Seay v. Tennessee Valley Authority
| Decision Date | 11 March 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:00-CV-168.,1:00-CV-168. |
| Citation | 340 F.Supp.2d 832 |
| Parties | Clarence SEAY, Jr., Plaintiff, v. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, Craven Crowell, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
John R. Benn, Sheffield, AL, for Plaintiff.
John E. Slater, Senior Litigation Attorney, Tennessee Valley Authority, Knoxville, TN, for Defendants.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants Tennessee Valley Authority and Craven Crowell (collectively "TVA") on Counts 67, 75, 125 (with respect to reassignment rights), and 129. The Sixth Circuit remanded these four claims in the plaintiff's amended complaint for further consideration. Seay v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 339 F.3d 454 (6th Cir.2003).
There are two motions before this Court. TVA moves for leave to add two documents to its exhibit list. [Court File No. 127]. The motion is GRANTED.
TVA makes a renewed motion for summary judgment as to Counts 67 and 125. [Court File No. 119]. After reviewing the record, the Court concludes that TVA's motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows. The summary judgment motion is GRANTED with regard to Count 67. For the reasons expressed by TVA in its briefs [Court File Nos. 120, 124], Count 67 of the plaintiff's amended complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
TVA's motion for summary judgment to dismiss Count 125 (reassignment rights) is DENIED because there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute. Seay may proceed to trial on Count 125 (reassignment rights). The only claims that remain before the Court for adjudication at trial are Counts 75, 125 (reassignment rights), and 129 of the amended complaint.
Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The Court must view the facts contained in the record and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); National Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir.2001). The Court cannot weigh the evidence or determine the truth of any matter in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. The moving party may satisfy this burden by presenting affirmative evidence that negates an element of the nonmoving party's claim or by demonstrating an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir.2003). To refute such a showing, the nonmoving party must present some significant, probative evidence and specific facts indicating the necessity of a trial for resolving a material, factual dispute. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 595. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; McLean v. Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir.2000); Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir.1996); Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 581-82 (6th Cir.1992). The Court's role is limited to determining whether the record contains sufficient evidence from which a rational, objective jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 595; National Satellite Sports, 253 F.3d at 907.
In Count 67 of his amended complaint, plaintiff Clarence Seay, Jr. ("Seay") asserts a claim of race discrimination in employment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, concerning his non-selection for the position of Methods Team Specialist (Plant Operations), pay grade ("PG") 8. This Court initially dismissed Count 67 after concluding that it is time barred and equitable tolling does not apply. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Seay is entitled to equitable tolling of the time limit for filing suit. The Sixth Circuit remanded Count 67 for further consideration of this claim's merits. Seay, 339 F.3d at 468-70.
The Court has reviewed the record in the light most favorable to Seay and makes the following findings of fact. Seay, an African American, was suspended from his Safety Specialist SD-4 position at TVA on July 2, 1997. TVA terminated Seay's employment through a reduction in force ("RIF") on September 26, 1997.
While Seay was suspended in July 1997, TVA's Process Methods organization advertised in Vacant Position Announcement ("VPA") 12205 that it was seeking to hire a Methods Team Specialist (Plant Operations), PG-8. The closing date for candidates to submit their applications was July 11, 1997.
The minimum qualifications for this particular position were listed as Bachelor of Science degree in engineering, or Bachelor of Science degree in another scientific discipline, or equivalent related experience. VPA 12205 further provided that applicants were also required to have: (1) detailed work knowledge of TVA processes, programs, and practices in the area of plant operations; (2) ability to analyze complex technical and management problems and determine the most cost effective solutions; (3) detailed working knowledge of nuclear plant design, construction, and maintenance techniques and practices; (4) minimum of eight years experience performing functions associated with plant operations in the nuclear industry; and (5) working knowledge of upper tier external and internal documents for nuclear power plants. [Plaintiff's Evidentiary Submission, Vol. 4, Tab 4, Deposition of Robert Adney, pp. 14-15].
There is a dispute whether Seay met all of these minimum qualifications. Seay had a Bachelor of Science degree from college but he may not have had the requisite experience and knowledge concerning the management and operation of a nuclear power plant. For purposes of ruling on TVA's summary judgment motion, the Court assumes arguendo that Seay met the minimum qualifications for VPA 12205. Even if Seay met the minimum qualifications for VPA 12205, his claim in Count 67 must be dismissed.
Seay applied for VPA 12205. The TVA procedure for processing the applications bears close scrutiny. TVA Human Resources employee, Debbie Layne, received all the applications for VPA 12205 including Seay's application. On July 14, 1997, Debbie Layne put the applications in a package which was forwarded to Human Resources Consultant Donald Nixon ("Nixon"). Nixon had the package in his possession but, as explained infra, Nixon did not review it. The applications package contained a computer-generated selection "spreadsheet" showing basic information about each candidate including their race. The spreadsheet clearly indicated that Seay is African American (black).
The TVA manager ultimately responsible for making the hiring decision with regard to VPA 12205 was TVA Vice-President for Process Methods, Robert Adney ("Adney"). Nixon served in the capacity as a Human Resources consultant to Adney. The Court concentrates its attention on determining whether there is any proof that Adney and Nixon had actual knowledge in July 1997 of Seay's race and that Seay had submitted an application for VPA 12205.
The Court finds that although the information about Seay's race was in the applications package prepared by Debbie Layne, there is no proof that Adney and Nixon reviewed the applications package and spreadsheet. There was no need for Adney and Nixon to review these documents because Adney decided on July 22, 1997, to cancel VPA 12205. Adney communicated his final decision to Nixon to cancel VPA 12205. Adney then asked for Nixon's advice and assistance in finding someone to work as a Methods Teams Specialist but at a significantly lower pay grade (PG-5) with lesser job duties and responsibilities than those advertised in VPA 12205, PG-8.
Based on Nixon's advice and recommendation, Adney decided to select a TVA employee, Albert Salatka ("Salatka") for the position of Methods Team Specialist, PG-5. Salatka was selected by Adney on a "rotational basis for developmental purposes."1 No one, including Salatka, ever filled the VPA 12205 position at the PG-8 level. Salatka is white (Caucasian). When Nixon recommended Salatka, Nixon knew that Salatka is white but Adney did not know Salatka's race. Seay complains that the selection of Salatka for the rotational assignment was a non-competitive placement, i.e. the position to which Salatka was assigned was not advertised by TVA in a VPA and Seay was not afforded an opportunity to apply for it. Seay also contends that Salatka was pre-selected. Since 1987, Salatka had worked for TVA in the position of Senior Fire Protection Specialist, PG-5, and he had more than eight years experience working in nuclear plant operations. (Adney Deposition, pp. 44, 51-52, 71, 90-91, 109).
Seay strives to make out a Title VII disparate treatment claim by comparing himself to Salatka. Seay asserts that Salatka was selected by Adney even though Seay was substantially better qualified for the position. Seay emphasizes that Salatka did not have the minimum education requirement for VPA 12205, whereas Seay had a Bachelor of Science college degree. Salatka was a high school graduate and did not have a college degree.
The Court finds it is immaterial whether Salatka did or did not meet the minimum qualifications for VPA 12205, PG-8. The Court's decision on Count 67 does not turn on the issue whether Salatka satisfied the minimum requirements and...
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