Seawall Associates v. City of New York, 1
| Decision Date | 22 December 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,No. 4,No. 3,No. 2,ASSOCIATES--86,1,2,3,4 |
| Parties | SEAWALL ASSOCIATES, a partnership, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK; Edward I. Koch, in his capacity as Mayor of the City of New York, and Paul A. Crotty, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Department of Housing Preservation and Development of the City of New York, Defendants, and Richard Wilkerson, Edgar Ferrell, Frank Alicia, Tom Williams, Danny Sogliuzzo, and the Coalition for the Homeless, Defendants-Intervenors. Action459 WEST 43RD STREET CORP., and Eastern Pork Products Company, Plaintiffs, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants, and Richard Wilkerson, et al., Defendants-Intervenors. ActionSUTTON EAST, a New York Partnership and Channel Club, Plaintiffs, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants. ActionANBE REALTY CO., a Co-Partnership, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, et al. Defendant. Action |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Shea & Gould and Dershowitz & Eiger, P.C., New York City (Sheldon D. Camhy, Kevin B. McGrath, Claudia A. Wagner, George G. Nelson and Nathan Z. Dershowitz, of counsel), for plaintiffs in Action No. 1.
Paskus, Gordon & Mandel, New York City (Philip H. Schaeffer, Alan M. Goldston, Jane D. Connolly, of counsel), for plaintiffs in Action No. 2.
Rosenberg & Estis, P.C., New York City (Gary M. Rosenberg, Roger W. Lawrence, Franklin R. Kaimen, of counsel), for plaintiffs in Action No. 3.
Shapiro, Mortman, Schwartz & Greene, New York City, for plaintiffs in Action No. 4.
Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Corp. Counsel, New York City (Gabriel Taussig, Albert Fredericks, Phyllis Arnold, of counsel), for defendants.
Mitchell S. Bernard, Norman Siegel, New York Civil Liberties Union, Robert M. Hayes, Mitchell S. Bernard, Coalition for the Homeless, Saralee Evans, West Side SRO Law Project, Goddard Riverside Community Center, Wayne Hawley, Olive Karen Stamm, MFY Legal Services East Side SRO Law Project, New York City, for proposed intervenors and amicus curiae only on this motion.
In America, the obligation to provide for the disadvantaged has been historically borne by private philanthropic societies and religious orders. In the twentieth century, the role of government expanded to include the responsibility for providing care and assistance to those in need 1. In recent years however, Government assistance to those individuals has been reduced 2 shifting the burden of providing care to the private sector.
Along these lines, the City of New York has enacted legislation requiring certain segments of the private order to assume a major responsibility for providing a solution to a current, critical social problem--providing housing for the large and growing number of homeless people in the City of New York.
The issue before me is whether the City of New York through its enactment of Local Law 22 is prevented, either by constitutional prohibitions or by lesser legal impediments from delegating this responsibility to the private sector in the manner chosen.
Briefly stated, Local Law 22 of 1986 which amended Local Law 59 of 1985, attempts to preserve and maintain single room occupancy multiple dwellings (SRO's). 3 For years SRO units have served as relatively inexpensive housing for persons of low and moderate incomes, the elderly and individuals suffering from some form of physical or mental disability. The City Council enacted Local Laws 59 and 22 in the hope that preserving and maintaining SRO's would limit the increasing number of homeless people in this city, ... "thereby lessening the significant strain that providing shelter for the homeless has placed on the city's resources". Crotty affidavit pg. 3.
The enactment of Local Law 59 in August, 1985 placed an 18 month moratorium on the demolition or alteration of SRO buildings retroactive to January, 1985. The moratorium established by Local Law 59 was to expire on July 9, 1986. However, the City Council extended the moratorium on the demolition or conversion of SRO buildings until December 31, 1986 through the enactment of Local Law 22. ( § 2).
The scope of Local Law 22 however was greater than merely imposing a moratorium on the demolition of SRO buildings; it imposed affirmative obligations on the owners of buildings containing SRO units. These obligations require the owners to maintain these units in habitable conditions and, if these units are either vacant or in a state of disrepair, then the owners must renovate them and make them suitable for habitation. ( § 4) All SRO units must then be rented at rents authorized by law ( § 4). The law also makes available to the Commissioner of the Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) enforcement mechanisms as a means of policing SRO owners. First, there is a statutory rebuttable presumption that an owner has violated the law if an SRO unit is not occupied by a bona fide tenant for a period of thirty days or longer ( § 4). If an owner fails to comply with the local law the Commissioner may issue a citation for noncompliance which may include a civil penalty of $500 per dwelling unit cited plus a $250 per unit per day fine commencing ten days after service of the citation running to the date of compliance ( § 4).
Significantly, these provisions only apply to private entities. The City of New York, itself an owner of a significant amount of residential-in-rem realty, is exempt from Local Law 22. ( § 2; C26-118.10(d)(1)(b)(ii).)
These affirmative obligations were to become effective on October 8, 1986. A few days before, a number of owner-developers of properties containing SRO units commenced applications to temporarily stay enforcement of these provisions by the City of New York. The plaintiffs also brought motions seeking preliminary injunctive and declaratory relief 4.
Pending the determination of these motions, I temporarily stayed enforcement of Local Law 22 except as to those provisions prohibiting demolition and conversion.
The plaintiffs assert similar causes of actions in complaints which essentially contend that the City of New York must be permanently enjoined from enforcing Local Law 22 because: a) the local law is unconstitutional as it is unreasonable, arbitrary and confiscatory and thus violates the due process clause, equal protection clause and "taking" clause of the United States and New York State Constitutions; b) that the City Council exceeded its constitutionally granted legislative authority in enacting provisions which directly conflict with state laws and which in fact preempt intrusion by the City Council in this area; c) that the City failed to consider the environmental impact of Local Law 22 on existing population concentrations and which, if implemented, would not comply with the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), City Environmental Quality Review (CEQR), and the Environmental Conservation Law (ECL); d) Local Law 22 is more restrictive and stringent than the regulations in effect on June 1, 1970 and therefore violates the "Urstadt Law" and; e) that the City failed to publish a notice for a hearing in the City Record as required by the Municipal Home Rule Law § 20(5) and Section 38b--1.00 of the New York City Administrative Code.
In view of the common questions of law and fact present in all of these cases, the application by plaintiff Sutton East Associates for consolidation is granted. (CPLR 602(a)). This decision will accordingly dispose of all of the applications for injunctive relief.
Preliminarily, a motion for leave to intervene as defendants in the Seawall Associates and 459 West 43rd Street Corp and Eastern Pork Products Co. actions was brought by the Coalition of the Homeless, a not-for-profit corporation and five of the tenants who reside in a building owned by Seawall Associates. The proposed intervenors contend that they have a sufficient interest in the outcome of this decision to permit them to intervene.
Pursuant to CPLR 1013, the Court in its discretion may permit intervention ... "when the persons' claim or defense and the main action have a common question of law or fact". Consideration should also be given to whether the intervention would delay the action or prejudice the substantial rights of any party.
Clearly, delay is not a bar here since the proposed intervenors have moved swiftly for the relief requested. There is also no claim of prejudice by the plaintiffs. Rather, the plaintiffs assert that the proposed intervenors do not have a substantial enough interest in the proceeding. Although it is true that the individual intervenors reside in only one of the plaintiffs' buildings, they have a substantial interest in seeing that this legislation withstands a challenge. The opportunity to live in a fully rented and renovated building as opposed to a currently near-vacant and delapidated building is a concrete interest.
The plaintiffs contend that the Coalition for the Homeless have an attenuated interest in this proceeding resembling the speculative interest of MFY Legal Services in MFY Legal Services, Inc., v. Dudley 67 N.Y.2d 706, 499 N.Y.S.2d 930, 490 N.E.2d 849 (1986) in which the court denied the requested intervention. But, since intervention is to be liberally applied (Plantech Housing Inc. v. Kevin Conlan, 74 A.D.2d 920, 426 N.Y.S.2d 81 (2nd Dep't, 1980)), the interest of the Coalition for the Homeless in the legislation under scrutiny here is not speculative but indeed real, intervention is granted.
Accordingly, the motion for leave to intervene is granted.
Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the enforcement of Local Law 22 principally on the ground that its provisions lack legal merit and if enforced will cost them the loss of significant investments and anticipated profits. They further argue that the law has unconstitutionally deprived them of the purpose for which they initially purchased these buildings--to...
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