Sears v. City of Maquoketa

• Decision Date: 12 March 1918
• Docket Number: No. 32129.,32129.
• Parties: SEARS ET AL. v. CITY OF MAQUOKETA ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

183 Iowa 1104

166 N.W. 700

SEARS ET AL.

v.CITY OF MAQUOKETA ET AL.

No. 32129.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 12, 1918.

Appeal from District Court, Jackson County; A. J. House, Judge.

The district court enjoined the City of Maquoketa from issuing bonds to secure funds with which to construct a light plant; hence this appeal. Affirmed.D. F. Bauman, of Maquoketa, and Clark & Byers, of Des Moines, for appellants.

F. D. Kelsey, of Maquoketa, and Barnes, Chamberlain & Hanzlik, of Cedar Rapids, for appellees.

SALINGER, J.

[1] 1. The issuance of these bonds was rightly restrained unless the proposal to issue had the support of such a majority as section 1306e, Supp. 1913, requires. The vote in favor must be (a) “a majority of all the electors voting at such election;” (b) it must be larger than half of the vote at the last preceding municipal election. Women were authorized to vote upon this bond issue. Section 1131, Code. If the favorable votes cast by them may be counted in determining whether the proposition had the majority required by section 1306e, then it had such majority. Otherwise not. The exact question is, Has the Legislature declared that, though the women were authorized to vote, their favorable vote may not be considered in determining whether the proposal has received the statutory majority? Was “electors” intended to mean male voters? Assuming for the sake of argument that it is illogical to permit one to vote and to exclude him from consideration on the question of whether a majority supports the proposition he has voted on, yet the Legislature has power to do illogical things, and the cure lies with the Legislature and not the courts. The mayor has a right to vote in some cases. Yet it is settled his vote may not be counted in determining whether some proposition he has supported has a required majority of the council. As the Legislature has the power to permit women to vote on whether bonds shall be issued and also the power to exclude them from the privilege, of course it has power to grant the privilege and to put limitations upon the privilege. It follows therefore that it may authorize women to vote on this question and provide at the same time that their supporting vote may not be counted in determining whether there is a required majority. And the fact that the right to vote on bond issues has been validly granted them does not make women “electors.” McEvoy v. Christensen, 159 N. W. 179. On the other hand, while the Legislature has no power to make women electors, it can empower them to vote on bond issues and can provide that the issue is authorized if it has a majority made up of the favorable votes of both men and women. And it may be conceded that, though the statute in terms requires a majority of the electors voting, this does not necessarily exclude that “elector” is used as a synonym of “person authorized to vote thereat.” Finally, the question is, In what sense did the statute use the word “electors”?

[2] If it be utterly against reason that the word was used in the sense of “male voter,” that fact will give powerful support to the claim that it was not used in that sense. Is there such unreasonableness? We think not. At the municipal elections, which are made the standard of measurement, men alone vote. At the election in review both men and women vote. It can fairly be said the Legislature had in mind that the comparison should be made upon a count of the male votes supporting the bond issue because otherwise there would be a limitation which usually would be no limitation; that is to say, a requirement that a bond issue should have more than the equal of half the votes cast by males alone will be too easily met by the favorable vote at an election at which the total vote cast would naturally be much larger than that at an election at which only men might vote. In fewer words, we think the...