Seattle Auto. Co. v. Stimson
| Decision Date | 10 January 1912 |
| Citation | 66 Wash. 548,120 P. 73 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | SEATTLE AUTOMOBILE CO. v. STIMSON. |
Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; R. W. Prigmore Judge.
Action by the Seattle Automobile Company against F. S. Stimson. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
J. L Waller, for appellant.
Chas F. Munday, for respondent.
This is a suit to recover the balance due upon an account for goods sold and delivered by the plaintiff to defendant. The alleged balance due is $1,013.95. A judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for $33.50, and it has appealed.
It is admitted that between the 9th day of January, 1907, and the 19th day of August, 1908, the appellant sold and delivered to the respondent automobiles and automobile supplies of the value of $16,574.15, and that the respondent paid thereon $15,500.20. The contention of the respondent is that his obligation to pay the balance of the account in excess of the judgment was postponed in the manner and form stated in the findings of the court hereafter set forth.
The respondent has moved to strike the statement of facts because of the insufficiency of the exceptions. The court made four findings of fact, separately numbered and stated. The exception to the findings is in the following language: 'The plaintiff herein excepts to the findings of fact entered in the cause for the reason that the same are contrary to the evidence in the case.' The appellant submitted seven findings, which were also separately numbered, and which were refused by the court. It reserved a like general exception to the refusal of the court to make these findings. Such an exception has been held insufficient in a uniform line of decisions of this court. Boom Company v. Railway Company, 57 Wash. 693, 107 P. 848; Yakima Grocery Co. v. Benoit,
56 Wash. 208, 105 P. 476; Fender v. McDonald, 54 Wash. 130, 102 P. 1026; Horrell v. California, etc., Ass'n, 40 Wash. 531, 82 P. 889; Smith v. Glenn, 40 Wash. 262, 82 P. 605; Bringgold v. Bringgold, 40 Wash. 121, 82 P. 179; Lilly v. Eklund, 37 Wash. 532, 79 P. 1107; Peters v. Lewis, 33 Wash. 617, 74 P. 815; Payette v. Willis, 23 Wash. 299, 63 P. 254. There being no specific exceptions to the findings and some of them being admittedly correct, the exceptions were insufficient. The motion to strike the statement will be denied, but the objection to its consideration will be sustained excepting as to the rulings of the court in admitting and excluding evidence. Lilly v. Eklund, supra.
It is first suggested that the court erred in permitting the respondent's counsel to ask a leading question. If the question was leading, which may well be doubted, the matter was within the sound discretion of the court.
The court refused to admit in evidence copies of certain letters written by the appellant to the respondent. This is assigned as error. The ruling was correct, as there has been no attempt to procure the production of the original letters.
The appellant's counsel propounded the following question to one of his witnesses: 'Now, what did the company [meaning the appellant] get out of that Stimson deal?' An objection to the meteriality of the question was sustained. The ruling is assigned as error. The point is without merit. As we shall see later, an answer would not have changed the result. The court found that the appellant, a corporation, was engaged in the business of buying, selling, dealing in, and storing new and secondhand automobiles and automobile supplies, and dealing in and doing all things pertaining to and usually done in and about the business of a garage and automobile agency; that between the dates heretofore stated it sold its goods to the respondent, and received payments in the sums respectively stated. It further found: 'That on, to wit, the 10th day of August, 1908, prior to the commencement of this action, the defendant, being then the owner of a secondhand automobile, made and entered into an oral agreement with the plaintiff, who had said automobile for sale, under and by the terms of which agreement the said plaintiff made an exchange of said automobile for a tract of land, which said tract of land was conveyed to this defendant and accepted by him in exchange for said automobile upon and subject to the express condition and agreement between the defendant and the plaintiff that the bill which the said plaintiff had against the defendant at that time amounting to $980.45 should not be presented for payment nor paid until and unless this defendant was able to and did sell said land for the sum of at least $2,000; that since receiving a deed to said land said defendant has used his best endeavors to sell said land, and has used his best endeavors in various ways to dispose of the same for said sum of $2,000, but has not been able to sell said land or to dispose of the same for said sum, or any other sum; that said land is not worth as much as $2,000, and cannot be sold or disposed of for that sum; that it was understood and agreed at the time of the said transaction and the making of said exchange between the plaintiff and this defendant, and it was a part of said agreement that unless said land could be sold or disposed of for at least $2,000, the said exchange should be in full settlement, satisfaction, and discharge of the claim set up in the amended complaint herein,' except the sum of $33.50, for which the appellant was entitled to a judgment under the admissions in the pleadings. The writer has italicized the words in the finding quoted.
The appellant further contends that the findings of the court did not warrant the judgment. The precise point made is that where there is a debt due, and it is agreed that it shall be paid upon the happening of a future event and the event does not happen, the law implies a promise to pay within a reasonable time. The following authorities are relied upon as upholding this view: Williston v. Perkins, 51 Cal 554; Chadwick v. Hopkins, 4 Wyo. 379, 34 P. 899, 62 Am. St. Rep. 38; Randall v. Johnson, 59 Miss. 317, 42 Am. Rep. 365; Sears v. Wright, 24 Me. 278; Nunez v. Dautel, 19 Wall. 560, 22 L.Ed. 161; Busby v. Century Gold Min. Co., 27 Utah, 231, 75 P. 725; Crooker v. Holmes, 65 Me. 195, 20 Am. Rep. 687; Noland v. Bull, 24 Or. 479, 33 P. 983; Page v. Cook, 164 Mass. 116, 41 N.E. 115, 28 L. R. A. 759, 49 Am. St. Rep. 449; Works v. Hershey, 35 Iowa, 340; Capron v. Capron, 44 Vt. 410. In the Williston Case certificates were given by the defendant which recited that the holders were entitled to receive a stated sum of money when a certain schooner in course of construction should be sold. Suit was brought upon the certificates before the vessel was sold. The court said that the defendants were entitled only to a reasonable time in which to finish and sell the schooner. In the Chadwick Case the defense interposed was that payment of the plaintiff's demand was to be made 'as soon and fast as they [the defendants] were able financially to do so without sacrificing their interest in or the property of said North Crow Land & Cattle Company,' and that the event named had not arrived. The court held that the agreement allowed only a reasonable time in which to make payment, and that it was not a sacrifice of property to sell it at the market price. In the Randall Case the contract was for the...
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