Hughes v. Judges' Retirement Bd.

• Decision Date: 28 August 1979
• Docket Number: No. 12,Docket No. 60922,12
• Parties: Sam Street HUGHES and Marvin J. Salmon, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The JUDGES' RETIREMENT BOARD of the State of Michigan, and Clyne W. Durst, Jr., Milton J. H. Knabusch, Frank J. Kelley, Allison Green, and Franklin C. Pinkelman, as members thereof, and Stephen Van Note, as Executive Secretary thereof, Defendants-Appellees. Cal.407 Mich. 75, 282 N.W.2d 160
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 160

282 N.W.2d 160

Sam Street HUGHES and Marvin J. Salmon Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The JUDGES' RETIREMENT BOARD of the State of Michigan, and Clyne W. Durst, Jr., Milton J. H. Knabusch, Frank J. Kelley Allison Green, and Franklin C. Pinkelman, as members thereof, and Stephen Van Note, as Executive Secretary thereof, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 60922.

Cal. No. 12.

407 Mich. 75, 282 N.W.2d 160

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Aug. 28, 1979.

Donald L. Reisig, Sinas, Dramis, Brake, Turner, Boughton, McIntyre & Reisig, P. C., Lansing, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Gerald F. Young, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, for defendants-appellees.

RYAN, Justice.

Retired Circuit Judges Sam Street Hughes and Marvin J. Salmon filed suit in the Court of Appeals, as an original proceeding under GCR 1963, 714, praying for a writ of mandamus to compel the defendant to increase their pension benefits under the Judges' Retirement Act ¹ in accordance with the 1974 amendment to the act. Judge Hughes became a member of the judges' retirement system on April 19, 1957, the first day of his employment as an Ingham Circuit Judge. He retired from that office on January 1, 1973 and since that time has received an annuity as a beneficiary of the judges' retirement system.

Judge Salmon became a member of the retirement system on January 1, 1952. He retired from his judgeship on January 1, 1974 and likewise has been receiving retirement benefits ever since.

The amount of the retirement annuity being paid the plaintiff judges is computed according to the provisions of § 14 of the Judges' Retirement Act. At the time Judges Hughes and Salmon retired, § 14 as applied to them provided that their pension benefits were to be an amount equal to one-half the salary "being currently paid" by the state to circuit judges. ²

In 1974, § 14 of the Judges' Retirement Act was again amended to provide, in part, as follows:

"Upon a member's retirement as provided in section 13 or section 16, he shall be paid a straight life annuity terminating upon his death equal to 50% Of the annual salary paid by the state to him at the time of retirement for the first 12 years of service credited to his account. In addition thereto for each year or fraction of a year of service credited to his account, up to 4 additional years, his straight life annuity, terminating upon death, shall be increased 21/2% Of his annual salary paid by the state. Not more than 16 years of service may be used to determine the amount of annuity to be paid." ³

The 21/2% Annuity increase for each year of service in excess of 12 years and up to 16 years has been applied by the Judges' Retirement Board exclusively to judges who have retired after the effective date of the amendment, December 18, 1974. Thus plaintiffs have received none of those benefits.

On November 23, 1976, plaintiffs' attorney sent a letter to the executive secretary of the judges' retirement system demanding that his clients be accorded increased annuity payments in conformity with 1974 P.A. 337, § 14, even though plaintiffs had retired prior to its effective date, December 18, 1974. The specific relief requested was as follows:

"1) The payment of the additional 91/2% Annuity to Judge Sam Street Hughes from December 18, 1974 to date, plus the legally allowed interest on that overdue sum, taking into consideration whatever options he has previously selected.

"2) The payment of the additional 10% Annuity payment for Judge Marvin Salmon from December 18, 1974 to date, plus the legally allowed interest on that overdue sum, taking into consideration whatever options he has previously selected.

"3) Commencing as of this date, Judge Hughes' annuity payments should be increased to 591/2% Of the current salary of a circuit court judge, taking into consideration whatever options he has previously selected.

"4) Commencing as of this date, Judge Salmon's annuity payment should be increased to 60% Of the current salary of a circuit court judge, taking into consideration whatever options he has previously selected."

In effect, plaintiffs sought to combine the 10% Increased benefit maximum of 1974 P.A. 337, § 14, with the 50% Escalator clause of 1956 P.A. 224, § 14, so that their annuity payments from December 18, 1974 into the future would always equal 60% Of the then current salary paid by the state to circuit judges.

In a reply letter, the executive secretary denied the requested relief, relying upon an earlier opinion of the attorney general ⁴ which held that § 14 as amended by 1974 P.A. 337 "contains no language which either expressly or by implication indicates that it is intended to operate retrospectively" to allow payment of benefits provided thereunder to judges retired prior to the amendment.

Complaint for mandamus was then filed by plaintiffs in the Court of Appeals which, by order dated December 21, 1977, denied all relief sought.

This Court granted leave to appeal, limited to the following questions: (1) whether plaintiffs are seeking retrospective application of 1974 P.A. 337, § 14, as amended by 1976 P.A. 134; and (2) whether the nonapplication of the cited public acts to judges who retired prior to December 18, 1974, violates equal protection of the laws.

I.

Retrospectivity

A.

Recognizing that as a general rule this Court has not countenanced retrospective application of statutory enactments absent legislative direction to do so, plaintiffs argue that 1974 P.A. 337 need not be applied retrospectively in order to confer its benefit upon judges who retired prior to December 18, 1974, its effective date. Their argument is that they seek payment of the increased benefits authorized by the amendment prospectively only, from the effective date of the legislation, and not retrospectively from the dates of their retirements. The plaintiffs concede that if the new benefits were awarded from the date of their retirement, which for both of them was prior to December 18, 1974, the amendment would have to be applied retrospectively.

Plaintiffs concede that there is no expression of legislative intent that the increased benefits of amended § 14 are payable to any judges for any period prior to the enactment of the amendment.

Despite that concession, the first stated issue warrants brief development.

A retrospective law is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability with respect to transactions or considerations already past. Barber v. Barber, 327 Mich. 5, 41 N.W.2d 463 (1950). A statute is construed to have prospective effect only unless the Legislature expressly, or impliedly, indicates its intention to give it retrospective effect. McQueen v. Great Markwestern Packing Co., 402 Mich. 321, 262 N.W.2d 820 (1978). An example of an attempt to apply an act retrospectively in the context of the Judges' Retirement Act confronted this Court in Campbell v. Judges' Retirement Board, 378 Mich. 169, 143 N.W.2d 755 (1966).

In 1961, with the passage of 1961 P.A. 169, the Legislature eliminated the escalator clause it had adopted in 1956 which was the basis for computing retirant's annuities. In Campbell the defendant Judges' Retirement Board argued that the repeal of the escalator clause was applicable not only to judges retiring after its effective date, but to those who retired prior thereto as well. This Court held that application of the 1961 repeal of the escalator clause to judges who retired under the benefits of the clause would give retrospective effect to the repealer. The Court refused to apply the repealer in that fashion, reasoning that once a judge agreed to enter the retirement system and pay contributions, a contract was formed and his right to receive certain retirement benefits became vested when he chose to retire. Thereafter, his rights under the contract could not be diminished or impaired by legislative amendment, although the Legislature could choose to add benefits by subsequent amendment. Campbell, supra, at 181, 143 N.W.2d 755.

We agree that Judges Hughes and Salmon do not seek retrospective application of 1974 P.A. 337 as statutory retrospectivity is generally understood, because rather than impair or diminish their vested rights to retirement benefits, the computation formula of the 1974 amendment would have the immediate beneficial effect of increasing their pensions. This reality does not alter the rule, however, that whether beneficial or detrimental, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, a statute may not be applied retrospectively.

A statute is not regarded as operating retrospectively because it relates to an antecedent event. Merely because some of the requisites for its application are drawn from a time antedating its passage does not constitute a law retrospective. Clearwater Twp. v. Board of Supervisors of Kalkaska County, 187 Mich. 516, 153 N.W. 824 (1915). Certainly the Judges' Retirement Act does not require that eligibility for a pension should depend upon circumstances occurring subsequent to enactment of the law. A retirant's period of judicial service prior to passage of the act is permitted to be taken into consideration in determining eligibility for its benefits.

It is unthinkable that only those judges who served 12 or more years after the effective date of the 1974 amendment would be entitled to the benefits provided thereunder. Thus, to apply the amendment to persons who presently possess a continuing status, even though a part or all of the requirements to constitute it were fulfilled prior to the passage of the amendment, does no violence to the rule prohibiting retrospective application of a statute. See People ex rel. Albright v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Pension Fund of the City & County of Denver, 103 Colo. 1, 11, 82 P.2d 765 (1938).

We are satisfied that by...