Seaton v. Mayberg

• Decision Date: 30 June 2010
• Docket Number: No. 05-56894.,05-56894.
• Parties: Michael Leon SEATON, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Stephen MAYBERG; Melvin E. Hunter; Dennis R. Sheppard, Phd; Barrie Glen, Phd, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

610 F.3d 530

Michael Leon SEATON, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Stephen MAYBERG; Melvin E. Hunter; Dennis R. Sheppard, Phd; Barrie Glen, Phd, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 05-56894.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Sept. 10, 2008.

Filed June 30, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jeffrey M. Hayes, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Newport Beach, CA, for the appellant.

Eric D. Bates, Deputy Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA, for the appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, George H. King, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-05-01918-GHK.

Before: ALEX KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, ANDREW J. KLEINFELD and JOHNNIE B. RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge KLEINFELD; Concurrence by Chief Judge KOZINSKI.

KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge:

We address a claim to privacy rights in his medical records of a prisoner being evaluated for civil commitment.

I. Facts.

The district court dismissed this case ¹ for failure to state a claim, so we decide it on the basis of the facts alleged in the complaint and filings in the prisoner's habeas case of which the district court took notice.

Seaton was convicted in 1986 of two counts each of forcible rape and forcible oral copulation, and one count of kidnaping for the purpose of committing rape. ² He had two prior serious felony convictions, and was sentenced to 42 years in state prison, later reduced to 37 and then 31 years. After 16 years, apparently because he was approaching early release, the county sheriff's department had him transferred to a state hospital for evaluation for possible civil commitment.

He sued the Director of the California Department of Mental Health, the Administrator of Atascadero State Hospital, and the two psychologists who examined him and gave their opinions to the county district attorney's office. Though he raises several theories, the most substantial is that the defendants violated his constitutional right to privacy by allowing the psychologists to look at his records and to communicate their opinions and supporting data to the district attorney's office. This case is his section 1983 claim, not his habeas corpus case.

Seaton's medical records were being examined to decide whether to seek his commitment under California's Sexually Violent Predator Act.³ The Act enables the state to commit some sex offenders civilly for indeterminate terms subject to yearly evaluations.⁴ A “sexually violent predator” under the statute is one who (1) has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, (2) has a diagnosed mental disorder, (3) that makes him a danger to the health and safety of others, (4) the danger being “that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” ⁵ The prior offense may be evidence, but is not conclusive. A mental disorder “that predisposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting the person a menace” ⁶ is a sine qua non. Thus the statute provides for the civil commitment of persons whose mental disease predisposes them to crime and whose criminal history gives weight to the predictive judgment.

The statute provides for the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to refer for evaluation, at least six months before release, prisoners who may be sexually violent predators if they are serving a determinate sentence or their parole has been revoked.⁷ The Department of Corrections first screens the prisoners with a screening instrument developed by the State Department of Mental Health, considering their “social, criminal and institutional history.” ⁸ If it appears that they are indeed sexually violent predators, then they are referred to the State Department of Mental Health for a full evaluation, in accord with a standardized assessment protocol, including “diagnosable mental disorders” and “factors known to be associated with the risk of reoffense” including “criminal and psychosexual history, type degree and duration of sexual deviance, and severity of mental disorder.” ⁹ The Director of Mental Health designates two practicing psychiatrists or psychologists to do the evaluation, and if they agree, the Director of Mental Health requests a petition from the county.¹⁰ The “evaluation reports and any other supporting documents” are made available to “the attorney designated by the county,” and if that attorney agrees with the recommendation, he files a petition for commitment in superior court.¹¹ The person gets a hearing before a judge to determine whether there is probable cause, and if there is, a jury trial at the prisoner's election with the assistance of counsel and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.¹²

Two psychologists reviewed Seaton's medical records from prison and recommended that he be civilly committed. They forwarded their evaluations and the supporting documents to the county district attorney, who then filed a petition to commit Seaton. The Santa Barbara County Superior Court found probable cause to detain Seaton. He was transferred to the Santa Barbara County Jail and, subsequently, the Atascadero State Hospital, pending a civil commitment trial.

II. Analysis.

We review de novo.¹³ Seaton's claim that the disclosures violate HIPAA fails because under Webb v. Smart Document Solutions, LLC, “HIPAA itself provides no private right of action.” ¹⁴ We affirm dismissal of Seaton's claim that the district court erred by denying him leave to amend to assert a claim of retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment rights. His pro se filings indicate some sort of disagreement with the prison law librarian. He was allowed to file an amended complaint, and we cannot discern from his district court filings what retaliation claim he might have or wish to assert. Seaton concedes that he has no right under California law to nondisclosure of his medical records in the sexually violent predator procedure. He argues his case based on a right to informational privacy under the Due Process Clause.

Two periods of time are at issue, the first while Seaton was still serving his sentence, the second during any subsequent period necessary for his evaluation. To the extent that his constitutional claim attacks disclosure while he was in prison serving his sentence and for a penological purpose relating to his imprisonment, Seaton's claim falls within the body of law regarding privacy for prisoners, the general principle being that whatever privacy right he has may be overridden for legitimate penological reasons.

“[I]mprisonment carries with it the circumscription or loss of many significant rights.” ¹⁵ Loss of privacy is an “inherent incident[ ] of confinement.” ¹⁶ “A right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal order. We are satisfied that society would insist that the prisoner's expectation of privacy always yield to what must be considered the paramount interest in institutional security.” ¹⁷ We join our sister circuits in holding that prisoners do not have a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in prison treatment records when the state has a legitimate penological interest in access to them. ¹⁸ The penological interest in access to whatever medical information there is regarding Seaton is substantial.¹⁹ Prisons need access to prisoners' medical records to protect prison staff and other prisoners from communicable diseases and violence, and to manage rehabilitative efforts.

Though many of the cases holding that a prisoner has no constitutional right to informational privacy regarding medical records involve AIDS and HIV, ²⁰ legitimate penological concerns are much broader. If a prisoner has a contagious disease such as pinkeye or strep throat, or a mental disease that generates violent predatory behavior, the prison may owe a duty, possibly a constitutional duty, to other prisoners to isolate him or otherwise protect them from him. The Eighth Amendment may entitle a prisoner to protection from a sexually violent predatory roommate whose proclivity to rape his roommate is known to the prison.²¹ If the prison is attempting a rehabilitative program, practical program management may require access to medical records to see if the prisoner is complying and if the program is working.²² Seaton did not plead any facts to rebut the connection between disclosure of his prison treatment records and the State's legitimate penological objectives during his custody.²³

The second period of time, raising different concerns, is during evaluation subsequent to what would otherwise have been Seaton's release date. Different concerns also arise if access to the prisoner's medical records is sought not to manage his custody, but to decide whether to seek civil commitment following his penal custody. The record does not say what the reason for his scheduled release date was, but Seaton alleges in his pleading that he is not on parole, so we assume for purposes of decision that his sentence was somehow reduced, perhaps by good time. And we treat the case, in accord with his amended complaint, as one of a prisoner who is in custody for evaluation as a possible sexually violent predator, but who would otherwise have been released. Though Seaton is indeed a felon, not a person with full civil rights, his medical records were shared, not to manage his incarceration for his crimes, but to decide whether he should be civilly committed based on the predictive judgment that he is a sexually violent predator. For this period, the penological objectives of managing his imprisonment for the safety of prison staff and other prisoners, and rehabilitating him during his imprisonment, have no application. The question for this period is whether he has a constitutional right to privacy of his medical information obtained while he would not be confined were he...