Seawell v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 27 November 1893
• Citation: 119 Mo. 222,24 S.W. 1002
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Parties: SEAWELL et al. v. KANSAS CITY, FT. S. & M. R. CO.

24 S.W. 1002

119 Mo. 222

SEAWELL et al. v. KANSAS CITY, FT. S. & M. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

November 27, 1893.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — INTERSTATE SHIPMENT — WHAT IS — DISCRIMINATION IN FREIGHT RATES — MEASURE OF DAMAGES — INSTRUCTIONS.

1. A shipment between two points in the same state is not interstate because a part of the track over which the shipment is made lies in another state. Lehigh Val. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 12 Sup. Ct. 806, 145 U. S. 192, followed.

2. An instruction requiring the jury to find more than was necessary for them to find in order for plaintiff to recover affords no ground of complaint to defendant.

3. Plaintiff shipped coal over defendant's railroad from C. C. to K. C., the rates charged being greater than rates advertised on the same date for shipments of coal over defendant's road in the same direction from M. to K. C., a greater distance. Held an unlawful discrimination, for which plaintiff could recover, though no coal was actually shipped from M. to K. C. on the day on which plaintiff's coal was shipped, since defendant, in advertising a certain rate from M., must be deemed to have charged such rate within Rev. St. 2637, making it unlawful for a carrier to "charge" a greater compensation for transportation of like kinds of property, under similar circumstances, for a shorter than a longer distance in the same direction.

4. In such case plaintiff's damages should be measured by the exact extent to which shippers of coal from M., under similar circumstances and conditions, were given a preference.

Appeal from circuit court, Jackson county; J. H. Slover, Judge.

Action by J. M. Seawell and others against the Kansas City, Fort Scott & Memphis Railroad Company to recover damages sustained by reason of defendant's giving undue preference to other persons shipping freight over its line. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Wallace Pratt and I. P. Dana, for appellant. Gates & Wallace, for respondents.

BRACE, J.

By article 2, c. 42, Rev. St. 1889, it is declared to be unlawful for any common carrier "to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company or firm, corporation or locality in the transportation of goods, wares and merchandise of any character, or to subject any particular person, firm, corporation or locality to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage with respect to such transportation," (section 2636;) and "for any such common carrier to charge or receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of like kinds of property, under similar circumstances and conditions for a shorter than a longer distance over the same line in the same direction," (section 2637;) and it is therein further provided that, "in case any such common carrier shall do or cause to be done any act or thing in this act prohibited or declared to be unlawful or shall omit to do any act or thing in this act required to be done, then such common carrier shall be liable to the person or persons injured thereby for three times the amount of the damages sustained in consequence of the violation of the provisions of this act, together with a reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the court, which fee shall be taxed and collected as part of the costs in the case," (section 2643.) The defendant is a corporation operating a line of railroad between Kansas City, Mo., and Memphis, Tenn., through the states of Missouri, Kansas, and Arkansas. The following diagram of a part of its main line and branches is sufficient to fully illustrate the present controversy:

NOTE: OPINION CONTAINING TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE

The gravamen of the plaintiffs' complaint is that during the months of April, May, and part of June, 1890, the defendant company charged the plaintiffs $2 more for the transportation of each of 150 cars of coal shipped to them at Kansas City, Mo., from Carbon Centre, than it charged at the same dates for transporting coal from Liberal and Minden, all being towns in the state of Missouri, on defendant's line of railroad, and the said towns of Liberal and Minden being each at a greater distance from Kansas City than the said town of Carbon Centre.

The answer, in substance, is a general denial and a special plea that any coal carried by defendant from Carbon Centre to Kansas City was transported over a part of its road situated in Missouri and over a much longer portion in the state of Kansas, and the same was true of all freight carried by defendant from either Minden or Liberal to Kansas City, (the distance being specified as to each place;) that defendant's said lines of railroad were operated not only for the transportation of freight between said three places and Kansas City, but also between many other places on said line in the states of Missouri, Kansas, and Arkansas, and that all freight transported from either of said three places to Kansas City was interstate commerce, and subject to regulation alone by congress, and not subject to said provisions of the laws of Missouri; and that said provisions of the Revised Statutes of Missouri are in violation of the constitution of the United States, and are unconstitutional and void. It appeared from the evidence that the defendant charged the plaintiff, and that he paid, for transporting coal from Carbon Centre, $2 per car more than during the same time were its charges for transporting coal from Liberal and Minden; that coal carried by defendant from Carbon Centre to Kansas City would run first about 20 miles in Missouri to the state line, then in Kansas about 81 miles, where it recrossed into Missouri, and ran 2 miles in that state, being an aggregate distance of about 103 miles; from Liberal to Kansas City, would first run about 7 miles in Missouri to the state line, then 115 miles in Kansas, and then 2 miles in Missouri, being an aggregate distance of 124 miles; and from Minden to Kansas City, would first run 5 miles in Missouri, then 122 miles in Kansas, and then 2 miles in Missouri, being an aggregate distance of 129 miles. On the trial the court refused to sustain some objections of the defendant to the plaintiff's evidence, which will be noticed in the course of the opinion, and refused to sustain the defendant's demurrers to the plaintiff's evidence. The defendant offered no evidence. The issues were submitted to the jury upon two instructions for the plaintiffs and seven for the defendant, and the jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs for $274. Thereupon, on application of plaintiffs, the court trebled said amount, rendered judgment for plaintiffs for $822 and costs, and taxed as part of such costs an attorney's fee of $250. The defendant brings the case here by appeal.

1. The first error assigned is that the trial court refused to nonsuit the plaintiffs on the evidence. To sustain this assignment it is necessary, and counsel for the defendant undertake, to maintain the proposition that, although it be conceded that Carbon Centre, Liberal, and Minden are all in Missouri, upon the line of defendant's railroad, the transportation by defendant of coal from all three of these points to Kansas City, also in the state of Missouri, is in the same direction, over the same line of railroad, and under similar circumstances and conditions; that the distance from Liberal and Minden to Kansas City is greater than from Carbon Centre; and that the defendant charged the plaintiff in the aggregate more for transporting plaintiff's coal from Carbon Centre than it charged from either of the other two points to said city, — yet the plaintiffs cannot recover, although the statutes of Missouri give plaintiffs a right of action for damages for such discrimination charges against them between places on the line of defendant's road in this state, because defendant's line of road between these points being partly in the state of Kansas, and the transportation of coal between these points thereon being partly through the state of Kansas, such transportation is "commerce among the several states," within the meaning of section 8, art. 1, of the constitution of the United States, and subject to regulation alone by congress; and as to such commerce the state statutes aforesaid are inoperative and void. There can be no question that the foregoing legislation of Missouri is part of a system adopted in this state for the purpose, and having the effect, of regulating that important branch of commerce conducted by railroads. In the same year in which it was first adopted the congress of the United States adopted a general law regulating "commerce." The law of congress was approved February 4, 1887, and went into effect 60 days after its passage. 24 Stat. 379, c. 104. This federal statute, enacted for the purpose of regulating "commerce among the states," passed under the power given congress by the constitution, defines and applies the provisions of the act to such commerce when conducted by railroads on land in the following language: "The provisions of this act shall apply to any common carrier or carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad * * * from one state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia to any other state or territory of the United States or the District of Columbia, provided however, that the provisions of this act shall not apply to the transportation of passengers or property, or to the receiving, delivering, storage or hauling of property wholly within one state, and not shipped to or from * * * any state or territory as aforesaid." Within six months thereafter the legislature of Missouri passed the law in question, approved July 5, 1887, (Laws Mo. Ex. Sess. 1887, p. 16, § 3; Id. p. 17, § 4; Id. p. 20, § 10,) which seem to have been in great measure copied from sections 3, 4, and 8 of the federal act. It goes without saying that the latter was...