SECURITY CREDIT v. DJ'S OF SALISBURY
Decision Date | 07 November 2000 |
Docket Number | No. COA99-1150.,COA99-1150. |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | SECURITY CREDIT LEASING, INC., a Florida Corporation, Plaintiff, v. D.J.'S OF SALISBURY, INC., a North Carolina corporation, d/b/a D.J.'s Restaurant, and Louie Mourouzidiz, Defendants. |
Adams Kleemeier Hagan Hannah & Fouts, by David A. Senter and Brooks F. Bossong, Greensboro, for plaintiff-appellant.
Woodson, Sayers, Lawther, Short, Parrott & Hudson, LLP, by Sean C. Walker, Salisbury, for defendant-appellees.
Security Credit Leasing, Inc. ("plaintiff") appeals the trial court's order denying its Petition and Motion to Enforce Foreign Judgment against defendant-appellees D.J.'s of Salisbury, Inc., and Louie Mourouzidiz (collectively "defendants").
The following facts are undisputed. Plaintiff is a Florida corporation in the business of leasing security equipment. Defendant Mourouzidiz, a resident of North Carolina, is president of D.J.'s of Salisbury, Inc., a North Carolina corporation doing business as a restaurant in Salisbury, North Carolina. On 12 June 1996, Mourouzidiz was approached while at D.J.'s by an agent of the plaintiff who proposed leasing video surveillance equipment to the restaurant. (Plaintiff's agent was headquartered in Greensboro, North Carolina.) Defendants and plaintiff entered into a lease agreement for security equipment, which agreement included a forum-selection clause giving the State of Florida jurisdiction over any controversy arising out of the lease agreement.
When plaintiff had the surveillance equipment delivered to defendants, defendants rejected the equipment as unsatisfactory, notifying plaintiff of the same. On 25 November 1996, plaintiff sued defendants in Hillsborough County, Florida for breach of contract. Although defendants were served by first class mail, defendants did not answer the Florida complaint, and on 11 August 1997, plaintiff obtained a default judgment against defendants in the Florida court. On 17 February 1998, plaintiff filed its Petition to Enforce Foreign Judgment in Rowan County, North Carolina. Defendants were properly served and in response, filed a Motion for Relief and Notice of Defenses on 7 May 1998, alleging that the State of Florida did not have personal jurisdiction over defendants at the time it rendered its judgment against them, thus the court's judgment was void. In its order denying plaintiff's motion to enforce the foreign judgment, the trial court found:
Therefore, the trial court concluded:
In the record, plaintiff preserved four assignments of error all of which rely on the notion that defendants' Motion for Relief and Notice of Defenses was time-barred pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1C-1701 et seq. (the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, hereinafter, "the Act"). Consequently, defendants preserved two cross-assignments of error. Due to our disposition of the case, we need only address whether, in fact, the Act—specifically § 1C-1704—serves as a statute of limitation for defendants to file their Motion for Relief and Notice of Defenses. Because we do not find the statute to be one of limitation for a defendant-debtor, we affirm the trial court's ruling.
In its brief to this Court, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1C-1704(b) because the statute plainly gives a defendant-debtor a maximum of thirty (30) days in which to seek relief from a foreign judgment. Furthermore, plaintiff contends that where, as here, defendant-debtor does not respond in the thirty (30) day time period, defendant-debtor is time-barred from later doing so. Although we find this an interesting argument, we are unpersuaded.
We recognize the statutes under the Act must be read in para materia in order to ascertain the regulations and allowances provided under the Act. Plaintiff's interpretation aside, in actuality N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1C-1703(b) (1999) states that:
(b) Upon the filing of the foreign judgment and the affidavit, the foreign judgment shall be docketed and indexed in the same manner as a judgment of this State; however, no execution shall issue upon the foreign judgment nor shall any other proceeding be taken for its enforcement until the expiration of 30 days from the date upon which notice of filing is served in accordance with G.S. 1C-1704.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, we conclude that the thirty day limitation period is not one barring a defendant-debtor's response but instead the limitation period is specifically set to bar a plaintiff-creditor from obtaining a foreign judgment against one of our state's citizens and then immediately (within thirty days) being able to enforce it without that defendant-debtor being afforded the notice required by due process. Furthermore, in keeping with our interpretation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1C-1703's thirty day limitation period, we note our statutes clearly go on to set out what a plaintiff-creditor must do in order to proceed with enforcing its obtained judgment:
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1C-1704(a), (b) (1999) (emphasis added). Thus again, we are convinced that the Act...
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