Seattle Taxi, Inc. v. King County

• Decision Date: 24 August 1987
• Docket Number: No. 17210-7-I,17210-7-I
• Citation: 49 Wn.App. 617,744 P.2d 1082
• Parties: SEATTLE TAXI, INC. a Washington corporation, Appellant, v. KING COUNTY, a Washington municipal corporation, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 617

49 Wn.App. 617

744 P.2d 1082

SEATTLE TAXI, INC. a Washington corporation, Appellant, v. KING COUNTY, a Washington municipal corporation, Respondent.

No. 17210-7-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington Division 1.

Aug. 24, 1987.

Publication Ordered Nov. 5, 1987.

Review Denied Dec. 2, 1987.

Bruce A. Wolf, Sheryl Bichich, Kargianis & Austin, Seattle, for appellant.

Michael E. Thurston, Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for respondent.

DONALD D. HALEY ^*, Judge Pro Tem.

Seattle Taxicab and Transportation Company, Inc., appeals from an order granting summary judgment dismissing its complaint and declaring section 6.64.090 of the King County Code constitutional and valid. We affirm.

FACTS

In 1984, the legislature enacted RCW 81.72.210. ¹ The Rate ceiling. No rate may exceed a ceiling rate of ten percent (10%) above the average of rates filed with the City on January 1st of each year.

                statute granted power to control taxicab rates to cities, towns, counties and port districts.   In response to the state statute, the city of Seattle passed section 6.212.115 of the Seattle Municipal [744 P.2d 1083] Code which provides, in pertinent part, as follows
                

On August 16, 1984, respondent King County enacted its own ordinance, codified as chapter 6.64.090 of the King County Code, relating to taxicab fares. The county ordinance provided, in pertinent part:

[I]t shall be unlawful for anyone operating a taxicab licensed by King County to charge, demand or receive any greater or lesser rate than the following:

1. For passengers for the first 1/6 mile $1.00.

2. Thereafter, for each additional 1/6 mile or fraction thereof $0.20.

3. For every one minute of waiting time $0.30.

Following the enactment of the county and city ordinances, certain of appellant's taxicab drivers were cited for violations of the fixed rate provision in the county ordinance. Those citations were appealed to the King County Board of Appeals, and on January 24, 1984, the board rendered a decision upholding the issuance of the citations.

On January 11, 1985, appellant filed the present action in Two issues are presented for review. The first issue is whether the County ordinance constitutes an impermissible exercise of the police power. The second is whether the County ordinance is unconstitutional because it conflicts with general law.

                superior court seeking a declaration that, among other things, the rate provisions of the King County ordinance were unconstitutional.   The county then moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal of appellant's action and a declaration that the county ordinance was constitutional.   The motion was subsequently granted, and, following denial of the appellant's motion for reconsideration, appellant appealed to this court
                

POLICE POWER

An ordinance is "presumed to be constitutional, and an attacker bears the burden of showing invalidity of an enactment beyond a reasonable doubt." Seattle v. State, 100 Wash.2d 232, 238, 668 P.2d 1266 (1983). Thus, we must determine whether appellant has carried its burden of showing invalidity of the ordinance.

Appellant argues primarily that the ordinance cannot meet the requirements for a valid exercise of the police power. The requirements referred to are set forth in State v. Conifer Enterprises, Inc., 82 Wash.2d 94, 96, 508 P.2d 149 (1973):

Two steps are involved in measuring the constitutionality of a legislative enactment against the permissible bounds of the police power. First, does it tend to promote the health, peace, morals, education, good order and welfare of the people? More specifically, does it tend to correct some evil or promote some interest of the state? ...

The second inquiry, more narrow, but equally important, is whether the particular statute under scrutiny bears a reasonable and substantial relation to accomplishing the purpose established in step one....

These tests cannot be applied in a vacuum. The state interest to be promoted or the evil to be corrected, and the relationship of the statute to this purpose, must be sought out.

Appellant apparently concedes that the first requirement, i.e. whether the ordinance tends to correct some evil or promote some interest of the state, is satisfied here. Appellant contends that the evil sought to be corrected was rate "gouging" by taxicabs charging excessively high fares for taxi service from Seattle-Tacoma Airport to downtown Seattle. Though appellant does not challenge the legitimacy of this "evil," it argues that the ordinance does not bear a reasonable and substantial relation to correcting that "evil," and therefore the ordinance cannot pass the second part of the test outlined in Conifer.

In support of this argument, appellant points to evidence in the record indicating that (1) the fixed rate established in the ordinance has more undesirable side effects than a rate ceiling; and (2) the fixed rate will actually do more harm to the public than good. While these points may be well taken, and though the ordinance may have undesirable or even unnecessary side effects, this court cannot say that the ordinance fails to reasonably and substantially relate to the evil sought to be corrected. This is especially true in light of the fact that a "reasonable and substantial" relationship exists as long as this court "can reasonably conceive of a state of facts ... which justify the legislation". Conifer, at 97, 508 P.2d 149. In the instant case, it is conceivable that rate gouging occurs throughout the county, and that a fixed rate or some other regulation is necessary to protect the public. Though a fixed rate may not be the wisest solution available, the wisdom of the enactment is a matter within the purview of the legislature, not the courts. Washington State Public Employee's Bd. v. Cook, 88 Wash.2d 200, 206, 559 P.2d 991 (1977), adhered to on rehearing, 90 Wash.2d 89, 579 P.2d 359 (1978); Eskay Plastics, Ltd. v. Chappell, 34 Wash.App. 210, 213, 660 P.2d 764 (1983); County of Spokane v. Valu-Mart, Inc., 69 Wash.2d 712, 716, 419 P.2d 993 (1966).

Moreover, rate gouging may not be the only evil that the ordinance attempts to correct. In RCW 81.72.200, the Washington State Legislature has stated Consequently, the safety, reliability, and economic viability and stability of privately operated taxicab transportation service are matters of state wide importance.

In light of the above, it is not difficult to imagine the justification for the...