Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Brooks

• Decision Date: 17 June 1921
• Docket Number: 2364.
• Citation: 107 S.E. 878,151 Ga. 625
• Parties: SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. v. BROOKS.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

107 S.E. 878

151 Ga. 625

SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. v. BROOKS.

No. 2364.

Supreme Court of Georgia

June 17, 1921

Syllabus by the Court.

Where a suit to recover damages for the homicide of an employee of a railway company is brought under federal Employers' Liability Act, § 6 (U. S. Comp. St.§ 8662), by the administratrix of the deceased employee, the action is barred by the statute of limitations, where it was commenced more than two years after the date of the homicide sued for, but within two years from the date of the appointment of the administratrix.

Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.

On questions as to the construction of federal statutes, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are final, but in the absence of direct adjudication it is the duty of a state court to determine the question by the exercise of its own judgment, enlightened by the best available authorities.

The denial of a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court is not binding as a precedent in another case, and does not come within the doctrine of stare decisis under Civ. Code 1910, § 6207.

Certified question from Court of Appeals.

Action by Eugenia Brooks, administratrix against the Seaboard Air Line Railway. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brought error to the Court of Appeals, which certified a question to the Supreme Court. Question answered.

Randolph & Parker and S. F. Parham, all of Atlanta, and J. Glenn Giles, of Marietta, for plaintiff in error.

Caleb Clarke and Westmoreland & Smith, all of Atlanta, for defendant in error.

GILBERT J.

The Court of Appeals certified the following question to this court for instructions:

"Where a suit to recover damages for the homicide of an employee of a railway company is brought, under the federal Employers' Liability Act, by the administrator of the estate of the deceased employee, is the action barred by the statute of limitations, where it was commenced more than two years after the date of the homicide sued for, but within two years from the date of the appointment of the administrator?"

The limitation provided in section 6 of the federal Employers' Liability Act as amended is as follows:

"No action shall be maintained under this act unless commenced within two years from the day the cause of action accrued." 8 U.S. Comp. Stat. p. 9432, § 8662.

In 2 Roberts on Federal Liability of Carriers, 1142, the author declares that--

"A hopeless diversity of opinion exists, among the courts construing state statutes giving rights of action for death, as to whether statutes of limitation begin to run from the date of the death or from the subsequent date of the appointment of an administrator."

The author might well have stated further that the decisions of the courts of last resort of the states, some of which contain able and elaborate opinions have often been by divided courts. The statutes in the different jurisdictions vary in their terms and phraseology, and "there is a resulting diversity of opinion as to whether the period within which suit must be commenced is to be computed from the time of the injury, the date of the decedent's death or the time when a personal representative is appointed." 8 R.C.L. 803, § 82; Atlantic, etc., R Co. v. McDilda, 125 Ga. 468, 54 S.E. 140, 114 Am.St.Rep 240; Chapman v. Central Ry. Co., 20 Ga.App. 251, 254, 92 S.E. 1025. In Fowlkes v. Nashville & Decatur R. Co., 56 Tenn. (9 Heisk.) 829, based upon the Tennessee statute providing that the suit should be commenced "within one year after the cause of action accrues," it was held that the statute began to run from the time of the injury. In Sherman v. Western Stage Co., 24 Iowa 515, 554, and Murphy v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co., 80 Iowa 26, 45 N.W. 392, based upon the Iowa statute providing that the suit should be commenced within two years after the cause of action "accrues," it was held that the statute began to run from the time of the injury. In Raugland v. Anderson, 30 Minn. 386, 15 N.W. 676, Crapo v. Syracuse,

183 N.Y. 395, 76 N.E. 465, s. c., 184 N.Y. 561, 76 N.E. 1092, based upon the New York statute (Laws 1886, c. 572) providing that the action "must be commenced within one year after the cause of action therefor shall have accrued," it was held, three of the seven judges dissenting, that the cause of action did not accrue until the appointment of an administratrix. The dissenting opinion of Judge Vann is particularly clear and convincing that the cause of action accrues on the death. In Andrews v. Hartford & New Haven R., 34 Conn. 57, based upon the Connecticut statute providing that suit must be "commenced within one year after the cause of action shall have arisen," it was held that the statute did not begin to run until the appointment of administrator. Immediately after this decision the Legislature passed an act providing that the statute should run from the date of the death. In Hanna v. Jeffersonville R. Co., 32 Ind. 113, based upon the Indiana statute providing that "the action must be commenced within two years," it was held that the limitation began to run from the date of the death. In Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Sanders 86 Ky. 259, 5 S.W. 563, based upon the Kentucky statute providing that suit "shall be commenced within one year next after the cause of action accrued," it was held that the statute began to run from the date of the death. Lindsay v. C., R.I. & P. R. Co., 56 Okl. 234, 155 P. 1173, a suit under the federal statute, it was held that the limitation began to run from the date of the death. See, also, Thornton on Federal Employers' Liability Act (3d Ed.) 232, § 158; Richey on Federal Employers' Liability Act (2d Ed.) 230; Tiffany on Death by Wrongful Act, § 122; Roberts on Federal Liability of Carriers, 1142, § 650; 17 C.J. 1237, § 84.

The law which we are called upon to construe, being an act of the United States Congress, presents a federal question. On all such questions the Supreme Court of the United States is the highest authority, and its decisions are final. Because there is an absence of direct adjudication on the precise point by the Supreme Court of the United States, it becomes the duty of this court to "determine the question by the exercise of its own judgment, enlightened by the best available authorities." Black's Judicial Precedents, 346, 347.

At common law no recovery could be had for an injury resulting in death, because the right of action died with the person. As stated in Morrison v. B. & O. R. Co., 40 App. D. C. 391, Ann.Cas. 1914C, 1028:

"The act in question creates the liability where none existed, and takes away defenses formerly available. Coupled with this enlargement of the liability of common carriers is the limitation that no action shall be maintained under the act 'unless commenced within one year [as amended two years] from the time the cause of action accrued.' The ordinary statute of limitation confers upon a defendant the privilege of interposing a definite limitation of time as a bar to the enforcement of a liability existing independently of the statute defining the limitation. Such statutes, therefore, are merely limitations of the remedy. Statutes like the present are more. They create a right of action conditioned upon its enforcement within the prescribed period. The Legislature, having the power to create the right, may affix the conditions under which it is to be enforced, and a compliance with those conditions is essential. 'The time within which the suit must be brought operates as a limitation of the liability itself as created, and not of the remedy alone. It is a condition attached to the right to sue at all. * * * Time has been made of the essence of the right, and the right is lost if the time is disregarded. The liability and the remedy are created by the same statutes, and the limitations of the remedy are therefore to be treated as limitations of the right."

As stated by Mr. Tiffany:

"Inasmuch as the act which creates the limitation also creates the action to which it applies, the limitation is not merely of the remedy, but is of the right of action itself. * * * It is said that no exception can be alleged to excuse the delay." Tiffany on Death by Wrongful Act, § 121.

The author proceeds to show that when the limitation prescribed mentions a certain period, such as "after the death," or after the injury, no confusion results; but when the period is within a specified time after the cause of action "accrues," the necessity for construction in connection with the other provisions of the particular statute arises. It is also shown that the recovery by the personal representative is for the benefit of designated relatives, and does not become a part of the estate of the deceased, and such personal representative is a mere nominal party, whose only duty on receipt of the proceeds of a recovery is to pay the same to the proper beneficiaries. It is generally agreed that where a recovery is sought by a personal representative for the benefit of the "estate of the deceased person," the cause of action does not accrue until the appointment of an administrator, because until then there is in existence no person capable of suing.

Thus far the principles announced in practically all of the cases "go along together." The Supreme Court, as stated above, has not directly decided the question. The federal Circuit Courts are not in harmony. In Bixler v. Penn. R Co. (D. C.) 201 F. 553, it was held that the limitation began to run from the death of the...