Sechler v. Krouse

• Decision Date: 06 December 1978
• Docket Number: No. 78-555,78-555
• Citation: 383 N.E.2d 572,56 Ohio St.2d 185
• Parties: , 10 O.O.3d 349 SECHLER, Appellee, v. KROUSE, Admr., Bureau of Workers' Compensation, Appellant, et al.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 185

56 Ohio St.2d 185

383 N.E.2d 572, 10 O.O.3d 349

SECHLER, Appellee, v. KROUSE, Admr., Bureau of Workers' Compensation, Appellant, et al.

No. 78-555.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 6, 1978.

Syllabus by the Court

The provision in R.C. 4123.52 which limits the jurisdiction of the commission to modify or change a claimant's award for medical benefits to a period of six years from the date of injury does not violate the "equal protection" requirement of Section 26 of Article II of the Ohio Constitution.

On July 9, 1969, Ronald Sechler (appellee herein) injured his back while employed by the Graber Construction Company. Appellee's claim for benefits covering medical expenses only was filed on Form C-3 with the Bureau of Workers' Compensation ("the bureau") on August 8, 1969, and was recognized by the Deputy Administrator on February 1, 1970.

Appellee received treatments throughout the period beginning on July 13, 1969, and ending on August 6, 1975. James H. Laubach, D.M., D.C., appellee's treating physician throughout the period, was compensated by the bureau for services rendered appellee.

Although Doctor Laubach indicated on several of his fee bills submitted to the bureau's claims section that appellee suffered moderate permanent partial disability as a result of his back injury, appellee did not apply for temporary total, permanent partial, or permanent total disability compensation prior to July 9, 1975. On December 31, 1975, more than six years after the date of his injury, appellee did file an application for the determination of the percentage of permanent partial disability on Form C-92.

Since appellee failed to submit his application for benefits within the prescribed time period set forth in R.C. 4123.52, the Industrial Commission ("the commission") dismissed appellee's application for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Common Pleas affirmed that decision.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, and held that R.C. 4123.52, in limiting the jurisdiction of the commission to modify or change a claimant's award for medical benefits for a period of six years from the date of injury, as opposed to ten years from the date of last payment of medical benefits unconstitutionally effected an unreasonable classification in conflict with Section 26, of Article II of the Ohio Constitution.

Because its judgment in this cause was in conflict with several unreported decisions, including Harvey v. Krouse (February 9, 1977), Case No. 76-CA-32, Williams v. Krouse (August 15, 1977), Case No. CA-1251; Hanna v. Krouse (August 15, 1977), Case No. 4-CA-77, Currington v. Krouse (June 28, 1977), Case No. 77AP-164, and Byers v. Daugherty (April 18, 1978), Case No. 1177 rendered by the Courts of Appeals for Miami, Tuscarawas, Fairfield, Franklin, and Columbiana Counties, respectively, the Court of Appeals for Williams County certified the record of this case to this court for review and final determination.

Newcomer, Schaffer, Geesey & Hutton, Bryan, Larrimer & Larrimer and Craig Aalyson, Columbus, for appellee.

William J. Brown, Atty. Gen., and Gerald H. Waterman, Columbus, for appellant.

SWEENEY, Justice.

In 1913, the General Assembly enacted former G.C. 1465-86 (103 Ohio Laws 88) which, in describing the continuing jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission to change or modify its former orders or findings regarding claims for benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act, provided that "the powers and jurisdiction of the board over each case shall be continuing."

However, in 1931, the General Assembly introduced a time limitation by providing that the commission lacked jurisdiction to change its former orders or findings where the date of the last payment of compensation or benefits (or, in the absence thereof, the date of injury) exceeded ten years (114 Ohio Laws 38).

Further amendments to G.C. 1465-86, now R.C. 4123.52, followed. In 1967, the General Assembly imposed a special restriction on the commission's jurisdiction to change or modify awards for medical benefits only. R.C. 4123.52 provides, in pertinent part:

" * * * No such modification or change nor any finding or award in respect of any claim shall be made with respect to disability, compensation, dependency, or benefits, after six years from the date of injury in the absence of the payment of compensation for total disability under section 4123.56 of the Revised Code, except in cases where compensation has been paid under section 4123.56, 4123.57, or 4123.58 of the Revised Code, then ten years from the date of the last payment of compensation or from the date of death * * *." (132 Ohio Laws 1405.)

Thus, while the commission has jurisdiction to change or modify a prior award for temporary total, permanent partial, or permanent total disability benefits within ten years of the date of the last payment of such award, the commission only has jurisdiction to change or modify a prior award for medical expenses within six years of the date of the injury.

The Court of Appeals, relying on this court's earlier pronouncements in Emmons v. Keller (1970), 21 Ohio St.2d 48, 254 N.E.2d 687; Fleischman v. Flowers (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 131, 267 N.E.2d 318, and Kinney v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 120, 322 N.E.2d 880, found that the jurisdictional time limitations effected an unreasonable classification, led to arbitrary and capricious results, and thus conflicted with the equal protection requirements of Section 26 of Article II of the Ohio Constitution. We disagree.

In Emmons, supra, this court struck down the second of three alternative eligibility requirements for the receipt of death benefits set forth in R.C. 4123.59. The requirement specified that before a dependent of a deceased worker could receive death benefits, the worker must have received compensation for partial disability during the year preceding his death. Since the requirement arbitrarily denied death benefits to dependents of those workers who had received their maximum compensation for partial disability prior to one year preceding their deaths, the court held the requirement to be unconstitutional. Emmons, supra, at page 52, 254 N.E.2d 687.

In Kinney, supra, this court struck down the remaining two eligibility requirements contained in R.C. 4123.59, which provided that before death benefits could be received, the worker's death must have occurred within three years of the injury or the administrator must find that the worker applied for total or partial disability compensation, was examined by a licensed physician and would have been entitled to compensation had he not died. The court found that the...