Sedar v. Reston Town Ctr. Prop., LLC

• Decision Date: 22 February 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-1972,19-1972
• Citation: 988 F.3d 756
• Parties: Camille SEDAR, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. RESTON TOWN CENTER PROPERTY, LLC; Boston Properties Limited Partnership, Defendants - Appellees, and Boston Properties, Inc; Beacon Capital Partners, LLC, Defendants, v. CDA Incorporated, d/b/a MaxSent, Third Party Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

988 F.3d 756

Camille SEDAR, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.RESTON TOWN CENTER PROPERTY, LLC; Boston Properties Limited Partnership, Defendants - Appellees,andBoston Properties, Inc; Beacon Capital Partners, LLC, Defendants,

v.CDA Incorporated, d/b/a MaxSent, Third Party Defendant.

No. 19-1972

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: January 25, 2021

Decided: February 22, 2021

ARGUED: David J. Sensenig, PARK SENSENIG LLC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. David Drake Hudgins, HUDGINS LAW FIRM, PC, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Andrew R. Park, PARK SENSENIG LLC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Joseph P. Moriarty, WILLCOX & SAVAGE, PC, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellees.

Before KING, FLOYD, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Reversed by published opinion. Judge Quattlebaum wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Floyd joined.

QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge:

This premises liability case involves the application of the well-established standards for summary judgment. Following a serious fall down a short flight of stairs, Camille Sedar sued the defendants for negligence and negligence per se . The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that Sedar did not offer sufficient evidence that there was a dangerous condition, that the defendants had notice of the condition or that the alleged dangerous condition caused her fall. Because the record contains enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to these issues, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

On a pleasant November afternoon, Sedar and several of her colleagues drove to Reston Town Center to celebrate a friend's overseas deployment over lunch. Sedar drove herself and two others, while the rest traveled in a separate car. Sedar's car arrived first and parked on the ground level of a parking garage available to Reston Town Center patrons.

To exit the garage, pedestrians had to climb a short flight of stairs inside the garage, cross a landing paved with bricks and descend a flight of five concrete steps to the sidewalk outside. While exiting the garage, Sedar, several steps ahead of her companions, was wearing flat-soled shoes and carrying a two-to-three-foot-wide photograph in one hand and her wallet in the other. At some point, when she either was crossing the landing or beginning to descend the stairs, Sedar tripped and fell, landing face first on the concrete sidewalk. The fall was severe. Sedar lost consciousness, sustained a concussion, fractured her elbow and split open her lip and other parts of her face, leaving blood on the sidewalk.

Sedar has no memory of the fall. The last thing she remembers is walking through the garage toward the pedestrian exit. And neither of Sedar's companions, who were trailing several steps behind her in conversation, saw precisely what caused her to trip. One colleague only noticed Sedar as she hit the ground "face down." J.A. 223. The other saw Sedar "disappear from [his] field of vision" as she fell over the stairs before seeing the photograph she was carrying in the air. J.A. 264–67.

Sedar's companions did, however, provide more information on Sedar's path of travel. Although there are some differences in their testimonies regarding Sedar's path, both place her over loose bricks right before the top of the stairs. One immediately noticed loose bricks at the top of the stairs, which created "space between the brick and the actual ground." J.A. 228. She testified that those loose bricks must have caused Sedar's fall. When rushing to assist Sedar, she "walked over to the side" to avoid the bricks. J.A. 229. After ensuring emergency help was on the way, she returned to the top of the stairs to examine the bricks, bringing them to others’ attention. The other colleague noticed the loose bricks when he went back after lunch with others to investigate. When he inspected the landing, he discovered loose bricks "directly in front of the area where we were walking down the stairs." J.A. 281.

After Sedar's fall, the rest of the group arrived and took several photographs and a video of the scene. The video depicts a loose brick at the top of the stairs to the right of where Sedar's blood stained the sidewalk below. The photographs show uneven bricks and sagging caulk between the bricks and the top step.

When Sedar retrieved her shoes upon leaving the hospital, she immediately noticed a large gray scuff at the tip of her right shoe. She claims this scuff had not been present before the fall.

Sedar retained a structural engineer to review the evidence and prepare an expert report. Relying on the witness testimony, photographs and the scuff on Sedar's shoe, her expert determined that the evidence demonstrated loose and unstable bricks and deteriorating caulk at the landing, which was "structurally unsound and a hazard that violated applicable building and maintenance codes." J.A. 434. He also opined that this hazard "most likely caused [Sedar] to lose her balance and fall down the stairway." J.A. 434.

II.

Turning now to the procedural background, Sedar sued the property owner, Reston Town Center Property ("RTCP"), and the property manager, Boston Properties, in state court asserting claims of negligence and negligence per se . The defendants then removed the case to federal court and brought a third-party complaint against MaxSent, with whom they had contracted to provide security, emergency service and monitoring of the property conditions.¹ Following discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting there was no dangerous condition, and, even if there were, they did not have notice of the condition. Moreover, even if they were negligent, the defendants argued, Sedar did not offer enough evidence that she tripped over the alleged hazard and thus had not created a genuine issue of material fact as to causation.²

The district court granted the defendants’ motion. It held Sedar could not succeed on her claims because she "produced no evidence that Defendants had either actual or constructive notice of the defects in the bricks and caulking" on the landing. J.A. 1042. The district court also stated that "Virginia law does not impose liability under the ordinary duty of care to remedy sidewalk irregularities that are, as here, under an inch or two." J.A. 1042. In addition, even if Sedar had enough evidence of negligence, the district court held that she "produced no more than mere speculation that [the alleged defects] were the cause of her accident." J.A. 1073.

Sedar timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

III.

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Carter v. Fleming , 879 F.3d 132, 139 (4th Cir. 2018). In so doing, we first review the well-settled principles for a summary judgment motion before applying those standards to the issues Sedar raises on appeal.

A.

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "A fact is ‘material’ if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. An issue of material fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant." Wai Man Tom v. Hosp. Ventures LLC , 980 F.3d 1027, 1037 (4th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the nonmoving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate specific, material facts that give rise to a genuine issue. Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Under this standard, "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in favor of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion." Wai Man Tom , 980 F.3d at 1037.

Yet, "[s]ummary judgment cannot be granted merely because the court believes that the movant will prevail if the action is tried on the merits." Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts , 780 F.3d 562, 568 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting 10A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2728 (3d ed. 1998) ). The court may grant summary judgment only if it concludes that the evidence could not permit a reasonable jury to return a favorable verdict. "Therefore, courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and refrain from weighing the evidence or making credibility determinations." Variety Stores, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 888 F.3d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted). A court improperly weighs the evidence if it fails to credit evidence that contradicts its factual conclusions or fails to draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 659–60.³

B.

Utilizing those principles, we turn to Sedar's arguments on appeal.

1.

Sedar first contends the district court erred in concluding there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of a dangerous condition. Under Virginia law, a property owner owes an invitee a duty to exercise ordinary care to "render [the premises] reasonably safe for the invitee's visit." Fultz v. Delhaize Am., Inc. , 278 Va. 84, 677 S.E.2d 272, 274 (2009). An owner need not, however, provide notice to an invitee of a dangerous condition that is "open and obvious." Id. (quoting Knight v. Moore , 179 Va. 139, 18 S.E.2d 266, 269 (1942) ). If reasonable persons "differ as to whether an accident could or should have been reasonably anticipated" from a condition, the jury must decide whether the condition was dangerous. Id. (quoting City of Roanoke v. Sutherland , 159 Va. 749, 167 S.E....