Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc. v. Haven Hills Farm, Inc.

Decision Date12 March 1981
Citation395 So.2d 991
PartiesSEARS, ROEBUCK & COMPANY, INC. v. HAVEN HILLS FARM, INC. 79-438.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Paul W. Brock and Ronald L. Davis of Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves & Johnston, Mobile, for appellant.

John T. Crowder, Jr. of Cunningham, Bounds, Byrd, Yance & Crowder, Mobile, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The single issue presented is whether the mere fact that a motor vehicle tire blows out proves the tire is a defective product under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine. We hold that an affirmative response, under the attendant circumstances shown by the proof of record in the instant case, would be an impermissible expansion of the standards for liability of manufacturers, suppliers, or sellers of products under Alabama law.

FACTS

Haven Hills Farm, Inc., purchased a tire from Sears, Roebuck & Co., for a truck used in the transportation of eggs sold in its wholesale egg business. Haven Hills purchases eggs from Cal-Maine Foods near Jackson, Mississippi, and transports them to Mobile, Alabama, for distribution to various food stores. The company has only the one large truck, for use on which the tire was bought, for shipping the eggs to Mobile; although it has several vans utilized in the distribution of the eggs. Only one person, William Hicks, ever drove the truck. On one such return to Mobile from picking up eggs in Mississippi, the left front tire on the truck blew out, causing the truck to turn on its side, destroying the eggs. The evidence shows that the tire had been driven approximately 30,000 miles.

Haven Hills filed suit against Sears, alleging that: 1) under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine, Sears sold or distributed the tire in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to consumers or other persons likely to be exposed to potential hazard; and 2) Sears breached its implied warranty of merchantability. Haven Hills sought an award for property damages and lost profits. On motion, the claim for lost profits was denied.

In its answer, Sears denied the material allegations and affirmatively pleaded that Haven Hills: 1) was itself guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to its injuries and damages; and 2) caused or allowed the truck to be misused. Sears' motions for directed verdict were denied and the jury returned a $21,856.88 verdict in favor of Haven Hills. The trial court overruled Sears' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial.

We hold that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion for a directed verdict based upon Plaintiff's failure to meet its burden of proving its allegation of the tire's defective condition at the time of its sale by Sears. Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

ALABAMA MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY DOCTRINE

Although earlier Alabama cases had employed the "manufacturer's liability doctrine," rejecting the privity of contract requisite in warranty claims, Casrell v. Altec Industries, Inc., 335 So.2d 128 (Ala.1976), and Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So.2d 134 (Ala.1976), refined the cause of action to its presently recognized status and labeled it the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine. Together, Casrell and Atkins changed products liability cases in this State from the pure form of negligence theory to a modified version of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (1965), strict liability theory, premising liability on proof that the injured ultimate user:

1) suffered injury or damages to himself or his property by one who sells a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff as the ultimate user or consumer, if

(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and

(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.

(2) Showing these elements, the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case although

(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and

(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from, or entered into any contractual relation with, the seller.

Casrell, at 132-133; Atkins, at 141; Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (1965).

Additionally, AEMLD allows defendants to escape liability by proving certain permitted legal defenses such as contributory negligence, assumption of risk and lack of causal relationship. Moreover, this Court rejects the no-fault concept embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and notes that fault is supplied by the defendant's selling a product in a defective condition, unlike before, when fault was shown by the careless conduct of the defendant, i. e., his failure to exercise due care in the manufacture, design, sale or placement of the product into the stream of commerce. Emphasis is now shifted from the Defendant's performance to the product's performance.

It is precisely because of these unique features, allowing certain affirmative defenses, retaining the fault concept, and preserving the distinctions between tort and contract remedies, that Alabama modifies the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A. Although this hybrid form of strict liability in products liability cases still retains vestiges endemic to the negligence cause of action, it substantially opened the way for injured ultimate users to sue the manufacturer, supplier or retailer for injuries proximately caused by a defective, unreasonably dangerous, unaltered product when put to its intended, usual and customary use.

PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN TO PROVE DEFECTIVENESS

With this as the historical background of AEMLD, the threshold inquiries then become: 1) What is the definition of a "defective" product? 2) What is Plaintiff's burden of proof? and 3) Has Plaintiff met that burden under the proof of record before us?

This Court, defining a defect, has borrowed from two separate legal authorities. The Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-314, speaks in terms of unmerchantability as evidence of product inadequacy, i. e., that the goods are not fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are expected to be used. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, speaks in terms of "unreasonably dangerous." Combining these two principles, and using each in aid of the other, Casrell, at p. 133, states:

(A) "defect" is that which renders a product "unreasonably dangerous," i. e., not fit for its intended purpose, and ... all "defective" products are covered.

"Defective" is interpreted to mean that the product does not meet the reasonable expectations of an ordinary consumer as to its safety. Comment g. of the Restatement says defective condition applies when, at the time the product leaves the seller's hands, it is in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer.

See, also, Atkins, at p. 142, under that portion of the opinion entitled "Defective Condition"; and Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, Comment i.

Accordingly, proof of the specific defect, i. e., the exact act, omission, process, construction, etc., resulting in the product's failing its intended use, is not required. "If a product is unreasonably dangerous, it is necessarily defective, and the consumer should not be required to prove defectiveness as a separate matter." Casrell, at 131.

Before applying the definition of defect to the facts at issue, we now address the second inquiry as to the Plaintiff's requisite proof to establish a prima facie case. Liability is not established merely by showing that the product failed in furthering or performing its intended use. The Plaintiff must prove that the product was substantially unaltered when used by him and must also prove causation in fact, including proof that the defect caused the injury and that the defect is traceable to the Defendant. 2 Frumer-Friedman, Products Liability, § 16A(4)(e)(i) (1980).

It is not enough to show, for example, that Sears sold the tire and that Haven Hills was injured.

The fact of an injury, of course, does not establish the presence of a defect. Thus, recovery...

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