Seaton v. Wayne County Prosecutor

• Decision Date: 29 December 1998
• Docket Number: Docket No. 191685
• Citation: 590 N.W.2d 598,233 Mich.App. 313
• Parties: Parnell SEATON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WAYNE COUNTY PROSECUTOR, Defendant-Appellee. (On Second Remand)
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 598

590 N.W.2d 598

233 Mich.App. 313

Parnell SEATON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WAYNE COUNTY PROSECUTOR, Defendant-Appellee. (On Second Remand)

Docket No. 191685.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Oct. 9, 1998, at Lansing.

Decided Dec. 29, 1998, at 9:50 a.m.

Released for Publication March 12, 1999.

[233 Mich.App. 314] Parnell Seaton, in propria persona.

John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, and Frank J. Bernacki, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the defendant.

Before: TAYLOR, P.J., and RICHARD ALLEN GRIFFIN and SAAD, JJ.

ON SECOND REMAND

RICHARD ALLEN GRIFFIN, J.

On second remand from the Supreme Court, this case is before us for the issuance of an amplified opinion on the question whether 1994 PA 131 is retroactive. We hold that the statute is remedial in nature and therefore retroactive.

I

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding in propria persona, appeals an order of the Wayne Circuit Court dismissing his 1993 complaint brought under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), M.C.L. § 15.231 et seq.; MSA 4.1801(1) et seq. On March 1, 1995, this Court denied plaintiff's application for leave to appeal for lack of merit in the grounds presented. Thereafter, in response to plaintiff's delayed application for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court remanded to this Court for consideration on leave granted. Seaton v. Wayne Co. Prosecutor, 450 Mich. 969, 548 N.W.2d 635 (1996).

In our previous opinion, Seaton v. Wayne Co. Prosecutor (On Remand), 225 Mich.App. 1, 570 N.W.2d 125 (1997), remanded 459 Mich. 876, 586 N.W.2d 743 (1998), the majority ¹ of this Court affirmed the grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant on the basis that the FOIA does not apply to a prisoner's request for records of his own criminal trial. Jones v. Wayne Co. Prosecutor, 165 Mich.App. 62, 418 N.W.2d 667 (1987). On second remand, we reaffirm our previous decision and accordingly again affirm the order of the circuit court granting summary disposition in favor of defendant. Nonetheless, pursuant to the directive from the Supreme Court, we now address an issue that we previously considered unnecessary for our disposition.

II

Effective May 19, 1994, the Legislature amended the FOIA to specifically exclude incarcerated prisoners from the class of persons entitled to obtain public records. Section 1(2) of the FOIA, M.C.L. § 15.231(2); MSA 4.1801(1)(2), now provides:

It is the public policy of this state that all persons, except those persons incarcerated in state or local correctional facilities, are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those who represent them as public officials and public employees, consistent with this act. The people shall be informed so that they may fully participate in the democratic process. [Emphasis added.]

Further, at the time applicable in this case subsection 2(a), M.C.L. § 15.232(a); MSA 4.1801(2)(a), exempted prisoners from the class of persons entitled to invoke the FOIA:

"Person" means an individual, corporation, partnership, firm, organization, or association, except that person does not include an individual serving a sentence of imprisonment in a state or county correctional facility in this state or any other state, or in a federal correctional facility. ² [Emphasis added.]

Under Michigan law, the general rule of statutory construction is that a new or amended statute applies prospectively unless the Legislature has expressly or impliedly indicated its intention to give it retrospective effect. People v. Russo, 439 Mich. 584, 594, 487 N.W.2d 698 (1992). However, an exception to the general rule is recognized where a statute is remedial or procedural in nature. Id. In In re Certified Questions, 416 Mich. 558, 570-571, 331 N.W.2d 456 (1982), the Supreme Court established rules for determining whether a statute is to be retroactively applied:

First, is there specific language in the new act which states that it should be given retrospective or prospective application. See headnote no. 1, Hansen-Snyder Co. v. General Motors Corp., 371 Mich. 480, 124 N.W.2d 286 (1963). Second, "[a] statute is not regarded as operating retrospectively [solely] because it relates to an antecedent event." Hughes v. Judges' Retirement Board, 407 Mich. 75, 86, 282 N.W.2d 160 (1979). Third, "[a] retrospective law is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability with respect to transactions or considerations already past." Hughes, supra, p. 85, 282 N.W.2d 160; Ballog v. Knight Newspapers, Inc., 381 Mich. 527, 533-534, 164 N.W.2d 19 (1969). Fourth, a remedial or procedural act which does not destroy a vested right will be given effect where the injury or claim is antecedent to the enactment of the statute. Rookledge v. Garwood, 340 Mich. 444, 65 N.W.2d 785 (1954).

See also Flynn v. Flint Coatings, Inc., 230 Mich.App. 633, 636, 584 N.W.2d 627 (1998).

In the present case, 1994 P.A. 131 is silent regarding whether its amendments of the FOIA are to be retrospectively or prospectively applied. Rule one is therefore not relevant to the present circumstances. In addition, rule two is not applicable because the statute does not relate to an antecedent event. Accordingly, the present question is determined by either rule three or rule four. The third rule "define[s] those retrospective situations that are not legally acceptable, whereas the fourth rule defines those that are acceptable." In re Certified Questions, supra at 572, 331 N.W.2d 456. In other words, "rule four establishes the corollary to the general proscription found in rule three." Id. at 575, 331 N.W.2d 456. As explained by the Certified Questions Court:

The third rule states that retrospective application of a law is improper where the law "takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability with respect to transactions or considerations already past." Hughes, supra, p. 85, 282 N.W.2d 160. The fourth rule was stated in Hansen-Snyder, supra (headnote no. 1):

"1. STATUTES--REMEDIES--RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION--AMENDMENT. Statutes related to remedies or modes of procedure which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of a remedy or confirmation of rights already existing will, in the absence of language clearly showing a contrary intention, be held to operate retrospectively and apply to all actions accrued, pending or future, there being no vested right to keep a statutory procedural law unchanged and free from amendment." [Id. at 572, 331 N.W.2d 456.]

After reviewing In re Certified Questions and the cases discussed therein as examples of rules three and four, id. at 572-576, 331 N.W.2d 456, we hold that the present statute falls within the category of rule four cases and that therefore the fourth, not the third, rule of retroactivity applies. Reaching this conclusion, we have again looked to In re Certified Questions for guidance:

E. Rule Four Cases

The case law development of rule four establishes the corollary to the general proscription found in rule three. A remedial or procedural statute may operate Moreover, in Guardian Depositors Corp. v. Brown, 290 Mich. 433, 439-440, 287 N.W. 798 (1939), this Court, in a "contract case," stated that the Legislature may modify, limit, and even alter the remedy for enforcement of a contract without violating the rule against retrospectivity. Thus, such a new act would fall into rule four because it does not completely deny a remedy with such restrictions that it impairs the value of the contract or the substantive right.

retrospectively if it does not "take away vested rights." Ballog v. Knight [233 Mich.App. 319] Newspapers, Inc., supra, pp. 533-534, 164 N.W.2d 19, quoting from headnote no. 1 of Hansen-Snyder Co. v. General Motors Corp., 371 Mich. 480, 124 N.W.2d 286 (1963).

Although Rookledge, supra, was considered in our discussion of rule three, its holding supports our analysis of rule four. While the Rookledge Court found that the defendant third-party tortfeasor did not have a vested right in a statutory defense which barred the plaintiff from suit once he elected workers' compensation benefits, that Court implicitly recognized, consistent with rule four, that the fact that the new statute changes the legal consequences of a prior act does not prevent a retrospective application of that statute, since that statute is remedial in nature.

In Hansen-Snyder, supra, this Court held that a plaintiff could take advantage of a statutory amendment which extended the period for serving notice of intent to claim a lien from 60 days to 90 days from the date of first furnishing labor and material. The plaintiff, who had begun work under the prior statute, had failed to file within the old act's 60-day prescription. Nevertheless, the new act was viewed as a procedural amendment which was applicable to the plaintiff's claim.

Once again, in Ballog, supra, this Court, in a case procedurally similar to the instant case, applied a new act retrospectively. The Court in Ballog had to determine whether a statute in effect at the time of the plaintiff's injury which granted interest "from the date of judgment" or a new act which granted interest "from the date of filing the complaint" was applicable. The plaintiff's personal injury cause of action accrued before the new act became effective, and he also filed suit before its enactment. Nevertheless, we indicated that the new act fell within the remedial or procedural classification which did not take away a vested right, and, thus, we gave the new act retrospective effect. 381 Mich. at 533-536, 164 N.W.2d 19. [Id. at 575-576, 164 N.W.2d 19 (emphasis in original).]

Further, we have explored in detail the concept of "remedial" statutes. In Rookledge, supra at 453, 65...