Sec. Co. v. Pratt

• Decision Date: 01 December 1894
• Citation: 65 Conn. 161,32 A. 396
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: SECURITY CO. v. PRATT et al.

32 A. 396

65 Conn. 161

SECURITY CO.

v. PRATT et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 1, 1894.

Appeal from superior court, Hartford coun ty.

Action by the Security Company, administrator with will annexed, against Mary A. Pratt and others for the construction of the will of Nancy W. Hall, deceased, and for direction. From the judgment rendered, a part of defendants appeal. Modified.

The portion of the will to be construed, after giving the use of the residuary estate to Mary A. Pratt for life, reads as follows: "And I do hereby authorize and impower my said sister, Mary Ann Pratt, if she shall deem it advisable and expedient for the interest and benefit of said life estate given to her as aforesaid, to sell and convey, from time to time, such part or portion of said life estate, real or personal, as she shall deem advisable, and to make and give all proper and necessary writings and deeds for the purpose of conveying and transferring the interest and the title to the same, and to invest the avails of any such sale or sales in other estate and property, real or personal, at her own option and discretion, to be held by her in trust for the use and purposes as aforesaid, or she may appropriate the avails of sale, either of real or personal estate, of which she has a life estate, as hereinbefore given and mentioned, to her own use and benefit, as of her own property and estate. (5) I give, devise, and bequeath to my niece, Eliza Trowbridge White, wife of Josiah J. White, and her heirs forever, subject to the bequest of Maria A. Woodruff and the life estate of my sister, Mary Ann Pratt, all the rest, residue, and remainder of the estate and property, real, personal and mixed, and of whatever description, and wheresoever being and situate, which shall belong to me, or to which I shall in any way or manner be entitled to, at law or in equity, at the time of my decease, except that hereinbefore bequeathed, to have and to hold the same, and the same to be to her, the said Eliza Trowbridge White, and her heirs forever, in fee simple, for her and their own sole use and benefit."

Lewis E. Stanton and Henry G. Newton, for appellants.

Charles E. Gross, for plaintiff appellee. Jeremiah Halsey, for appellee Mary Ann Pratt

BALDWIN, J. This in an action by an administrator cum testamento annexo, for directions as to its duties, and the construction of the will. Such a proceeding falls within the ordinary jurisdiction of courts of equity respecting the administration of trusts; and the provisions of Gen. St § 1124, as to allowances for expenses and counsel fees, are merely declaratory of the existing rules of chancery practice. 2 Perry, Trusts, § 928; 1 Redf. Wills, c. 9, § 7; Crosby v. Mason, 32 Conn. 482. Gen. St. § 559, provides that "when a life estate in any personal estate shall be given by will to one and the remainder to another, and there shall be no trustee named for such estate during the continuance of the life estate therein, the court of probate having cognizance of such will may order the executor to deliver said personal estate to the person having the life estate, upon his giving a probate bond, and it shall be his duty thereupon to safely and properly keep such estate to be delivered to the person entitled to receive it on the determination of the life estate therein, and in case such person shall fail to give bond as aforesaid, said court shall appoint a trustee for such estate during the continuance of said life estate, and the annual expense of such trust shall be chargeable upon the annual income of such estate." The language of the will of Nancy W. Hall, in reference to the power of sale and appropriation conferred upon Mary Ann Pratt, is such as to justify the plaintiff, in view of the demand made upon it by Mrs. Pratt, in seeking the advice of a proper court as to whether the estate in its hands should be turned over to her except upon her giving a probate bond for the security of those entitled in remainder. To such a suit the plaintiff was an indispensable party, with a substantial interest in the question to be decided; for, should it surrender the estate to the life tenant, without a bond, and the law be so that a bond is necessary, it might be called upon, on the termination of the life estate, to make good any diminution of the property occurring after it passed out of its hands. The representatives and heirs of Mrs. White were proper parties defendant, and Mrs. Pratt was an indispensable party defendant. Belfield v. Booth, 63 Conn. 299, 309, 27 Atl. 585.

The plaintiff's complaint presented not only this question as to a bond, but others, involving a determination of the respective rights and ownership of Mrs. Pratt and the representatives and heirs of Mrs. White, both in the real and personal estate of the intestate. As to these other questions, assuming that they could be properly raised in this proceeding, the substantial controversy was between the life tenant and those entitled in remainder. The laws of the United States provide that the circuit courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $2,000, in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different states; that any such suit, if brought in any state court, may be removed into the circuit court for the district in which such state court is held "by the defendant or defendants therein, being nonresidents of that state"; that when, in any such suit, there shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different states, and can be fully determined as between them, than either one or more of the defendants actually interested in such controversy may remove said suit Into said circuit court; and that the party desiring to remove any suit thus made removable, may file a petition for its removal "in such suit in such state court at the time, or any time before the defendant is required by the laws of the state or the rule of the state court in which such suit is brought to answer or plead to the declaration or complaint of the plaintiff." 25 Stat. c. 866, p. 437, §§T-3. The present suit was cognizable in the superior court by virtue of its general equitable jurisdiction. The plaintiff did not derive its title as administrator from that court, and (except so far as the amount in controversy might regulate jurisdiction) was no more accountable to it, than to any other court of equity. Parson v. Lyman, 32 Conn. 566, 574; Id., Fed. Cas. No. 10,780. Suits to determine the construction of a will are as fully within the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States as any other, where the plaintiff is a citizen of one state and the defendants of another. Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10, 22. The fact that the estate of the testator is in settlement in a court of probate does not exclude the jurisdiction of a proper circuit court to determine controversies between the executor and nonresident parties, any more than it excludes the jurisdiction of the superior court. Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U. S. 73, 77, 5 Sup. Ct. 377. Where, however, the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, as to such matters, depends upon diverse citizenship of parties, its exercise must be confined to the determination of their rights, and those alone. "The fact that other parties may be interested in the question involved is no reason for the federal courts taking jurisdiction of the controversy between such parties." Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608, 618, 13 Sup. Ct. 906. It follows that the original petition for removal was insufficient upon its face. The suit, it is true, was of a civil nature, in equity, involving over $2,000, and one in which there was a controversy between citizens of different states. But, to that controversy, in part at least, the plaintiff was not only an active party, but a party with substantial rights of its own to protect, and the plaintiff and one of the defendants were citizens of the same state. The petition alleged that the plaintiff had no interest in any of the questions involved in the controversy; but that allegation was without effect unless supported by the language of the complaint, and that language plainly showed that this position was untenable. Wilson v. Oswego Tp., 151 U. S. 56, 66, 14 Sup. Ct. 259. The petition was, therefore, properly denied, unless the situation of the parties was changed by the amendments, or amended petition, filed during the pendency of the cause.

A defendant seeking to remove a cause from a state court to the circuit court of the United States, on the ground of diverse citizenship, must file his petition and bond at or before the time when he "is required by the laws of the state, or the rule of the state court in which such suit is brought, to answer or plead to the declaration or complaint of the plaintiff." This means that they must be filed as soon as he is "required to make any defense whatever in that court, so that, if the case...