Seefried v. Hummel

• Decision Date: 28 July 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04CA0960.,04CA0960.
• Citation: 148 P.3d 184
• Parties: Richard SEEFRIED, individually; James Seefried, individually; and Colorado Digital Systems, LLC, a Colorado business entity, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Hans HUMMEL; Kim Hummel; Jon Budish; Fort Collins Bible Church; and Matt Homolka, Bob Herd, Dick Berg, Dan Stowell, and David Bischoff, individually and as members of the Board of Directors of the Fort Collins Bible Church, a Colorado entity, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

148 P.3d 184

Richard SEEFRIED, individually; James Seefried, individually; and Colorado Digital Systems, LLC, a Colorado business entity, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Hans HUMMEL; Kim Hummel; Jon Budish; Fort Collins Bible Church; and Matt Homolka, Bob Herd, Dick Berg, Dan Stowell, and David Bischoff, individually and as members of the Board of Directors of the Fort Collins Bible Church, a Colorado entity, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 04CA0960.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. A.

July 28, 2005.

Rehearing Denied October 13, 2005.

Certiorari Denied September 11, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

G. William Beardslee, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Dwyer, Ringenberg and Funk, P.C., James E. Ringenberg, Richard D. Beller, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees.

DAVIDSON, Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs, Richard Seefried, James Seefried, and Colorado Digital Systems, LLC (CDS), appeal from the trial court's judgment partially dismissing their complaint against defendants, Hans Hummel, Kim Hummel, John Budish, Fort Collins Bible Church (the church), and Matt Homolka, Bob Herd, Dick Berg, Dan Stowell, and David Bischoff, individually and as members of the board of directors of the church. We dismiss the appeal in part and otherwise affirm.

It is undisputed that plaintiffs Richard and James Seefried were employed with the church, respectively, as senior pastor and associate pastor. It is also undisputed that James Seefried owns CDS and previously had hired defendants Hans Hummel, Kim Hummel, and John Budish, who were all church members, to work there. The first amended complaint alleges that these defendants "engaged in certain activities, which resulted in their cessation as employees [with CDS]." That dispute subsequently became "an issue within the [church]." The parties agree that, after several church meetings, the church terminated Richard Seefried's employment, although it is unclear whether, at that time, James Seefried had already resigned as associate pastor. The complaint alleges that the church and its board of directors unlawfully discharged Richard Seefried as pastor based on this "secular non-church issue."

The complaint sets forth three claims for relief. The first claim alleges that defendants Hans Hummel, Kim Hummel, and John Budish made a series of "slanderous, libelous, false, fraudulent, and defamatory" statements to third persons concerning plaintiffs CDS and James Seefried. The third claim alleges that defendants wrongly refused to pay Richard Seefried's severance and health care benefits following his termination.

It is plaintiffs' second claim that is at issue here. In this claim, plaintiffs allege that Richard Seefried had been employed with the church subject to an "express indefinite contract" that contained "reciprocal duties of good faith and fair dealing." They further allege that, in violation of the church's constitution and its contract of employment with Richard Seefried, the church and the board arranged a "public meeting" with its members to discuss apparent discomfort with him as their pastor. Plaintiffs claim that, in violation of internal church procedure and its contract with Richard Seefried, all defendants participated in the meeting, signed petitions, or made false, slanderous, or libelous statements against plaintiffs, and that Richard Seefried was unlawfully terminated as a result of this meeting. Plaintiffs claim that as a consequence, all defendants are liable for "slander, libel, the intentional interference with business relationships, and outrageous conduct" for the statements made during this meeting.

Attached as an exhibit to the complaint is a transcript of the church meeting at which the alleged defamatory statements were made, and defendants do not dispute its accuracy. Defendants also do not dispute that the church meeting was held to discuss concerns about the pastor, that the statements were made, that a petition seeking removal of Richard Seefried was signed and submitted to the board, and that Richard Seefried was terminated as a result of the church meeting.

Defendants filed motions to dismiss all of plaintiffs' claims pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court granted the motion in part, dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction plaintiffs' defamation and related claims based on the statements published at the church meeting. The court also dismissed without prejudice the fraud claim set forth in the first claim for relief pursuant to C.R.C.P. 9(b).

The trial court granted C.R.C.P. 54(b) certification, and plaintiffs appeal.

I.

As an initial matter, we do not address plaintiffs' argument that the trial court erred by granting defendants' motion for a more definite statement on plaintiffs' claim of fraud. The ruling dismissing the fraud claim was without prejudice and, therefore, did not constitute a final judgment. See Pham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 70 P.3d 567, 571 (Colo.App.2003) (trial court's dismissal of an action without prejudice generally does not constitute a final judgment for purposes of appeal). Thus, it is not reviewable on appeal. See C.A.R. 1 (subject to exceptions not relevant here, appeal may be prosecuted only from final judgment or order); People v. People in Interest of G.L.T., 177 Colo. 196, 493 P.2d 20 (1972). To the extent the trial court intended its C.R.C.P. 54(b) certification to apply to this claim, we are not bound by that determination. See Pub. Serv. Co. v. Linnebur, 687 P.2d 506, 508 (Colo.App.1984) (trial court's C.R.C.P. 54(b) certification is not binding on appellate court), aff'd, 716 P.2d 1120 (Colo.1986).

This portion of the appeal is dismissed. However, because the issue may arise on remand, we note that in their briefs on appeal, plaintiffs asserted that they did not intend to allege a fraud claim against defendants.

II.

We do not agree with plaintiffs' threshold contention that the trial court improperly determined the issue of subject matter jurisdiction without an evidentiary hearing.

C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) permits a trial court to make its own factual findings in determining subject matter jurisdiction, and to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve any factual dispute upon which the existence of jurisdiction may turn. Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 452 (Colo.2001). However, where the matter can be resolved on undisputed facts, as here, a hearing is unnecessary. See Podboy v. Fraternal Order of Police, Denver Sheriff Lodge 27, 94 P.3d 1226, 1229 (Colo. App.2004) ("If all relevant evidence is presented to the trial court and the underlying facts are undisputed, the trial court may decide the jurisdictional issue as a matter of law without conducting an evidentiary hearing."); cf. Werth v. Heritage Int'l Holdings, PTO, 70 P.3d 627, 629 (Colo.App.2003) (trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve contested issues of fact when a court's jurisdiction is challenged under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1)).

We review the trial court's C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) determination, based on undisputed facts, de novo. See Medina v. State, supra, 35 P.3d at 452 ("If all relevant evidence is presented to the trial court, and the underlying facts are undisputed, the trial court may decide the jurisdictional issue as a matter of law, in which case appellate review is de novo").

III.

As relevant here, the court determined that the statements which gave rise to plaintiffs' claims were issued within the "constitutionally protected context" of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution because they occurred during a church meeting that concerned the "investigation, discipline and discharge of Richard and James Seefried." The court, consequently, declined to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. Plaintiffs contend that this was error as a matter of law. We agree with the trial court.

In certain circumstances, the First Amendment precludes a court from exercising jurisdiction over claims concerning a religious institution's activities on matters of religious doctrine or authority. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976) (court lacks jurisdiction to investigate whether internal regulatory proceedings of the church were procedurally or substantively defective); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 154, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952) ("religious organizations [have] an independence from secular control or manipulation, in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine"). The Colorado Supreme Court has recognized that courts have no authority to determine claims which directly concern a church's choice of minister. Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122 (Colo. 1996) (court lacked jurisdiction over claims brought by a former minister against a church arising out of the church's decision not to employ the minister).

In Van Osdol, the plaintiff minister was terminated by the defendant church and, subsequently, filed a complaint, alleging, as relevant here, claims of illegal retaliation in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, et seq., intentional interference with contract, interference with prospective economic advantage, and breach of fiduciary duty. The supreme court found that each claim, if addressed, would require the court to examine the reasoning behind the church's choice of minister. Van Osdol v. Vogt, supra, 908 P.2d at 1127 n. 8. The court then determined that the decision to hire or discharge a minister is purely ecclesiastical, is inextricable from religious doctrine, and "is an expression of the beliefs of the church and the `embodiment' of the religion." Van Osdol v. Vogt, supra, 908 P.2d at 1128, 1132; see...