel. Moodie v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929.
The legality of classifications adopted for legislative regulation may be determined with reference to the due process of law provision of the state Constitution; but, as such determination involves a federal question, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States control.
The provision of the state Constitution that 'no person shall * * * be deprived of * * * property without due process of law' extends to the property held and used by corporations, since the beneficial ownership of such property is in natural persons, and the law forbids the doing by indirection that which is forbidden to be directly done. Upon the same principle of law the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, relating to due process of law and the equal protection of the laws, being intended to be complete in its effectiveness, apply to the property held and used by corporations. State v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. (decided at this term) 47 So. 969.
The requirements of due process of law relate to rights, as well as to remedies, and extend to all the powers of government. The guaranty of due process of law afforded by the Constitution forbids the arbitrary exercise of governmental power by the Legislature.
An unreasonable classification of persons or corporations for the purposes of a legislative regulation that will be burdensome to those included in the class regulated, leaving others who are similarly conditioned with reference to the subject regulated free from the regulation and burden, may be an arbitrary exercise of governmental power.
The language of the statute in this case is explicit in limiting its operation to only one class of common carriers of goods, to wit, persons, firms, or corporations operating railroads; and the validity of the act with reference to the classification must be determined by a consideration of its plain and unambiguous terms. The subject regulated is not peculiar to railroads, but is equally and similarly applicable to all common carriers of goods, whether the service is rendered by the use of railroads, boats, or other means.
If this statute is enforced, and two entirely similar shipments are made at the same time between the same points, one by means of a railroad and the other by means of a steamboat, and both shipments are lost in transit, the shipper may, under the circumstances stated in the act, recover from the operators of the railroad 25 per cent. per annum in addition to the value of the goods lost by it; while under exactly similar circumstances only the value of the goods may be recovered from the operators of the...
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