Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Dixon

• Decision Date: 14 November 1913
• Citation: 79 S.E. 1118,140 Ga. 804
• Parties: SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. CO. v. DIXON.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

79 S.E. 1118

140 Ga. 804

SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. CO. v. DIXON.

Supreme Court of Georgia

November 14, 1913

Syllabus by the Court.

Where shipments of lumber in car load lots were consigned to a person at a named city, and were transported to their destination over the railroad on which they were shipped, and the consignee was given notice and afforded due opportunity to receive and unload the lumber, the liability of the railroad company as a common carrier ceased. In the absence of any law, valid rule of the railroad commission, contract or custom raising such a duty, it was not bound, at the request of the consignee, to deliver the cars to another carrier, to be transported to a different part of the same city, where the consignees desired to ship such lumber by steamship.

If the consignee relied on a usage or custom for the purpose of raising such a duty, he would have to take such usage or custom as it existed.

Error from Superior Court, Chatham County; W. G. Charlton, Judge.

Action by J. M. Dixon against the Seaboard Air Line Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed.

Anderson Cann & Cann and Thos. F. Walsh, all of Savannah, for plaintiff in error.

Osborne & Lawrence, of Savannah, for defendant in error.

LUMPKIN J. (after stating the facts as above).

1. If the plaintiff had cause for injunction against the defendant railroad company, it was because of some impending wrong which the latter was about to commit on the former. The alleged wrong was a violation of the duty of the railroad company as a common carrier. If there was any such duty, it must have been imposed by legislative enactment, by valid rule of the railroad commission, by contract, or by custom. Was such a duty, arising from any of these sources shown?

In Coles, Simkins & Co. v. Central Railroad & Banking Co., 86 Ga. 251, 12 S.E. 749, State v. Wrightsville & Tennille R. Co., 104 Ga. 437, 30 S.E. 891, and Central Ry Co. v. Murphey, 116 Ga. 866, 43 S.E. 265, 60 L.R.A. 817 it was held that there was no law which required a railroad company to make a contract to forward goods beyond its own line. The question of the power of the Legislature or the railroad commission was not determined. Under these rulings whether or not it will adopt a custom of issuing through bills of lading, at least as to intrastate freight, is optional, not compulsory. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Augusta Brokerage Co., 122 Ga. 648, 50 S.E. 473, 69 L.R.A. 119. Even had it been shown that the company had, on certain occasions, transported cars from the initial point of the shipment to a terminal point beyond its line, this would not alone suffice to impose on it the duty of doing so. Coles v. Central Railroad, etc., Co., supra.

But there was no evidence that the railroad company had transported any lumber beyond its own yards except upon request or order from the Central Railway Company. When the Seaboard Air Line Railway received at various points car loads of lumber consigned to Dixon at Savannah, and transported such cars to the point of destination--that is to the usual place of delivery of such cars on its line in Savannah-- and gave the consignee due notice and opportunity to receive and carry away the lumber, its liability as a common carrier ceased, in the absence of a law, valid rule of the railroad commission, custom, or usage to deliver the cars to another company for transportation to a different part of the same city. No statute or rule of the railroad commission raising such a duty has been shown. Civil Code, § 2655, does not apply to such a case. These were not through shipments of goods which had not reached their destination, and the shipments were not consigned to any point on the Central Railroad or beyond the terminus of...