Secrist v. State, 54908
| Decision Date | 22 February 1978 |
| Docket Number | 2,Nos. 1,3,No. 54908,54908,s. 1 |
| Citation | 243 S.E.2d 599,145 Ga.App. 391 |
| Parties | Mark SECRIST v. The STATE |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Jack H. Affleck, Athens, for appellant.
Ken Stula, Solicitor, Athens, for appellee.
Defendant was convicted of theft by taking or shoplifting in violation of Code § 26-1802(b)(1). The accusation charged that defendant did unlawfully remove from a named mercantile establishment, a leather wallet, a pair of leather earrings and a choker collar "with intent to appropriate the said merchandise, to his, the Defendant's own use and to deprive the said owner of possession thereof, . . . ." Evidence was admitted establishing that defendant was left in charge of a leather goods store by the owner for a short period. In further support of its case, the state caused the admission of an out-of-court statement of defendant which read in part The court charged the jury on the law of confessions. It is argued that this was reversible error as the pre-trial statement was at most an admission. Where a defendant has made only an incriminating statement and not a confession, it is reversible error to charge the law of confession. Pressley v. State, 201 Ga. 267, 272, 39 S.E.2d 478. An admission of the main fact, from which the essential elements of the criminal act charged may be inferred, amounts to a confession of the crime itself. Owens v. State, 120 Ga. 296, 299, 48 S.E. 21. But if the main fact is admitted with a qualifying exclusion of a necessary ingredient of the crime charged, the crime has not been confessed. Owens v. State, supra. The defendant argues that the above underscored portion of his statement denies an intention to deprive the owner of the value of the goods, an essential element of the crime charged. Therefore his statement was not a confession. The crime of theft by taking or shoplifting under Code § 26-1802(b)(1) provides that this crime is committed when there is a removal of merchandise from a mercantile establishment where merchandise is displayed for sale with "the intent of appropriating merchandise to his own use or to deprive the owner of possession thereof or of the value thereof, in whole or in part, . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) While defendant's emphasized part of the statement does reveal the lack of an intention to deprive owner of the value of the goods taken, he was not charged with the taking of these items with that specific intent. This crime by statutory definition can be committed by removal coupled with any one of the three described states of mind or specific intents. Defendant admitted all the elements of the crime charged for from the main fact of the removal of goods from the store it can be inferred that he intended to appropriate the merchandise to his own use as well as intending to deprive the owner of its possession. Applying the rules of Owens v. State, supra, the defendant's statement amounts to a complete admission of the crime alleged in the accusation. Whether he intended to pay for them is a matter not material to his guilt or innocence as the accusation did not allege an intention to deprive the owner of the value of the goods. There was no error.
Judgment affirmed.
The rule prohibiting a court from charging on confessions where there has been no more than an admission is based on the most fundamental policy of avoiding any inference from the court that the defendant has acknowledged his guilt unless he has, in fact, done so. Covington v. State, 79 Ga. 687, 7 S.E. 153 (1887). "To say to the jury that the defendant had confessed to a crime, when the language relied upon was a protestation of innocence, could have no other but the...
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K-Mart Corp. v. Coker
...of those goods from the defendant's admission that he removed the items from the store where he worked. Secrist v. State, 145 Ga.App. 391, 394, 243 S.E.2d 599 (1978); see also Commonwealth v. Balboni, 26 Mass.App. 750, 532 N.E.2d 706 (1989) (finding criminal intent from defendant's action a......
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Gilliam v. State
...evidence allowed a finding that the defendant "intended to deprive the store of both the possession and value of" the merchandise.4 In Secrist v. State5 defendant could be found to have intent both to appropriate merchandise for his own use and to deprive the owner of possession of the merc......
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Phillips v. State
...to general intent, and that theft by taking, and therefore motor vehicle theft, is a specific intent crime. See Secrist v. State, 145 Ga.App. 391, 392, 243 S.E.2d 599 (1978). The State argues that defendant waived his right to raise this enumeration by failing to object or preserve his righ......
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Johnson v. State
...were included, the list undoubtedly would exceed 100 cases. This issue reached the Court of Appeals last year in Secrist v. State, 145 Ga.App. 391, 243 S.E.2d 599 (1978). In that case that court was unable to agree on whether the defendant's statement constituted a confession or simply an i......