Secretary of the Office of Policy and Management v. Employees' Review Board, 267 Conn. 255 (Conn. 1/6/2004)

• Decision Date: 06 January 2004
• Docket Number: (SC 16806)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF POLICY AND MANAGEMENT <I>v.</I> EMPLOYEES' REVIEW BOARD ET AL.

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267 Conn. 255

SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF POLICY AND MANAGEMENTv.

EMPLOYEES' REVIEW BOARD ET AL.

(SC 16806)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 16, 2003.

Officially released January 6, 2004.

Borden, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, the secretary of the office of policy and management, appealed to the trial court from a decision of the named defendant, the employees' review board, in favor of the defendant O, an employee of the department of correction who worked a nonstandard ten hour workday and averaged forty hours per week over a six or eight week period. O had challenged the practice of the department of correction treating each of the personal leave days and holidays to which she was entitled by statute (§§ 5-250 [c] and 5-254 [a], respectively) as representing eight hours of leave time and deducting from her accrued vacation account the difference between the number of hours in her nonstandard workday and the eight hours of credit to which the department claimed she was entitled for each personal leave day that she took and each holiday. The trial court determined that the terms "day" and "holiday" as used in §§ 5-250 (c) and 5-254 (a), respectively, represent an entire calendar day rather than eight hours. That court concluded that the department was required to apply each of O's personal leave days and holidays against her nonstandard workday on a day-for-day basis without deducting any time from her accrued vacation account. That court also ordered restoration of any vacation time that already had been deducted from O's accrued vacation account in connection with her use of personal and holiday leave. On the plaintiff's appeal from the judgment of the trial court, held that, as determined by the trial court, §§ 5-250 (c) and 5-254 (a) require that O's personal leave days and holidays be applied on the basis of her nonstandard workday, without any deduction from her accrued vacation account to make up for the difference in hours between her workday and the standard eight hour workday: this court was persuaded that the legislature's use of the terms "day" and "holiday" in §§ 5-250 (c) and 5-254 (a), respectively, without any limiting language and read in light of their ordinary meanings, indicated that the legislature intended that employees be compensated for personal and holiday leave commensurate with their scheduled hours during the calendar day, there being no suggestion in either the purpose or the legislative history of those statutes that the legislature intended the terms "day" and "holiday" to represent an eight hour workday; accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that the practice of deducting vacation time from O's accrued account for her use of personal and holiday leave violated the mandate of § 5-250 (c), that the practice had to be discontinued and that O was entitled to restoration of any time that had been deducted from her accrued vacation account therefor.

(One justice concurring separately)

Procedural History

Appeal from a decision by the named defendant granting the appeal of a grievance filed against the state department of correction by the defendant Catherine Osten claiming that her paid personal and holiday leave time had been improperly calculated, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain and tried to the court, Cohn, J.; judgment dismissing the plaintiff's appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.

Richard T. Sponzo, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Thomas P. Clifford III, assistant attorney general, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Robert J. Krzys, for the appellee (defendant Catherine Osten).

Opinion

PALMER, J.

The defendant Catherine Osten¹ is a permanent full-time state employee working a nonstandard ten hour workday² but a standard forty hour work week.³ The sole issue raised by this appeal is whether, pursuant to General Statutes §§ 5-250 (c)⁴ and 5-254 (a),⁵ the trial court properly concluded that the defendant is entitled to have each of her fixed number of personal leave days and holidays credited, on a day-for-day basis, against her entire nonstandard ten hour workday, or whether, under those statutory provisions, each such personal leave day and holiday represents only eight hours of leave time in accordance with the standard eight hour workday for state employees. On appeal, the plaintiff, the secretary of the office of policy and management, contends that, contrary to the conclusion of the trial court, §§ 5-250 (c) and 5-254 (a) require him to: (1) treat each personal leave day and holiday as representing eight hours of leave time in accordance with the standard workday; (2) award the defendant eight hours of credit toward her ten hour workday for each such personal leave day and holiday; and (3) deduct two hours from the defendant's vacation account to make up for the difference in hours between her workday and the eight hours of leave time to which the plaintiff claims the defendant statutorily is limited for each personal leave day and holiday. We reject the plaintiff's claim and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reflects the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The defendant has been employed by the department of correction (department) since August, 1988. Since May, 1994, she has held the position of lieutenant. When the defendant first was appointed a lieutenant, the department assigned her to work an eight and one-half hour day, with four days on and two days off, repeating every six weeks. In October, 2000, the department changed her schedule to a ten hour workday.⁶ Throughout her employment as a lieutenant, the defendant's weekly schedule has averaged forty hours per week over a six or eight week period.

On March 13, 2000, the defendant filed a grievance with the personnel division of the department of administrative services (administrative services) claiming, inter alia, that, relying on the standard eight hour workday for state employees, the department improperly was treating each of her personal leave days and holidays as representing eight hours of leave time and then deducting from the defendant's vacation account the difference between the number of hours in her nonstandard workday and the eight hours of credit to which the department claimed she was entitled for each such personal leave day and holiday.⁷ The defendant contended that this practice violated § 5-250 (c) and that she was entitled to have each personal leave day and holiday credited against her nonstandard workday on a day-for-day basis. She therefore sought restoration to her vacation account of all the time that the department had deducted from that account in connection with her use of personal leave and holiday time.⁸ On April 19, 2000, administrative services denied the defendant's grievance.

Thereafter, the defendant appealed from the denial of her grievance to the employees' review board (board). After a hearing, the board concluded that the department's practice violated § 5-250 (c). Specifically, the board determined that the practice deprived the defendant of vacation time to which she was entitled because § 5-250 (c) does not reflect an intent by the legislature to penalize in such a manner employees whose workdays exceed the standard eight hours. Accordingly, the board ordered the department to: (1) grant the defendant three full calendar days of personal leave annually and credit her vacation account for any time that had been deducted from that account because of her use of personal leave days; and (2) make similar adjustments to the defendant's vacation account for any hours debited from that account in connection with her use of holiday leave.

The plaintiff then appealed from the board's decision to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183.⁹ The trial court issued its decision dismissing the plaintiff's administrative appeal, concluding that the terms "`day'" and "`holiday'" as used in §§ 5-250 (c) and 5-254 (a), respectively, represent an entire "`calendar day,'" rather than eight hours. Thus, the trial court determined that the department statutorily is required to apply each of the defendant's personal days and holidays against her nonstandard workday on a day-for-day basis, thereby barring any deduction from the defendant's vacation account because of her use of personal and holiday leave. The court also ordered the plaintiff to restore any time that had been deducted from her vacation account in connection with her use of leave pursuant to §§ 5-250 (c) and 5-254 (a). This appeal by the plaintiff followed.¹⁰

The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the defendant is entitled to personal leave days and holidays on the basis of her nonstandard workday, rather than the standard eight hour day. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that construing §§ 5-250 (c) and 5-254 (a) to award leave on the basis of the standard eight hour workday is consistent with other statutory provisions addressing irregular work schedules. The plaintiff further contends that the trial court's construction of §§ 5-250 (c) and 5-254 (a) gives rise to inequitable and irrational results, in particular, bestowing on employees working a nonstandard workday a windfall of additional leave time as compared to similarly situated employees working a standard eight hour day. Therefore, according to the plaintiff, the only reasonable interpretation of the terms "day" and "holiday" is an eight hour day.

The defendant, on the other hand, contends that equating personal leave days and holidays with the standard eight hour workday is incompatible with the legislature's intent as expressed in the pertinent statutory language and history. She further contends that employees working nonstandard workdays would receive disparate treatment under the...