Seaman v. Minneapolis & Rainy River Railway Company
| Citation | 149 N.W. 134,127 Minn. 180 |
| Decision Date | 23 October 1914 |
| Docket Number | 18,666,18,667 - (196,197) |
| Parties | FRANK F. SEAMAN v. MINNEAPOLIS & RAINY RIVER RAILWAY COMPANY; J. C. SULLIVAN and Another v. MINNEAPOLIS & RAINY RIVER RAILWAY COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Two actions in the district court for Itasca county against defendant railway company to recover $4,500 and $5,366 respectively, for unlawful discrimination in freight rates. The facts are stated in the opinion. The cases were tried before Stanton, J., who at the close of the testimony in the Seaman case denied defendant's motion to dismiss the action and in each case denied defendant's motion to dismiss the action and in each case denied defendant's motion to direct a verdict in its favor. The jury returned a verdict for $3,445.24 in favor of plaintiff Seaman and for $5,650.43 in behalf of plaintiffs Sullivan, Kolliner and Irvine, copartners under the name of J.J.J. Log & Cedar Co. From orders denying its motions for judgment in its favor notwithstanding the verdicts or for new trials, defendant appealed. Reversed on both appeals, with directions to reduce the amount of the verdict in the Sullivan case to nominal damages.
Case followed.
1. Decision in Sullivan v. Minneapolis & R.R. Ry. Co. 121 Minn. 488, adhered to.
Discrimination in freight rates.
2. Contracts made prior to statutory rate regulation held no justification for downward departure from freight tariffs thereafter established, whereby plaintiffs, shippers who were charged with the legal rates for the same services, were discriminated against.
Subsequent payment by shipper not a defense to action.
3. The favored shipper's alleged payment to defendant of the difference between the discriminatory rate and the regular tariff, after the discriminations complained of had occurred held no defense against the disfavored shipper's right to recover.
Competitive business essential to recovery.
4. Business competition is essential to a recovery of rate differentials by a shipper who is discriminated against, where no proof is made of damage other than the difference in the rates charged.
Competitive business essential to recovery -- evidence.
5. Evidence held to show business competition, between plaintiff Seaman and a favored shipper, within the rule requiring such competition where rate differentials are sought to be recovered, but the contrary was established in the Sullivan case.
Computation of rate differentials.
6. Rate differentials allowed as damages for discriminations in freight charges must be computed upon the basis of equal tonnage, but such discriminations should be considered with reference to a reasonable time before and after the disfavored shipment, and hence may arise from shipments on different dates.
Interstate commerce.
7. Under the facts disclosed, plaintiff Seaman's shipments were, to a considerable extent not precisely ascertainable, interstate commerce, to which the Federal rule of damages applied.
Powell & Simpson and Ernest C. Carman, for appellants.
George H. Spear, for respondents.
Separate actions to recover for unlawful discriminations in freight rates. After verdict for plaintiff in each, defendant appealed from orders denying its alternative motions for judgment or new trial.
The substance of the complaint in the Sullivan case is stated in the opinion (121 Minn. 488, 142 N.W. 3, 45 L.R.A. [N.S.] 612) sustaining it on demurrer, and like averments appear in the Seaman case, except that no claim is made therein for a recovery because of defendant's free hauling of lumbering supplies for others. The facts proved in the two cases are sufficiently similar to render joint consideration desirable.
1. Plaintiffs offered no evidence in either case of damages, other than the difference between the schedule rate paid by them and the less rate allowed the favored shipper. Since the decision in the Sullivan case, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Pennsylvania R. Co. v. International Coal Mining Co. 230 U.S. 184, 33 S.Ct. 893, 57 L.Ed. 1446, has held that payment by a carrier to one shipper of an unlawful rebate gives another shipper, not so favored, no right of action under the Interstate Commerce Act to recover like rebates on his shipments, nor any right to recover at all in the absence of other evidence of damages. We concede that this decision cannot be reconciled with ours. In the Sullivan case we are urged, on the one hand, to adhere to our determination there reached, both under the doctrine of the law of the case and on the ground that our decision is correct, while, on the other hand, we are asked to recede therefrom because its fallacy is demonstrated by the Federal case cited.
If defendant's contention be correct, the rule adopted should be abrogated. Defendant claims in this connection that, notwithstanding the statement to the contrary in the Sullivan decision, our rate-regulating statutes do provide a civil remedy for discrimination in rates, which was overlooked both by court and counsel on the former appeal, and to substantiate this contention quotes the latter part of R.L. 1905, § 1986, as follows:
"Any common carrier or warehouseman who shall do or cause to be done any act in this chapter forbidden, or fail to do any act therein enjoined, or who shall aid or abet in any such act or neglect, shall be liable in damages to any person injured thereby; and in any action for such damages the plaintiff, if he recover, shall be allowed by the court a reasonable attorney's fee, to be taxed and allowed in addition to statutory costs."
But the first part of this section reading:
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to abridge or limit the duties and liabilities of common carriers or warehousemen, or the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, and the provisions of this chapter are in addition thereto," nullifies the force of the contention and clearly indicates not only that the legislature had in mind the existence of common-law liability and remedy, but intended to preserve them in addition to those created by the statute.
We have given the opinion in the Federal case such careful attention as is due all declarations emanating from that high court. The decision, however, was reached only after reargument, reverses the determinations of both the circuit court and the circuit court of appeals, and the opinion failed to convince Mr. Justice Pitney, as is evidenced by his vigorous dissent. It is also in conflict with the decisions of many other able courts. The law is not an exact science, differences of opinion are inevitable, and counsel have not heretofore claimed or conceded infallibility for the decisions of any court. Our previous convictions are strengthened by the fact that, in Texas & P.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Com. 162 U.S. 199, 233, 16 S.Ct. 80, 40 L.Ed. 940, the court with which we differ declared, with reference to passenger rates:
"Nor is there any legal injustice in one person procuring a particular service cheaper than another," and again, in Parsons v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co. 167 U.S. 447, 17 S.Ct. 887, 42 L.Ed. 231, one of the mainstays of the decision in 230 U.S. 184, 201, 33 S.Ct. 893, 57 L.Ed. 1446, that where a reasonable freight rate is charged a person he has no right to complain because another is given a smaller rate; though, in the case under discussion, conceding the holding of Interstate Commerce Com. v. Baltimore & O.R. Co. 145 U.S. 263, 275, 12 S.Ct. 844, 36 L.Ed. 699, that prior to congressional action "the weight of authority in this country was in favor of an equality of charge to all persons for similar services."
Cogent reasons, we think, exist for not subscribing to the doctrines of the cases reported in 162 U.S. 199, 16 S.Ct. 666, 40 L.Ed 940, and 167 U.S. 447, 17 S.Ct. 887, 42 L.Ed. 231, above referred to. Unless current history is to be belied, the theory of their pronouncements laid the foundation for monopolistic fortunes, the greatest ever known, built up through systems of rebates where, as in the present cases, the same persons were often stockholders in the railroad company and its favored shippers. We are not prepared either to admit the soundness of these declarations,...
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