Sebulski v. Sec'y, Case No. 3:16-cv-831-J-34PDB

• Decision Date: 12 February 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:16-cv-831-J-34PDB
• Parties: JOSEPH RUSSELL SEBULSKI, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

JOSEPH RUSSELL SEBULSKI, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

Case No. 3:16-cv-831-J-34PDB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

February 12, 2019

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Joseph Sebulski, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on June 23, 2016,¹ by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1). In the Petition, Sebulski challenges a 2012 state court (Putnam County, Florida) judgment of conviction for aggravated battery. Sebulski raises five grounds for relief. See Petition at 5-20.² Respondents have submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See Response to Petition (Resp.; Doc. 13) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). On April 24, 2017, Sebulski informed the Court that he would not be filing a reply brief but would instead rely on the allegations contained within his Petition. See Petitioner's Reply to Order to Show Cause (Reply; Doc. 16). This case is ripe for review.

II. Procedural History

On August 30, 2011, the State of Florida (State) charged Sebulski by way of an amended Information with one count of aggravated battery on a person sixty-five years of age or older. Resp. Ex. A at 18. On May 18, 2012, Sebulski entered a negotiated plea of no contest to a lesser charge of aggravated battery. Id. at 63, 173. At the sentencing hearing held on June 12, 2012, Sebulski orally moved to withdraw his plea. Id. at 174. Sebulski's counsel did not adopt the motion, and the circuit court denied it on the merits. Id. Thereafter, the circuit court sentenced Sebulski pursuant to the plea agreement to a term of incarceration of five years in prison followed by a term of probation of seven years. Id. at 114-20.

Sebulski initially appealed the judgment and sentence to Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal (Fifth DCA). Id. at 92. However, on July 30, 2012, Sebulski, through counsel, filed a notice of dismissal of his direct appeal, id. at 99, which the Fifth DCA approved on August 1, 2012. Id. at 112. Thereafter, Sebulski petitioned the Fifth DCA for a belated appeal, which the court granted on January 25, 2013. Id. at 140. Sebulski, with the assistance of counsel, filed an initial brief arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to withdraw the plea. Resp. Ex. B at 1-17. The State filed an answer brief. Id. at 18-37. On May 13, 2014, the Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed the judgment and sentence without a written opinion, id. at 38, and issued its Mandate on June 6, 2014. Id. at 39.

On January 27, 2015, Sebulski filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Fifth DCA in which he argued his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue fundamental error occurred because the circuit court did not acknowledge a factual basis for the plea on the record (claim one) and for failing to withdraw as his counsel despitethe fact that the Office of the Public Defender had previously certified a conflict of interest in the circuit court. Resp. Ex. C at 1-14. On June 15, 2015, the Fifth DCA denied the petition. Id. at 32.

On June 25, 2015, Sebulski filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (Rule 3.850 Motion). Resp. Ex. D at 1-16. In the Rule 3.850 Motion, Sebulski raised two grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, alleging counsel failed to advise him about a viable defense (ground one) and counsel failed to file a motion to dismiss the amended Information (ground two). Id. On October 26, 2015, the circuit court denied the Rule 3.850 Motion. Id. at 72-74. Sebulski filed a motion for rehearing, which the circuit court denied. Id. at 95-98. On May 17, 2016, the Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed the circuit court's denial of Sebulski's Rule 3.850 Motion without a written opinion. Id. at 100. The Fifth DCA issued is Mandate on June 10, 2016. Id. at 101.

III. One-Year Limitations Period

This action is timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). "In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep'tof Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2245 (2017). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because the Court can "adequately assess [Sebulski's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

V. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017). "'The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'" Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (quotation marks omitted)). As such, federal habeas review of final state court decisions is "'greatly circumscribed' and 'highly deferential.'" Id. (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court's decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court'sadjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation, the United States Supreme Court recently stated:

[T]he federal court should "look through" the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The presumption may be rebutted by showing that the higher state court's adjudication most likely relied on different grounds than the lower state court's reasoned decision, such as persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the higher court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 1192, 1196.

If the claim was "adjudicated on the merits" in state court, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of the claim unless the state court's decision (1) "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98. The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited scope of federal review pursuant to § 2254 as follows:

First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for claims of state courts' erroneous legal conclusions. As explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), § 2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct clauses: a "contrary to" clause and an "unreasonable application" clause. The "contrary to" clause allows for relief only "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Id. at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523 (plurality opinion). The "unreasonable application" clause allows for relief only "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [theSupreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id.

Second, § 2254(d)(2) provides for federal review for claims of state courts' erroneous factual determinations. Section 2254(d)(2) allows federal courts to grant relief only if the state court's denial of the petitioner's claim "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has not yet defined § 2254(d)(2)'s "precise relationship" to § 2254(e)(1), which imposes a burden on the petitioner to rebut the state court's factual findings "by clear and convincing evidence." SeeBurt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ---, ---, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013); accordBrumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. ---, ---, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2282, 192 L.Ed.2d 356 (2015). Whatever that "precise relationship" may be, "'a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.'"[³] Titlow, 571 U.S. at ---, 134 S. Ct. at 15 (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010)).

Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2298 (2017). Also, deferential review under § 2254(d) generally is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the...