Seater v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 27 February 1945
• Citation: 156 P.2d 386,159 P.2d 826,176 Or. 542
• Parties: SEATER <I>v.</I> PENN MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PHILADELPHIA
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

176 Or. 542

156 P.2d 386

159 P.2d 826

SEATER

v. PENN MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PHILADELPHIA

Supreme Court of Oregon.

Argued January 16, 1945.

Reversed February 27, 1945.

Rehearing denied June 19, 1945.

Evidence

1. Writings, such as a death certificate, may constitute hearsay.

Evidence

2. Under the statute making death certificates prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, such certificates are admissible in private controversies, including actions on insurance policies.

Evidence

3. The Legislature may make a death certificate prima facie evidence of the facts shown therein.

Evidence

4. In an action for double indemnity under life policies, a death certificate stating that death was due to accident, not suicide or homicide, and that a fall was the means of injury, was inadmissible as evidence that the insured suffered an accidental fall.

Appeal and error

5. In determining the propriety of denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict, evidence will be considered in the light most favorable to plaintiff.

Insurance

6. To recover double indemnity under life policies, the beneficiary was required to prove that the insured's death resulted solely from bodily injuries effected directly and exclusively by external, violent, and accidental means.

Insurance

7. In action for double indemnity under life policies for death of the insured, an elderly woman suffering from lack of cordination, etc., who fell on floor of hospital and suffered a fractured hip, evidence that insured's death resulted solely from accidental means as required by policy, was insufficient for jury.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

Insurance

8. Plaintiff in action for double indemnity under life policy had burden of proving that insured died from bodily injuries, within terms of policy providing for double indemnity in case of death of insured resulting solely from bodily injuries effected by external, violent, and accidental means.

Insurance

9. Presumption against suicide is available in insurance cases in which the insurer defends upon the ground that the insured committed suicide.

Insurance

10. Presumption that injuries to insured were result of accident within double indemnity provision, upon proof that deceased died of bodily injuries effected exclusively by external and violent means, would not arise where evidence indicated that it was probable that the insured's mental or physical ailments or both were cause of fall, that she was seriously deranged mentally and was afflicted with a considerable degree of generalized arteriosclerosis, and that while she was in the hospital she frequently fell.

                  Death or injury from voluntary act as accidental, note, 92
                A.L.R. 164. See, also, 29 Am. Jur. 708
                  31 C.J.S., Evidence, § 194
                  37 C.J., Life Insurance, § 418
                

Before BELT, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, BAILEY, LUSK and HAY, Associate Justices.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County.

CHARLES W. REDDING, Judge.

Action by Robert A. Seater against the Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company of Philadelphia to recover double indemnity under life insurance policies. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

REVERSED. REHEARING DENIED.

James C. Dezendorf, of Portland (Hampson, Koerner, Young & Swett, of Portland, on the brief), for appellant.

Zanley F. Galton, of Portland (Goldstein, Galton & Galton and Charles Coston, all of Portland, on the brief), for respondent.

HAY, J.

Action by the beneficiary under two policies of life insurance, each in the sum of $1,000, with provision for double indemnity if the death of the insured should result solely from bodily injuries effected directly and exclusively by external, violent, and accidental means, such double indemnity not to be payable, however, if death resulted directly or indirectly from illness or disease of any kind, or from physical or mental infirmity. The insured, who was the wife of the plaintiff, died on March 29, 1943, at the age of upwards of sixty-one years. The insurance company paid the single indemnity. The beneficiary claimed that insured's death resulted from bodily injuries effected by accidental means within the terms of the policies. The insurance company refused to concede such claim. Thereupon this action was instituted. The insurance company defended upon the alleged grounds that the insured died as a direct or indirect result of illness or disease, or of physical or mental infirmity.

Motions for involuntary nonsuit, and for a directed verdict, were seasonably interposed by defendant during the trial, each of which was denied. The jury rendered a verdict against the defendant. Defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and, in the alternative, for a new trial. This motion was denied, and judgment was entered accordingly. The defendant has appealed.

The policies were dated July 18, 1924. On September 8, 1942, the insured was committed to the Oregon State Hospital. The hospital record showed that she was suffering from "complete mental confusion, loss of memory and disorientation". Her condition was diagnosed as "psychosis with cerebral arteriosclerosis". On March 12, 1943, while in a room or ward of the State Hospital, the insured suffered a fall. She died seventeen days thereafter, the immediate cause of death being duly certified as fracture of right hip, with "arteriosclerosis, generalized" as "other conditions".

No one actually saw her fall, but an attendant in charge of the ward testified that she heard "the commotion caused by the fall". The plaintiff offered in evidence a duly certified copy of the death certificate, which was received, over objection, as proof that the fall was accidental. This is assigned as error.

The Oregon Vital Statistics Act (chapter 130, Or. L., 1941) is substantially the uniform act framed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Section 27 of the Oregon act provides for compulsory registration of certificates of death. Section 28 requires the funeral director to procure an official form of death certificate, and enter certain personal data thereon. Having done so, he must present the certificate to the physician last in attendance upon the deceased, who is required to certify, over his signature, the cause of death, to his best knowledge and belief. Section 10 provides that the forms of the various certificates required to be used under the act "shall include as a minimum the items required by the respective standard certificates as recommended by the United States bureau of census". Under the form of death certificate which has been adopted, the attending physician must state, when the death was due to external causes, whether such causes were the result of accident, suicide, or homicide. That portion of the death certificate in the present case reads as follows:

"If death was due to external causes, fill in the following:

(a) Accident, suicide, or homicide (specify) Accident.

(b) Date of occurrence March 12, 1943

(c) Where did injury occur? (City or town) Salem, (County) Marion, (State) Oregon

(d) Did injury occur in or about home, on farm, in industrial place, in public place? In State Hospital While at work? No (c) Means of injury Fall."

The certificate was signed by Paul S. Wolfe, M.D.

Section 11 of the act provides: "Each certificate, as provided for in this act, * * * shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. * * *"

The appellant takes the position that a statute, which makes a death certificate prima facie evidence of facts therein stated, is designed only for public purposes, and has no application to private controversies between adverse parties. Appellant concedes that there is a sharp conflict in the decisions upon this question. In Beglin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 173 N.Y. 374, 66 N.E. 102, it was held that such a statute is a mere police regulation, required for public purposes, and that certificates issued by virtue thereof are prima facie evidence so far only as questions involving public rights are concerned. The court expressed its opinion that it was not the intention of the legislature, by such statute, to change the common-law rules of evidence in controversies between private parties arising out of contract. Similar holdings were made in In Re Curtiss' Will, 250 N.Y.S. 146, 140 Misc. Rep. 185; Oklahoma Aid Ass'n. v. Thomas, 125 Okla. 190, 256 P. 719; Dent v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 6 S.W. (2d) 195; (The two cases last mentioned arose under statutes which required the physician to state only whether the death was "probably" accidental, suicidal, or homicidal. The Dent case apparently was overruled by the later case of American National Ins. Co. v. Hernandez (Tex.) 104 S.W. (2d) 525.) United States v. Johnson, 72 F. (2d) 614; (This case held that the admission in evidence of a death certificate filed with the Bureau of Vital Statistics of Chicago Department of Public Health to show the death of decedent and the date thereof was error in a civil suit. There was an additional objection, however, that the certificate was not duly authenticated.) United States v. Blackburn, 33 F. (2d) 564, and United States v. Harrison, 49 F. (2d) 227; (These were war risk insurance cases, and the holdings therein were based upon Sullivan v. Seattle Electric Co., 51 Wash. 71, 97 P. 1109, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1082, discussed hereunder.) Levy v. Vaughan, 42 App. D.C. 146.

In Sullivan v. Seattle Electric Co., supra, the proof of cause of death was the report of a deputy coroner to the county auditor. The appellate court commented that it was formerly held that the record of the coroner's inquest was competent, but not conclusive, evidence of cause of death, in all civil actions, because it was the result of an inquiry, made under competent public authority, to ascertain matters of public interest and concern. This rule, the court said, still prevails in a few jurisdictions, but the great weight of modern authority is...