Seay v. Tennessee Valley Authority

• Decision Date: 29 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 1:00-CV-168.,1:00-CV-168.
• Citation: 340 F.Supp.2d 844
• Parties: Clarence SEAY, Jr., v. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY and Craven Crowell.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

340 F.Supp.2d 844

Clarence SEAY, Jr., v. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY and Craven Crowell.

No. 1:00-CV-168.

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee. At Chattanooga.

March 29, 2004.

John R. Benn, Sheffield, AL, for Plaintiff.

John E. Slater, Senior Litigation Attorney, Tennessee Valley Authority, Knoxville, TN, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

EDGAR, Chief Judge.

Defendants Tennessee Valley Authority and Craven Crowell (collectively "TVA") move to strike the plaintiff's claims for compensatory damages on his remaining Title VII claims, Counts 75 and 129 of the amended complaint. [Court File No. 130]. TVA contends that plaintiff Seay failed to exhaust his administrative remedies to the extent Seay claims he is entitled to recover compensatory damages under Title VII. TVA asserts that during the course of the administrative proceedings, Seay did not explicitly claim that he had suffered injuries involving emotional distress or mental anguish and Seay did not demand relief in the form of compensatory damages. TVA relies primarily upon Crawford v. Babbitt, 186 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir.1999); Gibson v. West, 201 F.3d 990 (7th Cir.2000); Fitzgerald v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 121 F.3d 203 (5th Cir.1997).

There is a second part to TVA's motion. If the Court should decide to strike Seay's claims for compensatory damages on the remaining Title VII causes of action, then TVA further moves the Court to place the case on the "nonjury calendar." TVA argues that if there are no claims for compensatory damages on Counts 75 and 129, plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c). In support of its position that Seay is not entitled to a jury trial, TVA cites Jones v. Dalton, 1996 WL 421945, *3 (E.D.Pa. July 18, 1996); and Journigan v. Eastover Bank For Sav., 805 F.Supp. 415, 418 (S.D.Miss.1992).

Seay opposes the motion [Court File No. 40]. After reviewing the record, the Court concludes that TVA's motion [Court File No. 130] is DENIED. Seay's claims for compensatory damages on his remaining Title VII claims are not precluded on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Seay may present his Title VII claims for compensatory damages on Counts 75 and 129 at a jury trial under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c).

I. TVA's Motion To Dismiss For Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction is Timely Filed

Seay argues that TVA's motion should be summarily denied because it has not been timely filed. This argument fails. The Court finds that TVA's motion to dismiss the claims for compensatory damages on the remaining Title VII claims (Counts 75 and 129) on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies is timely filed.

As explained infra, TVA's motion raises a question whether the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question that may be raised at any time, by any party or sua sponte by the Court. Community Health Plan of Ohio v. Mosser, 347 F.3d 619, 622 (6th Cir.2003); Young v. United States, 332 F.3d 893, 895 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 985, 124 S.Ct. 507, 157 L.Ed.2d 378 (2003); In re Millers Cove Energy Co., 128 F.3d 449, 450 (6th Cir.1997); Ford v. Hamilton Investments, Inc., 29 F.3d 255, 257 (6th Cir.1994); Franzel v. Kerr Mfg. Co., 959 F.2d 628, 629-30 (6th Cir.1992); Wooten v. United States, 825 F.2d 1039, 1045 (6th Cir.1987); Ambrose v. Welch, 729 F.2d 1084, 1085 (6th Cir.1984); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable defect that may be raised at any time to justify dismissal of a pending action. Ambrose, 729 F.2d at 1085.

II. Estoppel

Seay next argues that TVA is estopped from making its motion based upon TVA's answer to the complaint. In his original complaint [Court File No. 1] and his amended complaint filed with this Court on September 8, 2000 [Court File No. 41, pp. 40-41], Seay demands compensatory damages and requests a jury trial. TVA filed its answer to the complaint on January 21, 2000. [Court File No. 4]. In its answer, TVA did not dispute the Seay's right to make a claim for compensatory damages and to request for a jury trial on his Title VII claims. The Twenty-Fourth Defense in TVA's answer denies that plaintiff is entitled to any relief sought and goes on to state: "Specifically, plaintiff is not entitled to compensatory damages with regard to any claims pled in the complaint, except for the Title VII race and reprisal claims." The Twenty-Fifth Defense in TVA's answer states; "Plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial as to any claims pled in the complaint, except for the Title VII race and reprisal claims." [Court File No. 4, p. 19]. The first time that TVA ever raised an objection to plaintiffs' request for a jury trial and moved to dismiss the plaintiff's Title VII claims for compensatory damages on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies was in the instant motion filed on March 4, 2004. [Court File No. 130].

Seay's estoppel argument fails. TVA's motion to dismiss the Title VII claims for compensatory damages on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies is essentially a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It is well settled that no action of the parties can confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a federal court. The subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts does not depend upon actions by the parties that may be characterized as waiver or estoppel. Principles of estoppel and waiver cannot be used by a party to confer subject matter jurisdiction on a federal court that otherwise lacks jurisdiction. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982); Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 n. 21, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978); American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951); Fisher v. Peters, 249 F.3d 433, 444 (6th Cir.2001); Douglas v. E.G. Baldwin & Associates, Inc., 150 F.3d 604, 608-09 (6th Cir.1998); Mickler v. Nimishillen and Tuscarawas Railway Co., 13 F.3d 184, 189 (6th Cir.1993); McClinton v. Vickers Corp., 995 F.2d 1067, 1993 WL 191883 (6th Cir.1993); Franzel, 959 F.2d at 630; Wooten, 825 F.2d at 1045.

In sum, TVA through its conduct cannot waive the requirement of subject matter jurisdiction by failing or neglecting to challenge jurisdiction earlier in these proceedings. TVA is not estopped from making its motion to dismiss the Title VII claims for compensatory damages on the ground that Seay failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because the motion goes to the issue of whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction.

III. Compensatory Damages and Right To Jury Trial in Title VII Cases

Before addressing the merits of TVA's motion and the questions of exhaustion of administrative remedies and subject matter jurisdiction, it is necessary to explain the law governing claims for compensatory damages and the right to a jury trial in Title VII cases. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(1) provides that if a complaining party seeks compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, "any party may demand a trial by jury." See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 532 U.S. 843, 848, 121 S.Ct. 1946, 150 L.Ed.2d 62 (2001). 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2) provides that compensatory damages "shall not include backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

What exactly are "compensatory damages" under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a? The answer to this question is found in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) which provides a limitation on the amount of compensatory damages awarded for "future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses...." See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 253, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994); Moore v. KUKA Welding Systems & Robot Corp., 171 F.3d 1073, 1082 (6th Cir.1999).

Back pay and front pay are not elements of compensatory damages for Seay's employment discrimination claims brought under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 253, 114 S.Ct. 1483; Pollard, 532 U.S. at 848-54, 121 S.Ct. 1946 (Front pay is not an element of compensatory damages within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1981a). Reinstatement is not always a viable option for equitable relief under Title VII, and an award of front pay is a substitute remedy in lieu of reinstatement. Id.; Hall v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 337 F.3d 669, 673 (6th Cir.2003); E.E.O.C. v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 517 (6th Cir.2001); Hudson v. Reno, 130 F.3d 1193, 1203-04 (6th Cir.1997); Roush v. KFC Nat. Management Co., 10 F.3d 392, 398-400 (6th Cir.1993); cf. Fite v. First Tennessee Production Credit Ass'n, 861 F.2d 884, 892 (6th Cir.1988); Davis v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922-23 (6th Cir.1984).

It is for the Court to decide whether front pay is an appropriate remedy in lieu of reinstatement. If the Court determines that front pay is appropriate, the amount of any award of front pay is an issue of fact for the jury to decide. Hudson, 130 F.3d at 1203-04; Wells v. New Cherokee Corp., 58 F.3d 233, 238-39 (6th Cir.1995); Jackson v. City of Cookeville, 31 F.3d 1354 (6th Cir.1994); Roush, 10 F.3d at 398; Fite, 861 F.2d at 892-93; Kulling v. Grinders For Industry, Inc., 185 F.Supp.2d 800, 811-12 (E.D.Mich.2002).

For there to be a basis for Seay to demand compensatory damages under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, he is required to assert a claim for future pecuniary loss (excluding front pay), emotional pain or suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, or other similar nonpecuniary losses. Moore, 171 F.3d at 1082; Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir.1996); see also Harbert-Yeargin, 266 F.3d at 517. In his amended complaint [Court File No. 41], Seay avers in Counts 75 and 129 that TVA's...