Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven v. Choctaw Cotton Oil Co.

Decision Date14 April 1931
Docket NumberCase Number: 19859
PartiesSECURITY INS. CO. OF NEW HAVEN, CONN., et al. v. CHOCTAW COTTON OIL CO. et al.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court
Syllabus

¶0 1. Action--When Actions on Several Insurance Policies May Be Joined.

Separate causes of action on several policies issued by different insurers to one person on the same property may be joined where the insurers are liable only proportionately.

2. Insurance--Fire Policy--"Fire" Defined.

The word "fire," as used in an insurance policy, in the absence of language showing a contrary intention, is to be given its ordinary meaning, which includes the idea of visible heat or light.

3. Same--Insurers Held Liable for Loss of Cotton Seed Hulls from Spontaneous Combustion.

A quantity of cotton seed hulls were destroyed by fire caused by spontaneous combustion. Internal heat, sufficient to cause damage to the hulls, developed some time prior to the effective date of appellants' policies, but there was no visible flame or glow, no actual fire until thereafter. Held, appellants liable.

Error from District Court, Pontotoc County; Orel Busby, Judge.

Action by the Choctaw Cotton Oil Company against the Security Insurance Company of New Haven, Conn., and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant named and another appeal. Affirmed.

Rittenhouse, Lee, Webster & Rittenhouse, for plaintiffs in error.

Wimbish & Duncan, for defendant in error Choctaw Cotton Oil Company.

H. C. Thurman (Byrne A. Bowman, of counsel), for defendants in error.

HEFNER, J.

¶1 The Choctaw Cotton Oil Company carried fire insurance in 12 different insurance companies, covering a quantity of cotton seed hulls located at Muskogee, Okla. Each of the companies had a clause in its policy making it liable only for its proportionate part of the insurance. A fire occurred on the 24th day of June, 1925, causing damage to the property insured.

¶2 There is no controversy as to plaintiff's right to recovery. The controversy is between defendants Security Insurance Company of New Haven and American Equitable Assurance Company of New York on one side and Superior Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa., on the other. The policies of the companies first above mentioned became effective at 12 o'clock noon on the day of the fire and the policy of the latter company expired at 12 o'clock noon of that day. Defendants Security Insurance Company and American Equitable Assurance Company contend that the fire occurred before 12 o'clock noon the effective date of their policies, while defendant Superior Fire Insurance Company contends to the contrary. All of the other defendant companies conceded liability, but because of the controversy between these contending companies were unable to make settlement. Suit was then brought by insured in a single action against all defendants on all the policies. The contesting defendants demurred to this petition on the ground that several causes of action were improperly joined, which demurrer was by the court overruled. Thereafter issues were joined, cause went to trial before the court, resulting in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff against defendants Security Insurance Company and American Equitable Assurance Company, and in favor of defendant Superior Fire Insurance Company. The Security Insurance Company and American Equitable Assurance Company appeal.

¶3 Appellants' first assignment of error is that the court erred in overruling their demurrer to the petition. The demurrer was properly overruled; there is no misjoinder of causes of action. The correct rule is announced in the case of Gerber v. Wehner, 96 Okla. 48, 220 P. 648; there this court said:

"Actions upon different bonds with different sureties may be joined, where the different bonds relate to the same matter and are similarly conditioned, and the default complained of constitutes a breach of each bond, so as to render all of the sureties upon the different bonds liable therefor."

See, also, Pretzfelder v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 116 N.C. 491, 21 S.E. 302; Fegelson v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. (Minn.) 103 N.W. 495.

¶4 Appellants next contend that the judgment of the trial court is not supported by the evidence, and in this connection insist the evidence discloses that the property was on fire at the time set for taking effect of their policy, but do not contend that there was an actual blaze or visible flame until after the same...

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