Seaboard Rendering Co. v. Conlon
| Decision Date | 09 April 1943 |
| Citation | 152 Fla. 723,12 So.2d 882 |
| Parties | SEABOARD RENDERING CO. v. CONLON. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Broward County; George W Tedder, judge.
Vincent C Giblin, of Miami, and Joseph A. Varon, of Hollywood, for appellant.
Ella Jo Stollberg, of Hollywood, for appellee.
At the conclusion of rather extensive litigation the chancellor entered a decree in favor of the appellee, a property owner, against the appellant, operator of an 'animal reduction plant,' holding that appellant was maintaining a nuisance and permanently enjoining it from the operation of the business.
In this appeal from the final decree the appellant, with laudable frankness concedes that the relief was justified but insists that the order was too drastic and asserts, to quote the brief, that 'opportunity should, and must, be accorded to the defendant-appellant to show, by the installation of corrective machinery and the inauguration of new processes that it could carry on its business without annoyance or harm to anyone.' Thus, the criticism of the final decree is focused on the failure to take into account the possibility that in the future some way might be discovered for the operation of the factory in such a manner that it would not constitute a nuisance to neighboring residents.
It is a rule that an injunctive order should not be broader than is necessary to secure to the injured party the relief warranted by the particular facts without injustice to his adversary. This principle, outlined in 28 Am.Jur. page 473, seems to have been approved by this court in Palm Corporation v. Walters, 148 Fla. 527, 4 So.2d 696, 699.
it is difficult to see, however, where the chancellor transgressed this rule in his adjudication of the present controversy. As we have said the appellant concedes that the writ was justified and in this connection it may be well to draw attention to the observation of the chancellor in his order on petition for rehearing. He stressed the point that opportunity had been given the appellant to demonstrate that the plant could be operated in such fashion as not to constitute a nuisance while the manufacturer was exercising the privilege extended by the court of continuing the operation for the purpose of using up materials then on hand. During this period it was shown that the offensive and objectionable odors still emitted. He concluded from his study and knowledge of...
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...injured party the full relief warranted by the particular facts of the case without injustice to his adversary. Seaboard Rendering Co. v. Conlon, 152 Fla. 723, 12 So.2d 882. * * In clause 1(a) of the temporary restraining order the defendants are prohibited 'from persuading or inducing the ......
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...make it equitable to do so, United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 52 S.Ct. 460, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932); Seaboard Rendering Co. v. Conlon, 152 Fla. 723, 12 So.2d 882 (1943); Jackson Grain Co. v. Lee, 150 Fla. 232, 7 So.2d 143 (1942), and (b) since the terms of an injunction must be confin......
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...make it equitable to do so, United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 52 S.Ct. 460, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932); Seaboard Rendering Co. v. Conlon, 152 Fla. 723, 12 So.2d 882 (1943); Jackson Grain Co. v. Lee, 150 Fla. 232, 7 So.2d 143 (1942), and (b) since the terms of an injunction must be confin......