Seeley v. State
| Decision Date | 18 December 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 48S00-8812-CR-1010,48S00-8812-CR-1010 |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
| Parties | Jerry SEELEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender and Laurel A. Elliott, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. and Jane A. Morrison, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
In June of 1982, appellant entered into a written plea agreement wherein he pled guilty to Attempted Rape, a Class B felony, Criminal Recklessness, a Class A felony, and Resisting Law Enforcement, a Class D felony. After a hearing on his plea, he was sentenced to twenty (20) years imprisonment. In August of 1983, appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief which, after a hearing, was granted, and a new trial was ordered.
In August of 1985, a jury trial was conducted and appellant was convicted of Attempted Rape, a Class B felony, and Resisting Law Enforcement, a Class D felony. The trial court entered a sentence of ten (10) years enhanced by ten (10) years by reason of aggravating circumstances, as to the attempted rape charge, and a sentence of two (2) years on the resisting law enforcement charge, sentences to run concurrently. In April of 1988, appellant filed his belated motion to correct error, which was overruled, giving rise to this appeal.
The facts are: Shortly after 9:00 a.m. on April 16, 1982, the victim was awakened by the ringing of her doorbell. She put on a bathrobe and answered the door. Appellant represented that he was an insurance salesman and that he was looking for one William Carpenter. The victim advised him that she did not know any William Carpenter, whereupon appellant asked to use her telephone to try to locate the man.
The victim allowed appellant to enter her kitchen for that purpose and in fact attempted to aid him in looking through the telephone book. The victim called the post office to determine, without success, whether a William Carpenter lived in the Markleville mailing area. Appellant continued to look through the telephone book to the point where the victim suggested that he leave and try some other method to locate the man. However, appellant insisted on staying, whereupon the victim went to her bedroom to change into her clothing.
While in the bedroom, she became disturbed because she no longer heard appellant in the kitchen. When she looked out the bedroom door, she saw appellant coming toward her with his pants unzipped. In an obscene manner, he indicated to her he wished to have sexual intercourse. He placed his hand on her and pushed her toward the bed.
The victim ran into an adjoining bathroom and attempted to lock the door. However, appellant shoved his way inside. Then the victim began to scream out the bathroom window for help. However, appellant knocked her to the floor and covered her mouth with his hand. He then began fumbling with the buttons on her bathrobe but stopped when she lost control of her bladder. Appellant then left and the victim was able to observe his automobile.
When the victim attempted to call for help, she discovered that the receiver had been torn from the telephone. It was later found among some bottles in the garage. The victim dressed and drove to a neighbor's house where she telephoned the sheriff's department. From her description of the vehicle, the police were able to intercept appellant on the highway. Three officers were involved in the pursuit of appellant's vehicle. After a high-speed chase during which appellant damaged one of the police vehicles, he was apprehended.
Appellant claims the trial court committed fundamental error by failing to adequately instruct the jury that the prerequisite culpability requirement of the offense of attempted rape applies to the crime attempted and not to the substantial step which constitutes the attempt. The trial court instructed the jury concerning the definition of rape as set out in Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-4-1. He also instructed the jury as to the crime of attempt as set forth in Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-5-1.
Appellant relies upon the case of Smith v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 355, wherein this Court reversed a conviction for attempted murder. This Court held that the instructions in that case failed to include the essential element of the offense, namely, that the defendant must have had the specific intent to commit murder in order to be found guilty of attempted murder. However, in Santana v. State (1986), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 1010, this Court distinguished Smith, over the dissent of its author justice, pointing out that the error in the Smith instruction dealt with the second portion of the instruction which focused on the proscribed conduct and not the proscribed result, whereas in Santana the jury was properly instructed on that point.
In the case at bar, the instructions are more complete than the instruction in Smith. The court gave a complete and accurate instruction as to the definition of the crime of rape. He then gave a complete instruction of the definition of the crime of attempt to commit rape. He also gave an instruction defining "knowingly" and "intentionally" and further instructed the jury that they were to consider the instructions as a whole.
In Clemons v. State (1981), Ind., 424 N.E.2d 113, this Court held that a trial court's instructions, taken as a whole, adequately covered the definition of attempted murder where an...
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Bufkin v. State
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