Seaboard Air-Line Ry. Co. v. Holliday

• Decision Date: 18 November 1927
• Docket Number: 6007.
• Parties: SEABOARD AIR-LINE RY. CO. v. HOLLIDAY.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

140 S.E. 507

165 Ga. 200

SEABOARD AIR-LINE RY. CO. v. HOLLIDAY.

No. 6007.

Supreme Court of Georgia

November 18, 1927

Syllabus by the Court.

Where the plaintiff and the defendant, in an action to recover land, claim under a common grantor, and a valid deed from the common grantor to the plaintiff is prior in time to the deed from the common grantor to the defendant, and is duly recorded, the title of the plaintiff is superior to that of the defendant; and the court did not err in these circumstances in directing a verdict for the plaintiff, in the absence of some valid attack by the defendant upon such title of the plaintiff.

Adverse possession does not run against a remainderman while the life tenant is in life.

(a) If two estates in the same property unite in the same person in his individual capacity, the lesser estate is merged in the greater.

(b) The coincidence of two independent estates, presently held by one and the same person or class of persons, is a necessary prerequisite to a merger; and no merger can take place until such identity of person and of present interest in point of fact exists.

(c) Whenever a greater and a lesser estate meet in one and the same person, without any intermediate estate, the lesser is sunk in the greater.

(d) The doctrine of merger of estates is designed primarily for the benefit of one who acquires an interest in property greater than he possessed in the first instance, and will not be held to apply against his will to his disadvantage.

(e) One estate cannot be merged in another, unless both estates are owned by the same person in the same right.

(f) In order for legal and equitable estates to merge, the estates must be coextensive and commensurate.

(g) Where M., the owner of a tract of land, conveyed to H. a one-ninth undivided interest in remainder therein, to take effect upon the death of the grantor, and where M. thereafter conveyed to W. by a deed which purported to convey the entire tract to secure a debt, the effect of said deed was to convey to W. only the life estate of M. in the one-ninth undivided interest in remainder previously conveyed to H., and the eight-ninths undivided interest in the tract which remained in M. after the above conveyance to H.; and, where M thereafter conveyed to deed to H. and five other persons the entire tract, the effect of this deed was to convey to H. and the other grantees therein only the equity of redemption of M. under her deed to W. in and to the life estate reserved under her deed to H., and the eight-ninths undivided interest which she had conveyed to W. to secure debt. In these circumstances there was no merger of H.'s legal estate in remainder, under her deed from M., and her undivided one-sixth interest in the equity of redemption in this tract remaining in M. after her conveyance to W., and acquired by H. and her cograntees under the conveyance from M. to them.

(h) There being no merger of H.'s legal estate in remainder under her deed from M., and her one-sixth undivided interest in the equity of redemption in this land remaining in M after her deed to W. to secure debt, and acquired by H. under the deed from M. to her and her five cograntees, prescription did not run against H. during the lifetime of M.; and W. and those claiming under him did not acquire a title by prescription to M.'s legal estate in remainder by virtue of possession held by them during the lifetime of M.

Where W. reduced his debt to judgment, and had the execution issued thereon levied upon the land conveyed by M. to him to secure such debt, and where H. and her five cotenants under the deed from M. to them filed a claim to this land when so levied upon, setting up title under the deed from M. to them, and where the claimants afterwards voluntarily dismissed their claim, and the land was sold under the execution of W. and was bought in by him, H. is not estopped in these circumstances from asserting title to her one-ninth undivided interest in remainder under her deed from M., against W. and those claiming under him, she having done nothing else to induce W. to buy the tract embracing her said interest, or to entrap him.

Where the plaintiff relied for recovery upon legal title, and the defendant sought to defeat her legal title by an estoppel the burden was upon the defendant to establish all the elements necessary to constitute the estoppel, including want of knowledge of the true title by the purchaser at the sheriff's sale, under whom the defendant claimed by mesne conveyances; and, the defendant having failed to carry this burden by showing such want of knowledge of the true title in such purchaser, the court did not err in directing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, she having shown title to the premises in dispute superior to that of the defendant.

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; G. H. Howard, Judge.

Action by Mrs. Lula Holliday against the Seaboard Air-Line Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Randolph, Parker & Fortson, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Granger Hansell and Anderson, Rountree & Crenshaw, all of Atlanta, for defendant in error.

HINES J.

1. Mrs. Lula Holliday brought her action against the Seaboard Air-Line Railway Company to recover a one-ninth undivided interest in three described parcels of land, which were parts of a larger described tract of 14 acres. Both parties claimed under Mrs. McMillan, a common grantor. She owned the larger tract. On June 24, 1892, Mrs. McMillan conveyed, by deed recorded on July 1, 1892, to Mrs. Holliday a one-ninth undivided interest in the larger tract, to take effect upon the death of the grantor. On September 20, 1894, Mrs. McMillan conveyed to one Wyatt the tract of 14 acres, by deed to secure a debt, recorded September 22, 1894. The debt not having been paid, Wyatt brought suit and obtained judgment against Mrs. McMillan on November 21, 1895. On December 21, 1895, Wyatt, by quitclaim deed recorded on December 28, 1895, conveyed to Janie H. McMillan, with other property, the 14-acre tract for the purpose of levy and sale under his judgment. Thereafter the execution issued on said judgment was levied upon property embracing the 14-acre tract and the premises in dispute. After due advertisement, the property was sold by the sheriff on the first Tuesday in January, 1901, and bought in by Wyatt, and the sheriff conveyed it to him. By mesne conveyances from Wyatt to Burton and from Burton to the defendant, the latter claims title to the lands embracing the premises in dispute.

As both the plaintiff and the defendant claim title under Mrs. McMillan as a common grantor, and as the deed from the common grantor to Mrs. Holliday is prior in date to the deed from Mrs. McMillan to Wyatt, under whom the defendant claims by mesne conveyances, Mrs. Holliday obtained a title superior to that of the defendant. This is so for the reason that, where the plaintiff and defendant claim title from a common propositus, and that of the plaintiff is prior in time, and is not invalid for any of the reasons assigned in the defendant's attack upon it, the direction of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff is proper. Lee v. Pearson, 138 Ga. 646, 75 S.E. 1051.

2. But it is insisted by the defendant that the evidence shows that it has a good title by prescription to the premises in dispute. The defendant and those under whom it claims had been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, and exclusive possession of the premises in dispute, under a claim of right, from January 1, 1901, until August 18, 1925. when the present suit was brought. In reply to this contention, the plaintiff asserts that she acquired title to these premises as remainderman under the deed from Mrs. McMillan to her, and that in consequence she could not assert her title and recover possession of this land until the death of Mrs McMillan, which took place only a few months prior to the bringing of this suit. It is now well settled that adverse possession does not run against a remainderman while the life tenant lives. The life tenant, or those claiming under her, being entitled to the possession of the property, no suit can be maintained therefor by the remainderman, and the defendant has no possession which could become adverse so as to ripen into a prescriptive title against the remainderman so long as the life tenant lives. Bull v. Walker, 71 Ga. 195; Bagley v. Kennedy, 81 Ga. 721, 8 S.E. 742; Lamar v. Pearre, 82 Ga. 354, 9 S.E. 1043, ...