Sealy v. Goddard
| Decision Date | 10 February 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 2003-IA-02144-SCT.,2003-IA-02144-SCT. |
| Citation | 910 So.2d 502 |
| Parties | Gloria Poche SEALY, Douglas Paul Sealy, Rachel Sealy Kimble and Patrice Sealy Torres v. Michael Edward GODDARD, III by his Next Friend Jeanie Danos and Jeanie Danos, Individually. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Lawrence Cary Gunn, Jr., Hattiesburg, attorney for appellants.
Morris Sweatt, James Coleman Rhoden, Columbia, attorneys for appellees.
Before COBB, P.J., CARLSON and RANDOLPH, JJ.
¶ 1. In this case of first impression arising under our long-arm statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 13-3-57 (Rev.2002), Gloria Poche Sealy, Douglas Paul Sealy, Rachel Sealy Kimble and Patrice Sealy Torres ("Sealy heirs") appeal the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss or in the alternative, to quash summons, and therefore, assuming personal jurisdiction over them in their individual capacities. Finding that the trial court erred in determining that the provisions of Miss.Code Ann. § 13-3-57 provided personal jurisdiction over the Sealy heirs, we reverse the order of the Lamar County Circuit Court and render judgment here in favor of the Sealy heirs dismissing the amended complaint and action without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction.
¶ 2. On April 6, 1999, George W. Sealy, a Louisiana resident, was driving his vehicle on a public road within the confines of Little Black Creek State Park in Lamar County, Mississippi, when he struck a pedestrian, eighteen-month-old Michael Edward Goddard, III. Although we do not know the extent of Michael's injuries, the original complaint alleged that Sealy's vehicle ran over Michael's body and head, causing severe injuries. On April 3, 2002, Michael's mother, Jeanie Danos, an adult resident citizen of Mississippi, commenced a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Lamar County. The complaint was styled, "Michael Edward Goddard, III, By His Next Friend, Jeanie Danos, and Jeanie Danos, Individually vs. George W. Sealy." Since no responsive pleading had been filed, the plaintiffs, consistent with the provisions of Miss. R. Civ. P. 15(a), filed an amended complaint on April 17, 2002. In the amended complaint, the named defendants were "George W. Sealy and United Agents Insurance Company, In Receivership, and Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association."1
¶ 3. On June 6, 2002, the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (LIGA), through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss and a suggestion of death, with an attached certified copy of a death certificate from the Vital Records Registry of the state of Louisiana. The death certificate revealed that George W. Sealy, age 79, died of natural causes on August 11, 2000, in Houma, Terrebonne Parish, Louisiana. In their response to LIGA's motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs conceded that the insurance carrier and LIGA should be dismissed as party defendants, and in fact incorporated into their motion to dismiss, a motion to substitute party wherein the plaintiffs requested the circuit court to substitute "The Estate of George W. Sealy, deceased," in the stead of "George W. Sealy." In due course, the trial court dismissed LIGA,2 and additionally, on the plaintiffs' motion and by separate order, the trial court directed that an alias summons be issued for service upon "the Estate of George Sealy, Deceased, c/o Honorable Milton Cancienne, Jr., P.O. Box 6035, Houma, Louisiana 70361, attorney for said Estate."3 The attorney received the summons via certified mail. In both the order dismissing LIGA and the order directing issuance of the alias summons, the named defendants in the style of the orders were "George W. Sealy and United Agents Insurance Company, In Receivership and Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association."
¶ 4. Although already dismissed as a party, LIGA filed an amicus curiae motion to dismiss alleging inter alia that the Circuit Court of Lamar County had not acquired jurisdiction. Among the reasons asserted by LIGA in support of its motion to dismiss were (1) that prior to the commencement of the lawsuit, Sealy had died in Louisiana and his estate had been opened, administered and closed in accordance with Louisiana law;4 (2) that service of process was not completed upon Sealy or his estate; (3) that the plaintiffs' motion to substitute Sealy's estate as a defendant was meritless since at the time of the motion, Sealy's estate had been closed and not re-opened; and, (4) that the Louisiana attorney for the estate was without authority to accept service of process since the estate had been closed. Although the plaintiffs objected to LIGA's filing of an amicus curiae motion since LIGA had been dismissed as party, the trial court thereafter entered an order in response to LIGA's amicus curiae motion to dismiss, but did not dismiss the lawsuit. Instead, the order stated in its entirety.
Upon motion by the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association, appearing as amicus curiae, this Court finds that service upon Milton Cancienne, Jr., a Louisiana attorney, was not properly effected and did not act as service on the estate of George W. Sealy, deceased, as the estate was administratively closed before the plaintiff (sic) filed suit on April 3, 2002.
WHEREFORE, for good cause shown, this Court dismisses the attempted service upon Milton Cancienne, Jr., as defective, and grants the plaintiff (sic) sixty (60) additional days to reopen the estate of George W. Sealy and effect service of process upon the estate.
The style of this order listed the defendants as "George W. Sealy & United Agents Insurance Company."
¶ 5. Approximately one and one-half months after entry of this order, the trial court granted the plaintiffs leave to have alias process issued for Gloria Poche Sealy, Patrice Sealy Torres, Douglas P. Sealy, and Rachel Sealy Kimble (the Sealy heirs). The style of this order listed the defendants as "Estate of George W. Sealy, Deceased and United Agents Insurance Company, In Receivership." An alias summons was issued for service upon each of the Sealy heirs, and, although these individuals were not parties to the litigation, each summons directed the therein named heir to file responsive pleadings to the attached amended complaint within thirty days of service of process, failing which the named individual would suffer a judgment by default.5 Counsel for the plaintiffs thereafter submitted written proof of service on the Sealy heirs to the Lamar County Circuit Clerk.
¶ 6. LIGA once again appeared amicus curiae, over the plaintiffs' objection, and filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter alia that process on the individual heirs was invalid since the complaint had never been amended to include the individual heirs; that no claim of negligence or liability had been asserted against any of the heirs; and, that Sealy's estate had long since been closed. In its motion, LIGA requested that the trial court dismiss with prejudice all claims against the estate, or alternatively, that the trial court quash process as to the Sealy heirs. The trial court denied LIGA's motion, stating in its order inter alia that the court had subject matter jurisdiction in this case; and, that the court had personal jurisdiction over the Sealy heirs pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 13-3-57. Of considerable import is this additional finding by the circuit court:
This Court finds that the successors of George W. Sealy's Estate, namely, Douglas P. Sealy, Patrice Sealy Tones (sic), Gloria Poche Sealy, and Rachel Sealy Kimble, are defendants in this cause of action as said successors to George W. Sealy, deceased, and said successors have been duly served with notice and process of this Court under the Long Arm Statute of Mississippi, i.e., § 13-3-57 Miss.Code Ann. (1972, as amended) and Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.
The trial court thus denied LIGA's motion to dismiss and ordered that since the Sealy heirs had been "duly served" with process, they were to file responsive pleadings to the amended complaint within thirty days of the date of the order. The style of this order listed the named defendants as "George W. Sealy, and United Agents Insurance Company, In Receivership."
¶ 7. LIGA thereafter filed a motion requesting the trial court to amend its order denying dismissal by adding the required M.R.A.P. 5 language so that it could file a petition for an interlocutory appeal with this Court. While this motion was pending before the trial court, the Sealy heirs, in accordance with the court's prior order, filed responsive pleadings to the amended complaint and in these responsive pleadings, the Sealy heirs alleged inter alia that (1) the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over them; (3) the complaint and amended complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; (4) the complaint and amended complaint had never been amended to name them as party-defendants; and, (5) they committed no tort within the state of Mississippi nor did the plaintiffs assert that they (Sealy heirs) were negligent or that they in any way contributed to any injuries or damages suffered by the plaintiffs. The trial court thereafter, on motion of the plaintiffs, entered an order which "deleted" United Agents Insurance Company as a party. In the style of this "Order Amending Case to Delete Party," the named defendants were "The Estate of George W. Sealy, Deceased and United Agents Insurance Company, In Receivership." On the same date as the entry of this order, the trial court entered another order entitled "Order to Rename Party" which directed that George W. Sealy "should be succeeded herein by The Estate of George W. Sealy or The Succession of George W. Sealy under Louisiana law."6 In the style of this order, the named defendants were "George W. Sealy and United Agents Insurance Company, In Receivership."
¶ 8. In due course, the trial court denied LIGA's motion to...
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